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CHAPTER ONE
RATIONALITY, BELIEF, AND FAITH
Job
The ancient Hebrew epic poem Job, written perhaps in the tenth century
BCE, tells of Job's suffering and lamentations during the testing of his faith.1
Early in the story, Job loses assets, family members, and his own health.2 As the
plot unfolds, Job exchanges several verbal volleys with three of his friends, each
of whom attempts to explain why God would allow such devastation to befall
Job.3 Yet none gives an answer that Job finds satisfactory. Job expresses the
locus of his frustration with the explanations of his friends.
Surely there is a mine for silver,
and a place where gold is refined.
Iron is taken from the ground,
and rock is poured out as copper.
Man puts an end to the darkness;
he searches the farthest recesses
for the ore in the deepest darkness.
Far from where people live he sinks a shaft
in places travelers have long forgotten,
far from other people he dangles and sways....
He has cut out channels through the rocks;
1

For possible dates, and the myriad complications in accurately dating the book of Job, see
Norman C. Habel's The Book of Job, 40-42.
Job 1:13-2:10. All biblical quotations are from the New English Translation (NET) Bible, 1 st
Edition.
2

3

Elihu, the fourth friend, has not yet appeared by chapter 28. Elihu's first speech is in chapter 32.

1

2
his eyes have spotted every precious thing.
He has searched the sources of the rivers
and what was hidden he has brought into the light.
But wisdom—where can it be found?
Where is the place of understanding?
Mankind does not know its place;
it cannot be found in the land of the living.4
Mining is Job's chosen image of seeking what is precious. In this poem he
lists several techniques for locating and extracting precious gems and minerals.
Look at the extent, says Job, to which humankind has developed a technology
for finding hidden things of value. Yet wisdom and understanding, whose value is
immeasurable, remain elusive. Job wants insight into his present circumstances.
When God speaks to Job, enlightenment is not on the agenda.5
To the fideist, Job may be seen as a sort of epic hero.6 Here is the fideist's
take on the story: Job confronts the quandary of understanding the divine.
Humankind, notes Job in his rumination on mining, has made laudable progress
in the realms of science and industry. Much has been learned, much has been
gained. But when confronting the problems of a divine nature, human capabilities
have fallen short. There is a lacuna, a mandatory lacuna, that cannot be bridged

4

Job 28:1-4, 12-13.

5

Steven M. Cahn points out that the odd thing about the story is that the reader does have insight
into the reason for Job's suffering—the explanation is found in Job 1 (Cahn 2006, 31-33). The
point of Job, argues Cahn, clearly is not that humans cannot understand God's motivations, for
we are told his motivations.
6

For more on Job as an epic hero in the tradition of Sumerian, Hebrew, and Babylonian folklore,
see Habel 1985, 35-40.

3
7

by human understanding. The fideist extracts the following moral from the story
of Job: The solution is to overcome this limitation with faith. One has faith in God,
or at least faith that certain propositions about God obtain. And this faith
overcomes any shortage of evidence or reasons.
Viewed correctly, the Job poem is not exactly an endorsement of or an
argument for fideism. Job and the fideist are after two very different things. Job is
not interested in the justificatory status of propositions such as “there is a God.”
He is not investigating whether non-propositional belief content is adequate to
support religious beliefs. Neither is he questioning the existence of God or the
soundness of certain religious doctrines. Rather, he is inquiring into the
motivations behind God's actions.8 The fideist, on the other hand, is interested in
precisely those places where human reason runs up against religious beliefs and
finds itself at an explanatory impasse. And the fideist's answer is that, in at least
some cases, “having faith” can forge the link between our limited cognitive
capacities and the truths we seek so desperately to grasp. But is the fideist
correct in this assertion? Can one remain rational, yet hold a position “by faith”?
And what exactly is meant by “having faith”?

7

Lev Shestov argues this in his essay “The Theory of Knowledge,” in which he alludes numerous
times to Job (Shestov 1966b). Job, for him, represents the man who has correctly forsaken the
quest for knowledge, and has embraced incommunicable truth via faith (cf. Mai Neto 1995, 98,
Evans 1998, 133-134, and Monas 1966, xiv).
8

Even if the message here is that Job should have (more) faith in God, this does not immediately
conceded the point to the fideist. C. Stephen Evans suggests that the Biblical accounts of faith
should be understood as something different than the fideist account suggests (Evans 1998, 4-7).
Faith, in the present context, seems to be fiducial, not belief-oriented.
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Introduction
The focus of this dissertation is a theory, typically offered in a religious
context, that certain propositions can be held (and in some cases ought or even
must be held) by faith without regard for evidence.9 Deriving its name from the
Latin word for faith (fides), this theory is called fideism. Just as it is not possible
to talk of metaphysical dualism, moral deontology, or epistemic externalism as
unified theories, fideism is not so much a single theory as a family of related
theories—related in the sense that all focus on the important role of faith, and the
unimportance of evidence, in accepting a particular religious position.10 Nowhere
does this appear more clearly than by taking a glance at the variety of ways in
which theorists have attempted to capture the essence of fideism in a sentence
or two.
• Speaking of the possibility of religious knowledge, Pierre Bayle makes the
famous remark that, “The powers of reason and philosophical examination
go no further than to keep us in suspense and in fear of error, whether we

9

Some fideists offer fideism as a solution to evidential ambiguity or insufficiency, while others
take a stronger stance and suggest that evidence ought to be disregarded when it comes to faith
propositions. Thus, “without regard” is not intended to suggest strictly that evidence is ignored,
but only that evidence is not a determining factor for the fideist. I revisit this point at the end of the
chapter, after sufficient groundwork has been provided.
10

Here I use the term acceptance loosely. Clarifications of this and other related terms are made
throughout this chapter.

5
affirm or whether we deny.”

11

Bayle suggests that the “grace of God or

childhood education” must fill in where reason falls short.12
• Barbara Sher Tinsley attempts to capture Bayle's fideism with this quip:
“[H]e insisted that, in the last analysis, faith had to be accepted by faith, and
could not be proved by reason.”13
• Michel de Montaigne offers his own succinct statement of the fideist
position, saying that “Christians wrong themselves in desiring to support
their belief by human reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a
special inspiration of divine favour.”14
• Richard H. Popkin offers this as an historical observation: “Fideism is the
thesis that religious belief is based on faith and not either evidence or
reasoning.”15
• Terence Penelhum defines fideism as the “insistence that faith needs no
justification from reason, but is the judge of reason and its pretensions.”16

11

Bayle 1999, 21.

12

Ibid.

13

Tinsley 2001, 21. Later in the chapter I examine various models of faith.

14

Montaigne 1999, 162.

15

Popkin 2000, 200.

16

Pebnelhum 1983, 1.
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• In a similar vein, C. Stephen Evans calls fideism the idea that “faith should
not be governed or regulated by reason, where reason is understood to be
an autonomous, relatively competent human faculty.”17
• Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli offer this definition in their Handbook of
Christian Apologetics: “Fideism contends that the only knowledge, or at
least the only certain knowledge, we can have is by faith.”18
• Drawing on Luther's rally cry of “Faith alone,” John R. Shook characterizes
fideism as the “contrary principle” that “where one cannot know, one should
faithfully believe, at least where Christianity is concerned.”19
• John Bishop, defending a form of fideism markedly different from those
above, provides his own generic characterization: “[P]eople may be justified
in holding and acting on religious beliefs even though those beliefs lack
sufficient evidential support, whether direct or inferential.”20. Bishop explains
his own fideism as the thesis that doxastic or sub-doxastic faith ventures are
sometimes morally and epistemically permissible.21
Beginning from such characterizations, what conclusions can be drawn about
“fideism in general”? All of these characterizations deal with doxastic or sub17

Evans 1998, 9.

18

Kreeft and Tacelli 1994, 35.

19

Shook 2010, 20.

20

Bishop 2007, 2.

21

Ibid., 22. More will be said on doxastic and sub-doxastic faith ventures in the section on Faith in
this chapter.
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doxastic states—usually belief.

22

And they likewise rely on a notion of faith. As

we shall see, though, these accounts have nuanced views of faith. Some of the
characterizations above seem to focus broadly on reason and rationality in
general, while others take an epistemic tenor. Some of these characterizations
make surprisingly strong claims. The only certain knowledge we can have is by
faith? Others are more tempered. Bishop, for example, offers fideism as a
solution in cases where evidence is insufficient. The relative strength of these
claims not withstanding, all of these fideists (Bayle included, though the quote
doesn’t make this evident) offer faith as a remedy for a purported inadequacy in
(epistemic) rationality.23 Rationality (epistemic and otherwise), belief, and faith
are all topics in need of some clarification before we can meaningfully and
consistently discuss them, and this chapter deals with all three topics.
Just as dualism, deontology, and externalism have general tenets shared
among adherents, so too does fideism. One such claim is that propositions that
are important—propositions that serve as framing principles—can be held or
taken fideistically.24 The classic example of fideism illustrates this: By faith, one

22

This assumes that faith has a doxastic component. This question is covered more in the
section on Faith in this chapter.
23

All seem to suggest problems with epistemic rationality. Not all suggest, though, broad issues
with rationality in general. This point is discussed further in the section on rationality later in this
chapter.
24

A framing principle is a high-order principle providing support for a broad array of other beliefs.
Bishop (2007, 2010) uses this term to describe foundational religious propositions. As the name
implies, framing principles are propositional in nature. Both framing principles and nonpropositional content will be discussed later in the chapter as well as in chapter 3.

8
may hold that God exists. Many prominent fideists, from Montaigne and Bayle to
contemporary fideists such as Stephen Evans and John Bishop, have sought to
defend variations of the claim that certain propositions can (and perhaps even
ought to) be accepted by faith.25 And in the theories elaborated by these and
other fideists, the acceptance of such a proposition plays an important role in
reasoning. Does fideism (in any of its forms) offer a compelling theory that a
rational agent ought to, or even can, accept? Can one remain rational while also
being a fideist? Is fideism, as its proponents suggest, the best contender for
answering questions about religious propositions?
Overview
In this dissertation I argue that fideism is not the best theory for accepting a
particular position (religious or otherwise). It does not offer the best explanation
about how one ought to hold important propositions while maintaining a
commitment to rationality. Thus, I argue, a person concerned with holding
epistemically rational beliefs ought not accept fideism. Further, I argue that the
Kantian move of accepting a proposition on moral (or prudential) grounds does
not make fideism the best rational position, all things considered. Instead, I argue
that propositions, including the sort of propositions touted by fideists as
candidates for fideistic support, are best held by evidential support.

25

Again, acceptance here is used loosely. The “ought” here implies an ethics of belief, but that
subject will not be broached until the discussion of rationality later in this chapter.

9
The argument proceeds as follows. In what remains of this chapter, I
examine several key notions relevant to our examination. I discuss a model of
rationality, following the traditional distinction of moral, prudential, and epistemic
rationality. I also discuss a strategy for addressing so-called “rational conflict”
wherein different types of rationality seem to be in conflict. Given the centrality of
belief to the topic, I suggest a particular notion of belief, and then address
concerns about doxastic voluntarism. I also examine the common distinction
between faith in and faith that. From there, I turn to faith, examining several
models. The important concept of (epistemic) entitlement arises during the
examination of models of faith, and I point out how that pertains to fideist
theories. I conclude the chapter with a general account of fideism, in light of what
has been said about rationality, belief, faith, and entitlement.
In the second chapter I examine C. Stephen Evans’s “responsible fideism,”
which claims that individuals can claim to know certain propositions by faith.
Evans provides an epistemological theory purporting to link a notion of defeasibly
held faith propositions to Plantinga’s notion of “properly basic beliefs” and arrive
at the claim that fideist believers attain knowledge. This, claims Evans, stands
against evidentialist notions of justification, which, on his account, fail to provide
grounds for believing certain faith-oriented propositions. Against this theory, I
argue that the Evans has confused several epistemic notions, and that while he
has done well in showing the limits of reason, he ultimately points the way toward
evidentialism, not away from it. Several problems arise in Evans’s account,

10
largely stemming from Evans’s treatment of epistemic reason as untrustworthy
while faith remains a proper guide. In the second chapter, I explore some of the
problems.
In the third chapter, I turn from epistemologically oriented theories to
moral/prudential fideism. This fideism, finding its roots in Kant and James,
suggests that it is rational for humans to hold certain beliefs on moral or
prudential grounds (in absence of, or even contrary to evidence), and that such
beliefs may also play the foundational role of “framing beliefs” in one’s overall
belief system. John Bishop has recently provided a sustained defense of this
position, and it is on his work that I focus. I argue that Bishop’s account relies
upon a notion of evidential ambiguity that is flawed in crucial ways. Further, I
suggest that the venture model of faith does not best address the concerns of the
religious seeker committed to epistemic rationality. Finally, I examine to what
extent Bishop’s model addresses the rational goals of an agent, asking whether
or not fideism is the most rational approach (all things considered).
I close the dissertation in the fourth chapter where I suggest that
evidentialism remains a better candidate for supporting religious beliefs. I begin
by returning to fideism’s inability to address the concerns of the skeptic. From
there, I sketch a theory of evidentialism that addresses the concerns raised by
Evans and Bishop. I also return to the “evidential ambiguity” hypothesis of
Bishop, suggesting that with a better notion of evidence, evidentialism does not
suffer from the problems identified by Bishop. This leads to a notion of evidence

11
more robust than the ones offered by Evans and Bishop. Building a broadly
abductive argument, I claim that fideism faces critical challenges when
confronting the goals of a rational agent. Instead, evidentialism becomes the
more compelling theory.
Rationality
Why is there a theory of fideism? What problem does fideism purport to
solve? Fideism is positioned as a solution to a problem of epistemic justification.
Particular beliefs—notoriously, particular religious beliefs—seem to be resistant
to traditional epistemic justification.26 This resistance seems to be either a result
of certain explanatory gaps or of evidential ambiguity or insufficiency. Either it is
unclear how such beliefs could be justified or, given epistemic norms, it is unclear
that the beliefs are (or can be) justified.
Does this lacuna suggest that one ought not believe, or ought to suspend
judgment? In at least some cases, the fideist suggests otherwise: One can
(ought to?) accept certain propositions, evidence (or lack thereof)
notwithstanding.27 One need not suspend judgment on important matters (e.g.
the existence of God) merely because of an explanatory or evidential gap.
Instead, the fideist proposes that we look elsewhere—somewhere other than

26

27

Penelhum 1989, 1.

Note that here we must transition from “believing” to “accepting propositions” because not all
fideists suggest that belief is the correct response. Some, like Bishop (2007, 2010) and F.R.
Tennant (1989), suggest taking a proposition to be true (without necessarily believing it). Later in
the chapter, I replace “acceptance” with more suitable notions of belief, assent, holding, and
taking (to be true).

12
traditional epistemic justification—for a reason to accept such propositions. As
we shall see, the fideist contends that in at least some circumstances, one ought
to (or at east may) hold a proposition by faith.28
(For the moment, I use the term accept to mean assenting to proposition P
at time t. This does not necessarily entail a long-term disposition toward P, and
consequently does not entail belief. These notions will be refined later in the
chapter.)
It is sometimes held that fideism is a variety of irrationalism, but the
existence of well-developed theories of fideism, often held by people claiming to
not be irrationalists, suggests that merely dismissing fideism as such is
unwarranted.29 It seems that fideism’s raison d’etre is to show that one might
accept certain unsupported propositions, yet do so in a generally rational way. 30
That is, most fideists do not seem to take an “anything goes” attitude when it
comes to evaluating and accepting propositions.
But how could believing against evidence (or when acknowledging the
insufficiency of evidence) ever be rational? One answer grants such beliefs a
certain degree of irrationality while also suggesting that the position is, on the
28

Some varieties of fideism emphasizes faith in something, while others emphasize faith that. I
return to this distinction in the section on Faith below.
29

cf. Evans 1998, chapters 1 and 2. Evans spends much time examining the claims about fideism
and irrationalism.
30

I use the term “unsupported propositions” to include both propositions that do not have
sufficient (epistemic) support and propositions which are purported to not need or be capable of
support. In this way, I intend to capture the claims of a wide variety of fideists. Also, a notion of
rationality will be sketched later in this chapter.
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whole, still rational. It might be epistemically irrational to believe an unsupported
proposition—particularly one of importance, as religious propositions seem to be.
But this does not rule out the possibility that, all things considered, accepting the
proposition is generally rational.31 In that sense, fideism may turn out to be a
rational theory even while eschewing the application of traditional notions of
epistemic justification to a certain class of propositions.
To suggest such a line of argument, though, one must also suggest an
appropriate model of rationality.
A Model of Rationality
For our line of questioning, the rationality of (accepting) a belief is of deep
concern. And the present focus on religious beliefs makes this point even more
salient, as the rationality of religious belief is a popular topic in philosophy of
religion.32 The varieties of fideism considered in this work are those that maintain,
either explicitly or implicitly, that fideism is a rational position.33
A common approach in contemporary philosophy is to recognize at least
three distinct kinds of rationality: epistemic, prudential, and moral rationality. 34
31

For a sustained discussion of rationality as a broad notion, and epistemic rationality as a more
specific concept, see Foley 1993 or Foley 2002.
32

For a broad example, Paul Helm’s Faith and Reason (1999) is an anthology of both historical
and contemporary perspectives on faith and reason.
33

34

Evans’s “supra-rational” fideism maintains a commitment to rationality. Evans, 1998.

The model of rationality proposed here is derived largely from Moser 1985, particularly
chapters I and VI, as well as from Foley 2002 and Foley 1993. Moser follows the tripartite division
here (though he does so qualifying that there are or may be other types of rationality). Foley
distinguishes primarily between epistemic and prudential, but also discusses moral and
economical rationality.
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Epistemic rationality has to do with truth. If S is epistemically rational, S has
preferences best served by acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.35
Moral rationality is concerned with whether a belief is moral. S is morally rational
only if S has preferences best served by acquiring morally advantageous beliefs.
Prudential rationality is concerned with whether having a particular belief is in an
individual’s best interest. If S is prudentially rational, S has a preference best
served by acquiring beliefs supporting S’s well-being. Such beliefs would be
prudentially advantageous beliefs. It is not necessary that a given belief be
morally, prudentially, and epistemically rational at once for a given individual. P
may be epistemically rational while being morally and prudentially neutral. Or on
occasion, rational conflicts may arise. It may seem epistemically rational to hold
B, while seeming morally rational to hold not-B. The account sketched below
addresses this possibility.
Evaluating the rationality of belief requires a general notion of justification. A
basic characterization of justification suggests that S is justified in holding a belief
B when B correctly relates to a relevant end for S.36 An account of justification,
then, is an account of what it means for B to correctly relate to a given end. This
characterization is worked out differently in each of the three domains introduced
above.

35

This is a rough sketch. A more complete statement would include preferences for important
epistemic propositions over against less important propositions. See Moser 1985, 214.
36

Moser 1985, 1. Foley’s characterization of justification is different than this (Foley 2002, 196).
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In epistemology, justification can be explained as S’s having sufficient
undefeated evidence in support of a proposition.37 If S has sufficient evidence for
P (in the absence of undefeated defeaters), then S is epistemically justified in
believing that P.38 Of critical importance, here, the evidence we speak of is
evidence that indicates the truth of P.39 In this sense, it is epistemically oriented.
Phrased according to our previous characterization of justification, we can say
that sufficient undefeated evidence in support of B correctly relates one’s belief
that B to the epistemic end of acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.40
This can be contrasted with moral justification.
S is morally justified in holding belief B when it is right or good for S to
believe B. When S’s belief B is morally advantageous—promoting S’s moral
goodness—then S is morally justified in holding B.41 In contrast to epistemic
justification, no truth requirement is immediately necessary when explaining
37

This is in no way a full treatment of epistemic justification. It is just an introductory sketch.
Likewise, my explanations of moral and prudential justification are merely sketches. In chapter 4 I
offer a more detailed characterization of epistemic justification.
38

This is by no means an analysis of justification. It is a rough sketch intending to capture the
basic idea of evidentialism. For more complete formulations of evidential notions of justification,
see Moser 1989 and Conee and Feldman 2004a. Again, justification is treated in more detail in
the fourth chapter.
39

As I have here defined justification, it is clearly an internalist, evidentialist approach. Many
contemporary epistemologies would take issue with my characterization of justification as
internal. However, as will become clear in the section on faith, the internalist construal of
justification is clearly the most pertinent when it comes to fideism. In the next chapter I discuss an
externalist theory of justification, showing how one theory of fideism attempts to leverage it. In the
final chapter, I discuss internalist justification and evidence in more detail.
40

Reasons, in this epistemic sense, are alethic, while this is not the case for moral or prudential
reasons. cf. Moser 1989, 44.
41

B may promote S’s goodness by helping him act rightly or by developing S’s (moral) character.
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moral justification, as it is goodness (not truth) that is the relevant end for moral
rationality.
Finally, S may be prudentially justified in holding a belief B. S is prudentially
justified in believing B when S’s belief promotes S’s own well-being. In his
discussion of prudential obligation, Paul K. Moser characterizes the scope of
prudential interests as follows: “Among our most valued prudential interests
are… the interests to have psychological, physiological, social, and financial wellbeing.”42 These are interests of the non-moral, non-epistemic variety. To say that
S has adequate prudential reasons for believing B is to say that believing B is
most conducive to S’s well-being (compared to the options of not believing B and
withholding judgment on B).
These are three forms of justification. Satisfaction of a justification condition
indicates that it is rationally permissible for S to hold B. Notice, however, that
there is nothing above that tells us whether one ought to hold justified beliefs.
Questions about obligation are typically captured under the heading of the ethics
of belief.
Just as we sketched three types of justification above, I will sketch three
types of obligation here: Epistemic, moral, and prudential.43 Epistemic concerns
are concerns over the truth of a belief. Thus, when we talk of epistemic
obligations, we are talking about one’s obligation to both maximize one’s true
42
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One’s moral obligation, in contrast, is

to hold beliefs that, on balance, are morally advantageous to the denial (or
suspension of judgment) of such beliefs. That is, one morally ought to hold the
beliefs most likely to be morally conducive. And a similar description can be
given of prudential obligation: S is prudentially obligated to believe P when S’s
belief that P is better suited to S’s wellbeing than the denial of or suspension of
judgment regarding P.
For each of our types of rationality, we now have a sense of being justified
in a belief, and also a sense of being obligated to believe. Before looking at
broader questions of rationality in general, it also makes sense to talk about what
it means, for each of these three types of reasoning, to rationally seek to fulfill
these obligations.
For S to be rational in fulfilling these obligations, S must have “a preference
whose satisfaction is evidently best provided for by his fulfilling his relevant
epistemic, moral, or prudential obligation. For it is a preference of this sort that
typically makes such obligations rational obligations for S.”45 Rationality, in this
case, is pragmatic in the sense that it reflects the agent’s commitment to
preference—an epistemic preference for accumulating true (and only true)
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beliefs, a moral preference toward beliefs conducive to goodness, and a
prudential preference toward beliefs that foster one’s well-being. Given this, one
is acting irrationally only if one does not have a preference best satisfied by these
obligations.46
In this sense, the radical fideist Lev Shestov is indeed (as he claims) an
epistemic irrationalist, for he eschews the very foundations of epistemic
obligation:
Then, then―and this is most important of all―you will at last be
convinced that truth does not depend on logic, that there are no logical
truths at all, that you therefore have the right to search for what you
like, how you like, without argument, and that if something results from
your search, it will not be a formula, not a law, not a principle, not even
an idea!47
Shestov refuses, in this quote, to countenance any proffered normative
epistemology.48 Since Shestov is not interested in fulfilling any epistemic
obligation, failing to see it as meeting his epistemic objectives, he seems clearly
to be an irrationalist at least in the realm of epistemic reasoning. Shestov’s
epistemic irrationalist does not, by that fact, make him a moral or prudential
irrationalist as well. From our definitions above, it would be possible for Shestov
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to hold a belief on moral grounds, and do so rationally, for the requirement for
moral rationality does not presuppose that an agent is epistemically rational.
So far I have sketched an account of rationality for each of the three kinds of
rationality discussed: epistemic, moral, and prudential. The difficulty with such an
account of rationality is that it does not, as it stands, provide a method for
resolving problems where rational conclusions conflict. For example, it is
perfectly conceivable that for some person S it is morally rational to hold that P,
while it is prudentially rational to hold that not-P. And we need not restrict the
possibilities to a dilemma, but a trilemma can also arise. It may be morally
rational to believe P, prudentially rational to believe not-P, and epistemically
rational to suspend judgment on P.
As we shall see over the course of the dissertation, this particular issue is
pertinent to the question of fideism, where one may claim that whereas epistemic
rationality suggests suspension of judgment regarding a faith-proposition, moral
rationality suggests that one ought to accept that same faith-proposition.49 How
can such problems be addressed? One approach is to claim that one particular
form of rationality (e.g. moral rationality) should always be considered most
important.50 Such an account of rationality puts external conditions on an agent’s
rationality. The account offered here, though, suggests a person-relative solution
49
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to the problem: Instead of assigning (by fiat) a precedence to the different forms
of rationality, we can instead suggest that the individual’s preferences may
determine the resolution of a rational conflict.51
Such a solution can be found in an account of a broader form of rationality.
Moser provides such an account in Empirical Justification, and I offer here an
abbreviated account of what he terms “All Things Considered” (ATC) rationality. 52
Moser suggests that when a rational conflict arises, one may ask what is best for
one, all things considered. On this account, one ought to be able to decide (at
that time, given the context) on a superior preference—a preference favoring one
type of rationality over the others. Clarifying this, Moser says:
Let us understand a preference to be a desire related either to a goal or
a means to a goal. Thus, let us say that S prefers, for instance, to
resolve a rational conflict by fulfilling [epistemic obligation] Oe rather
than [moral obligation] Om if and only if S desires to fulfill Oe rather than
Om. S’s desiring to fulfill Oe rather than Om, as I understand it, is just
S’s desiring to make true the proposition that he will fulfill O e rather
than Om.53
Essentially, ATC rationality requires that the agent have preferences in cases
where rational conflict arises. As Moser develops his account of ATC rationality,
he provides this concluding description of what it means for one to be ATC
rational:
51
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In a case of rational conflict of any sort, S has an ATC rational
obligation to fulfill a particular obligation, Oi, if and only if (i) the
fulfillment of Oi is likely (i.e., more likely than not), on S’s total evidence,
to satisfy his superior evaluative preference, which does not depend on
an epistemically unjustified belief of S’s, and (ii) S is capable of coming
to recognize the truth of (i) from reflection on his evidence.
There are a few notes to make on this account. First, a protective clause
stipulates that S be epistemically justified in his or her belief that a particular
obligation is indeed correctly related to his or her chosen superior preference.
Second, a cognizability clause requires that the agent is actually capable of
reflecting on evidence and thereby recognizing the truth. Third, this account
suggests that immoral people—even, perhaps, moral monsters—may in fact be
ATC rational even when engaging in morally irrational acts.54
Later in the dissertation (chapters 3 and 4), we shall see how Bishop
attempts to solve rational conflict by situating one form of rationality (epistemic
rationality) over others. And others have made similar attempts to resolve
conflicts by appeal to one form of rationality as authoritative.55 But what this ATC
account acknowledges is the role of an agent, and that agent’s preferences, in
sorting out rational conflicts in a rational way. By this model, one may opt to act,
say, epistemically rationally but not prudentially rationally at one time, yet at
another opt for the reverse. And it is possible that in both cases the agent may be
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acting generally (ATC) rational. I find such an account to be compelling for this
reason. It avoids a (question-begging) hierarchy of sorts of rationality, and it does
this will granting (or acknowledging) agents a freedom to have and express
preferences.
While my characterization has not been an attempt to provide any sort of
analysis or even a thorough examination of the concept of rationality, I have
provided a sketch that will provide an adequate foundation for the subsequent
discussion of fideism. Pertinently, I have suggested that we observe a difference
between moral, prudential, and epistemic rationality. Following Moser’s
discussion of rationality56, I have suggested notions of justification, obligation and
of rational obligation that provide a model of rational obligation, as well as a basic
distinction between an agent’s acting rationally (in accordance with rational
obligation) and irrationally (against one’s rational obligation). Finally, I have
introduced Moser’s All Things Considered (ATC) approach to resolving rational
conflicts—conflicts an individual faces when one rational obligation comes into
conflict with another such obligation.
I have introduced all of this with a purpose, for fideism is a theory (or a
family of theories) about rationality and belief. It cannot be confined to purely
epistemic construals any more than it can be confined to purely moral or
prudential domains. And for this reason, a theory of general rationality will assist
us in untangling the complexities of various forms of fideism.
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Given an agent who is ATC-rational (that is, who is interested in fulfilling
rational obligations in accordance, when necessary, with a superior rational
preference), we can turn an evaluative lens toward various forms of fideism,
asking which, if any, provide such an agent with the necessary equipment for
judging the rationality of (primarily religious) beliefs. For at the core, what I take
the fideist to be suggesting is that one can continue to hold an ethics of belief
while at the same time having beliefs that are not based upon evidence.
Obligation
The fideist is suggesting that sometimes a proposition P does not have
adequate epistemic support (either because S does not posses sufficient
evidence, or because such a proposition cannot be supported epistemically), yet
in such cases, it is okay for S to believe P. The fideist wants to suggest that P is
still in some way “certified.” Above, I characterized rationality as coming in
different forms, including a general All Things Considered (ATC) rationality. In
this account, I suggest an ethics of belief that requires that if S is interested in
achieving certain goals (epistemic, moral, or prudential), S must abide by certain
obligations.
Is the satisfaction of a rational goals or obligations (either in a specific
sense, as in epistemic rationality, or in the general ATC sense) what the fideist is
after? I think it is fair to answer this question in the affirmative. I think that what
the fideist wants to claim is that S is justified (again, using the broad notion of the
term) in holding B even if S is not epistemically justified in believing B. But it goes
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beyond merely being rational. The fideist seems to also want to be able to use
fideistically held propositions in epistemic context with what Bishop calls “full
epistemic weight.”57
There seem to be several strategies for making such an argument. Some
fideists approach the matter as skeptics about epistemology. They suggest that
we cannot be epistemically justified in holding any beliefs, and suggest a
Pyrrhonian route toward accepting or not accepting religious beliefs.58 Also there
is a group of fideists who claim that while certain faith propositions cannot be
epistemically justified according to traditional means, there remains a sense in
which one can be epistemically rational in holding such beliefs. These I cover in
chapter 2. Finally, some have suggested, following Kant and William James, that
at least in certain cases, when it is morally or prudentially rational to hold a belief,
it may also be admissible in epistemic contexts. In other words, even without
adequate evidence, one might be able to assert that God exists, and thereby
treat this as a “framing principle” in one’s epistemic framework. This is the
subject of chapter 3, where I focus on John Bishop’s account of fideism.
One might claim to be an irrationalist in all regards—opposed to moral
rationality, prudential rationality, and epistemic rationality—yet still claim to hold
certain beliefs fideistically. It is unclear to me what “fideism” would be in such a
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context, for if one’s overarching strategy is “anything goes,” ones beliefs need no
methodological rigor at all. Neither justification nor obligation is necessary.
Consequently, there seems to be no practical role for “fideism” to play. In
contrast, there seems to be a place for non-global forms of irrationalism; for
example, Lev Shestov’s irrationalism seems to be limited to epistemic
irrationalism. Shestov might be construed as interested in achieving moral and
prudential rationalism, but not at all favoring epistemic rationality. Whenever
there is an appearance of a conflict between epistemic and moral rationality, for
example, moral rationality wins out. The details of Shestov’s account may be
bizarre and internally inconsistent, but we can still understand Shestov (at this
high level) as having particular preferences in regards to moral, epistemic, and
prudential questions.
At this point, we can revise the initial characterization of fideism to reflect
two things: first, the fideist does seem to have a commitment to adhering to
general rationality, and second, the fideist is not simply interested in being (ATC)
rational, but also has an epistemic interest. Namely, the fidiest wants to suggest
that, S can hold or take some faith-propositions with full epistemic weight. Next
we will look at a notion of belief.
Belief
While it is not a prima facie logical necessity that fideism apply only to
religious propositions, we have seen already that many avowed fideists are
fideists concerning (primarily) religious propositions. Thus, there is much
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discussion of religious beliefs. Faith, as we shall see shortly, is a notion often
coupled with belief. And already, we have talked about belief in the context of
rationality. In the familiar account of knowledge, one must not only be justified,
but also believe a true proposition before one has knowledge. Thus, it is clear
that belief will be an important notion for the present discussion.
In this section I first discuss belief itself, providing a definition along with a
few crucial clarifications.59 I focus first on belief in the sense of believing that.
Then I turn toward a puzzle about belief that could be particularly vexing to many
accounts of fideism. That is the problem of doxastic voluntarism. Finally, I turn to
the differentiation commonly made between believing that and believing in.
Belief is a state. It is always dispositional, and also sometimes occurrent;
that is, one may be in a long-term doxastic state regarding P, but needn’t always
be actively contemplating P to maintain this state. A belief has content (S
believes (that) C). Of interest to us are propositional beliefs—beliefs whose
content is a truth-bearing statement.60 A belief may also have non-propositional
content, such as the object of belief. Take my belief that there is a table before
me: Obviously, this belief has propositional content (“There is a table before
me”); but there is a second relationship—an aboutness relationship—between
my belief and the table. It does not make sense to say of this latter content that it
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is true or false. Moser uses this detail to distinguish between de dicto and de re
beliefs:
Believing, then, is a dispositional state of a person that is related to a
propositional object. This in short is the state-object view of belief. On
this view a belief has two essential components: a dispositional state
and a propositional object. These two components exist not only in de
dicto belief, where a belief is related only to a propositional object, but
also in a de re belief, where a belief state is related to a
nonpropositional object as well as a propositional object.61
While both de dicto and de re beliefs have propositional content, only the de re
belief has non-propositional content.62 There is a locutional difficulty: We often
speak of “S’s belief.” Is this a reference to the belief itself, the propositional
content, the non-propositional content, or some other variant? In most cases,
when I use this locution I mean the propositional content of one’s belief; when
further specificity is needed, I will make it explicit.
So far I have spoken only of “belief,” and spoken of it as a propositional
attitude. There are three propositional attitudes considered under the heading of
belief: there is belief (doxastic affirmation that P), there is disbelief (doxastic
denial that P), and there is suspension of judgment (withholding doxastic
affirmation regarding P).63 Like belief, I here take disbelief and suspension of
judgment as doxastic dispositions, not necessarily occurrent at any moment. For
the sake of brevity, I use the term belief, but understand disbelief and withholding
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of judgment as having essentially the same characteristics.

64

Disbelief that P is

disbelieving that P, while suspension of judgment that P is neither believing nor
disbelieving P.
In Knowledge and Evidence, Paul K. Moser distinguishes between believing
and merely being disposed to believe, and this distinction provides a few
important details that will be helpful in examining fideism.65 Roughly, to be
disposed to believe is to be in such a state that if given the opportunity to assent
to P, one would indeed assent. This differs from belief, which requires that one
has (in the past or at present) assented to P.66 Assent is the psychological
affirmation of a proposition. As Moser describes it, assent is “one’s sincerely and
understandingly affirming it [the content of the belief].”67 There are a few details
that need to be clarified. First, there are the dual criteria of sincerity and
understanding. Sincerity captures the requirement that the affirmation must be
unfeigned and honest. This is different than, say, affirming as a working
hypothesis, affirming for the sake of argument, or lying. The criterion of
understanding, which I shall not describe in great detail, requires that one’s
64
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affirmation be suitably cognitively grounded. If S does not understand P, one
cannot assent to P. Affirmation that does not meet these two qualifications of
sincerity and understanding does not qualify as assent.
Second, assent needn’t be a conscious decision. One may psychologically
affirm a belief—and thus assent to it—without necessarily being cognitively
aware (that is, conscious) of doing so. But assent is occurrent. One assents,
even unconsciously, at a particular time. Merely assenting to some proposition
does not mean one believes that proposition. While assent is a necessary
condition of belief, assent and belief are not the same. Belief requires a
dispositional element, as well. Assent, being an action, is not dispositional.
Thus on the one hand we have assent; but on the other hand, we have the
disposition to believe. This is not the same as belief; it is the fact about S that if S
was prompted to assent to P, S would assent. One may be disposed to believe
but not yet actually believe:
A person, S, is merely disposed to believe that P at a time, t = df. (i) S
does not believe that P at t, but (ii) S is in a dispositional state at t
whereby he will come to believe that P upon his sincerely and
understandingly answering the question whether it is the case that P.68
Having not yet considered P, one may remain disposed to believe P. While this is
not yet a proper belief, it reflects something about S than cannot otherwise be
accounted for in a more basic belief model: namely, that S has developed
doxastic dispositions to affirm certain propositions (such as, say, arithmetic
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sums), but it need not be said that S has an infinite number of beliefs (one for
each possible sum).
Belief, then, is the combination of a dispositional state and assent (either
consciously or unconsciously). Thus it has both an occurrent (though not
necessarily presently occurrent) component and a long-term dispositional
component.
A person, S, believes a proposition, P, at a time, t, = df. (i) S has
assented to P (consciously or unconsciously) either before t or at t, and
(ii) as a nondeviant result of his assenting to P, S is in a dispositional
state at t whereby he will assent to P in any circumstance where he
sincerely and understandingly answers the question whether it is the
case that P.69
Note again that assent to P can occur either presently or at a previous time
(again, assuming that the belief has been sustained since the time of assent).
The distinction between belief and a disposition to believe sidesteps other
epistemic concerns regarding “beliefs” that are not presently or have never been
occurrent.70 For example, consider the novel proposition P: “the next integer after
9,109,321 is 9,109,322.” Assuming S would understand and agree to the
proposition if presented the proposition at time t, does S believe P at t - 1? A
notion of belief that does not have, for example, the occurrent consent condition
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may lead one to suggest that S holds a potentially infinite set of beliefs (since,
given the example above, we could continue enumerating integers without end).
But given our current model, we need only say one has a disposition to believe.71
While our present focus is not on epistemology or epistemic justification,
there is one thing that should be said here on the matter: While the traditional
account of knowledge focuses on justified true belief, it seems that in at least
some cases, justified true assent (as we have defined assent above) ought also
be considered knowledge.72 This will differ from JTB-knowledge in that belief’s
dispositional nature makes such knowledge dispositional. That is, on our
definition, S’s knowledge that P persists even when S is not occurrently
assenting to P. But in justified true assent (JTA), there is no underlying and
dispositional belief to (speaking loosely) sustain S’s initial assent; to that end,
JTA knowledge is transitory, lasting only when S is occurrently assenting to P.73
In this section I have sketched a notion of belief that will be used throughout
this dissertation. There remain a few clarifications to make regarding belief, the
first of which is to what extent human agents can be said to control their beliefs.
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Fideism
Fideism is concerned either directly or indirectly with belief. Many forms of
fideism (Evans’s included) make claims about S’s believing that (or believing in)
some faith proposition. Others, such as Bishop’s version, distinguish between
one’s believing (holding) P and one’s taking-that P (or taking it to be true that P),
and continue on to claim that it is one’s fideistically taking-that P that matters. Of
course, to distinguish between taking-that and belief, one must have worked out
a notion of belief. Thus regardless of the details, both of these positions are
concerned with belief.
But can we choose what we believe?74 Can one follow the advice of the
radical fideist and believe against all evidence, or decide to ignore evidence? To
what extent does it make sense to admonish one to believe P? One puzzle often
discussed in contemporary epistemology is the problem of doxastic voluntarism.
To what extent, if any, do we have control over our beliefs? Can one directly or
indirectly determine to believe P? Can one even influence one’s belief that P?
If it were to turn out that human agents have no significant doxastic control,
the tenor of this examination of fideism would change markedly. For the
questions would then turn to whether being a fideist is a logical possibility, and
whether one’s being a fideist has implications for an ethics of belief. Only if there
is a meaningful sense in which one can influence one’s own beliefs can we
continue along the proposed line of inquiry. It is important to examine, even if in a
74
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cursory manner, the question of doxastic voluntarism. In an essay entitled “The
Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” William P. Alston argues
that we have no meaningful doxastic control.75 At best we can indirectly influence
(but not control) our beliefs.
Alston suggests four different modes of doxastic control: basic control,
immediate nonbasic control, long-range nonbasic control, and indirect influence.
The basic control thesis suggests that “one can take up at will whatever
propositional attitude one chooses.”76 That is, beliefs—any and all of them—are
under direct volitional control. Alston offers a few thought experiments as
counter-examples of the basic control thesis. For example, “Can you, at this
moment, start to believe that the United States is still a colony of Great
Britain…?”77 Alston also suggests that in cases where there is no meaningful
sense of an alternative to a belief it does not seem right to say that one can
choose to believe, for there is no relevant alternative to be chosen. Thus, for
beliefs that seem prima facie indubitable, it makes no sense to speak of
voluntarism of any sort. Perceptual beliefs are, suggests Alston, one such
example. “Thus, even if I willingly, or not unwillingly, form, for instance,
perceptual beliefs in the way I do, it by no means follows that I form those beliefs
at will, or that I have voluntary control over such belief formation, or that I can be
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held responsible or blameworthy for doing so…. We have just as little voluntary
control over ordinary beliefs formed by introspection, memory, and simple
uncontroversial inferences.”78
Alston claims that since the vast majority of our beliefs fall into categories in
which we are bereft of doxastic control (including perceptual beliefs, recollection,
and any propositions that seem prima facie true or false), the only sorts of beliefs
that might remain under our control are so-called controversial beliefs. “Hence if
only the uncertain beliefs are under voluntary control, that will not enable us to
form a generally applicable deontological concept of epistemic justification.”79 Yet
even with this category of controversial beliefs, Alston suggests that it is wrong to
talk of doxastic control; for it is not the case, he says, that we choose to believe
one proposition over another, but that once the evidence points a particular way,
we simply do believe—belief naturally follows the direction of evidence. There is
no decision, no action. And what of cases where evidence seems ambiguous?
Can we choose in such cases? “To do so would be to choose a belief in the face
of the lack of any significant inclination to suppose it to be true. It seems clear to
me that this is not within our power.”80 Alston’s argument seems unclear, though,
77
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for it suggests that inclinations are limited only to epistemic reasons. That is,
belief in P is dependent, wholly dependent, on whether or not S supposes P to
be true (or at least supposes P).81 But could one not have prudential or moral
reasons to accept a proposition? This is, in fact, the contention of a number of
fideists (though it is by no means limited to fideists).82 Indeed, this argument can
be extended against cases where evidential ambiguity is not an issue. There may
be cases (as discussed earlier) where one has epistemic evidence in favor of P,
but has moral or prudential reasons for believing not-P. Thus, to claim that a
“decision to believe” cannot exist when the epistemic evidence for a proposition
is decisive seems to me to be based on an exclusive emphasis on epistemic
considerations. While this consideration is far from supporting unconditional
doxastic voluntarism (such as basic volitional control), it does suggest that the
link between epistemic reasons and doxastic states is not as strong as Alston
assumes.
One might revise Alston’s argument and suggest (following our earlier
discussion of rationality) that doxastic states are the result of generally rational
(or ATC rational) automatic belief forming processes, and in so doing again reassert the claim that a human agent has little or no doxastic control. But this
assumption seems to me to be less readily acceptable, for it suggests an
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underlying process far more sophisticated than preponderance of evidence. Even
if such a process can occur, and even if it can occur at an unconscious level, this
does not necessarily conclusively show that one cannot exercise voluntary
control.
In another attempt at salvaging Alston’s argument, one might also be
inclined to reject the influence of moral or prudential reasons on belief,
suggesting that such reasons do not actually have any impact on beliefs—only
on what one takes (hypothetically) to be true. It is not hard, however, to conjure
examples of life-threatening situations averted by one’s prudentially motivated
(even if evidentially ambiguous) belief that one can perform a task or endure a
challenge. Either response, therefore, faces additional challenges before it can
be shown to be successful.
Alston anticipates another objection—the suggestion that we routinely
decide to hold a position regarding propositions in political, social, or religious
domains. Again referring to controversial beliefs, Alston suggests that perhaps
one misleading factor is a misuse of the term belief. We say believe when we
mean something else. Alston suggests that many times we accept a proposition,
holding it as a working hypothesis.83 The scientist, of course, relies upon working
hypotheses when testing theories. But Alston by no means intends to restrict this
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to the scientific realm. Rather, he suggests that acceptance (as opposed to
belief) is a broad pattern, extending even to religion. “One may adopt belief in
God, or some more robust set of religious doctrines, as a guide to life, setting out
to try to live in accordance with them, seeking to act and feel one’s way into the
religious community, in order to determine how the doctrines work out in the
living of them, both in terms of how satisfactory and fulfilling a life they enable
one to live and in terms of what evidence for or against them one acquires.” 84
Thus, even the decision to hold certain religious “beliefs” may just be the decision
to accept those propositions as a working hypothesis.
Alston’s introduction of his notion of acceptance is evocative of a term
introduced in the previous section on belief. There, I suggested that there are two
components of belief: a dispositional element and an act of assent. As Alston
introduces acceptance, it sheds some clarity on his notion of belief. Acceptance
is capable of sometimes including assent,85 yet belief is merely conceived as a
disposition. Contrast the account of acceptance above with his characterization
of belief:
Now a belief, in the psychological sense that is being used here (as
contrasted with the abstract sense of that which is believed), is a more
or less long-lived state of the psyche, a modification of the wiring that
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can influence various actions and reactions of the subject so long as it
persists.86
Clearly, this is a wholly dispositional notion of belief; in fact, it seems unclear that
one could distinguish (on the account above) between a disposition to believe
and belief itself. Furthermore, the passive language above raises an important
question. Whence belief? Alston seems to accommodate no moment of assent in
his account of belief. Beliefs just appear, perhaps upon reaching a
preponderance of evidence, or when confidence reaches a certain level, or when
probability weighs in on direction rather than another: “Thus when our
philosopher or religious seeker ‘decides’ to embrace theism or the identity theory,
what has happened is that at that moment this position seems more likely to be
true, seems to have weighter[sic] considerations in its favor, than the envisaged
alternative.”87 In absence of a component of assent, belief is left as a result of
some other non-volitional process. I think this is a crucial oversight on Alston’s
part, one that plays a role in Alston’s other categories of doxastic control, too.88
Alston suggests a second category of voluntarism, which he calls nonbasic
immediate voluntary control. This locus of control requires more than just an act
of the will. It requires some other action, such as physical movement. Alston
quickly dismisses “perceptual, introspective, and memory propositions” from
86
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being under immediate voluntary control, suggesting that there are no auxiliary
actions that accompany the belief, and that will thereby provide us with beliefaccepting (or rejecting) powers.89 He then turns to Chisholm’s suggestion that
one can put oneself in an epistemic position in which the evidence will influence
one’s beliefs in a particular way. For example, one might yield to the suggestion
to collect more evidence, rather than to form a belief based on current
evidence.90 Alston’s counter-argument runs as follows: “Consider propositions
concerning what is visible. I have the power to open my eyes and look about me,
thereby putting myself in a position, when conditions are favorable, to reliably
form propositions about the visible environment…. No one, I suppose, would take
this to show that I have immediate voluntary control over what I believe about the
visible environment…. And yet this is essentially the same sort of thing as the
search for additional evidence….”91 Interestingly, when opposing Alston’s
account, Richard Feldman takes Alston’s example as evidence that one can
indeed have immediate voluntary control.92
There is a third category of voluntarism, suggests Alston: “People try to
convince themselves that X loves them, that Y will turn out all right… or that God
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But this is not a directly occurring sort of voluntarism (as both basic and

nonbasic immediate voluntary control are), for it does not happen in one specific
set of actions. Rather, it is a long-term (diachronic) process involving many
actions over time. Alston calls this long-range voluntary control. By selectively
gathering evidence, exposing oneself to influences, and keeping company with
“believers,” one might attempt to influence one’s beliefs. But this method, points
out Alston, is not necessarily successful. One may or may not be able to believe
even when taking so many steps to influence one’s belief. Alston suggests that it
takes too much vigilance to amass only confirming evidence while avoiding
disconfirming evidence. Simply stated, because we are (as Alston puts it) at the
mercy of “doxastic tendencies that are too deeply rooted to permit modification
by deliberate effort,”94 exercising long-term control, while possible, is not a
reliable enough process to consider it to be really under our control.95
Alston concludes his examination of doxastic control with the suggestion
that, at best, what we have is indirect influence over some of our beliefs.96 We
make non-doxastic choices that influence our beliefs. There are “(1) activities that
bring influences to bear or withhold influences from, a particular situation
involving a particular candidate, or a particular field of candidates, for belief, and
93
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I may

choose, for example, to ruminate on my political views, and in so doing accept
propositions that in turn result in a doxastic change. “Although the fact that it is
within my power to either look for further evidence or not does not show that I
have voluntary control over what attitude I take toward p, it does show that I have
voluntary control over influences on that attitude.”98 Thus, it seems to be that the
fact that one’s decision to continue gathering evidence (or take similar epistemic
measures) does not necessarily result in a change of beliefs is reason enough,
on Alston’s account, to reject this is a form of doxastic voluntarism.
Alston’s account is not conclusive. Even reviewing just his argument against
basic doxastic control we can see this. The argument first suggests that one
cannot help but disbelieve clearly false beliefs. He then suggests that one also
cannot disbelieve clearly true beliefs. Granting these, there is still the large
matter of beliefs that are neither clearly true nor clearly false. Alston engages a
handful of examples backed by intuitions about them—the philosopher
considering epiphenomenalism, the gardener wondering whether to plant a
garden today or tomorrow, and the religious seeker pondering God’s existence.
Alston suggests that one’s final decision is not actually volitional at all. It is
merely a toggling of belief state, and it is caused by some sort of tipping of the
cognitive scales. But this conclusion itself raises a number of doubts: What is to
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be said of this feeling of decision we believe we have made? Do we decide when
a certain amount of evidence is garnered or do we decide when a certain
threshold of confidence has been reached? Do we choose in which cases
psychological certainty is the criterion and in in which evidential probability is the
criterion? Alston’s simple appeal to intuition seems to mask a tangled web of
assumptions about underlying cognitive phenomenon that are supposedly nonvolitional, yet which trigger belief.
Keeping that in mind, we can see how the situation is made more difficult by
Alston’s distinction between acceptance and belief. Acceptance seems to be,
from Alston’s account, the willful affirming of a proposition. It is not directly
related, on Alston’s account, to an enduring disposition toward P.99 But how does
it relate to assent as we have defined it? Alston doesn’t indicate the relationship
between acceptance and assent. More explicitly, Alston does not explain whether
when S accepts P, S also may sincerely and understandingly affirm P. Clearly,
there are some cases where accepting P as a hypothesis will not be done
sincerely. But conversely, it seems equally as clear that in some circumstances
one may accept P and do so sincerely and understandingly. Alston’s example of
accepting religious propositions seems to suggest sincerity. Already it has been
suggested that one can assent to P without believing P, and Alston provides no
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reason to cause us to doubt this. Taking the rest of Alston’s argument at face
value, then, it seems that at least some cases of acceptance may involve assent.
It appears, given the above, that Alston is not denying the human capability
to assent. Alston is concerned that when it comes to the other half of belief—the
dispositional component—it is unclear that we have any doxastic control. For our
present account of belief, this is not particularly concerning. Where Alston’s
account becomes troubling is where he treats all cases of doxastic assent as
unconscious, while the subdoxastic assent in acceptance is conscious. Because
of this distinction, it does appear that one may have no explicit doxastic control.
But I see no reason to accept this. Alston gives examples of cases where assent
is unconscious. That is not troubling. He has not, conversely, shown that all
assent must be unconscious.
The result seems to be this: If there is a meaningful sense of assent, and
there is no conclusive argument that beliefs do form automatically in all cases, it
seems there is room for doxastic control. Returning to our original definition of
belief, belief requires both assent and a disposition toward the belief. If assent is
sometimes conscious and voluntary, and is so in some cases where a disposition
to believe also exists, then there is a meaningful sense in which we can talk of
doxastic voluntarism.100 Clearly this is not a thesis of radical doxastic
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voluntarism; it is a moderate view, for I am not suggesting that all beliefs are
subject to volition.
With this characterization of moderate doxastic control, a question arises in
the context of religious belief, and this is a question of particular importance to
the fideist.
The radical fideist might be inclined to suggest that one believes against
one’s evidence. In its most simplistic form, the argument might go something like
this: S has ample undefeated evidence that not-P; yet S ought to believe that P
anyway. As we have seen already, Alston suggests that one cannot truly believe
against one’s epistemic and psychological proclivities. 101 But given the present
notion of belief as assent coupled with a dispositional element, does the radical
fideist have a foothold?
Religious belief seems to be among the clearer cases in which (at least for
some people) belief includes an explicit conscious moment of assent. History is
replete with conversion stories in which individuals recount their moment of
belief. The biblical book of Acts tells many such stories, including Saul’s
conversion in chapter 9. Augustine’s Confessions may very well mark the
inception of a conversion narrative as a literary work. 102 And this phenomenon is
not restricted to Christian belief, either. The Chuang-Tzu, for example, recounts
Taoist conversion stories, and the Huang-Po provides examples from Zen
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In both of these works, the moment of assent is the focus of the

account.
Yet the details of Alston’s account once again raise a question about our
doxastic limits. For while the present notion of belief requires an element of
assent—which seems satisfiable in religious cases—it also requires a disposition
to believe. Clearly (and Alston illustrates this well) dispositions easily arise when
they accord with evidence. Can a disposition be formed against evidence,
though?
It is far from clear that doxastic dispositions are necessarily epistemically
warranted or even rational, regardless of whether they are voluntary. One need
only reflect on the wide range of human psychoses and neuroses to see that
people genuinely and sincerely believe obviously false things, and persist in
doing so regardless of the evidence. Thus, it seems possible that one has a
doxastic disposition toward P even in a case where evidence points to not-P.104
Consequently, it seems possible that one can assent to P, and even sincerely
believe P “against the evidence.” Whether or not this sort of fideism qualifies as a
neurosis is a question for the psychologist.
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One might claim that this is a result of malfunctioning belief forming mechanisms, but that
does not matter in the present context. The fact that it is possible to form a disposition to believe
is adequate to carry the point.
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Believing In and Believing That
The account of belief so far has been focused on propositional belief—belief
that. But does this exhaust what is normally meant by religious belief? It is
commonly suggested that believing in can be contrasted with believing that. And
since religious believers often talk about believing in God, or believing in a
particular doctrine or set of doctrines, clearly this is a matter deserving
investigation, even if only in a preliminary way.
Suppose some proposition P. To believe that P is to hold the epistemic
position that P is true. Thus, when talking about de dicto beliefs, the statement S
believes that P is equivalent to S holds P.105 Believing that is a propositional
attitude.
But the term believing in is not so clear, in part because it is used in
multiple senses. First, there are cases where believing in expresses belief that
some instance of a given description exists.106 Creedal uses of belief-in may
sometimes be taken as such. “I believe in God the Father, maker of heaven and
earth…” may be taken to be (merely) a statement that one believes that there is
a being who is described by “God the Father, maker of heaven and earth.”
Second, there is the sense in which believing in means having trust in someone,
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or more specifically, having trust that that subject will do what is good, right, or
prescribed. In this sense, people say things like “I believe in the Chicago Bears,”
“I left my teenager at home alone, but I believe in her,” or “I believe in Senator
Crookshanks.” Importantly, this sense seems to entail belief that, but is not
reducible to belief that.107 Third, believing in can function as a moral report of
one's own viewpoint; it may mean believing that a particular effort or course of
action is right or good. “I believe in democracy,” “I believe in charity,” and “I
believe in practicing what I preach” are all examples of this. Perhaps in this
sense believing in P can be reduced to believing that P is good. But it is less
clear that these cases directly entail believing that P exists. Arguably, selfidentification with an ideology or movement is also a different meaning of
believing in. Thus “I believe in Christianity” is not just a claim that “I believe
Christianity is good or right,” but is also an expression of acceptance of,
membership in, or a doxastic disposition toward that movement.
If there is a second thing in common between various versions of belief in,
it might be the fiducial component. Many of our uses of belief in seem to have
something to do with trust. (And the term faith, which looms large in the present
inquiry, suggests a similar dissection into doxastic and fiducial components.) “I
believe in the President” seems to entail that “I trust the President” (while “I
believe in the Easter Bunny” does not seem to entail “I trust the Easter Bunny”).
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“I believe in democracy” similarly seems to entail something like “I trust in the
principles of democracy.” As we shall see in the next section on faith, this overlap
in meaning complicates the distinction between belief and faith.
Given the discussion above, at least some senses of belief in are
expressive of a propositional attitude, and have this in common with locutions of
belief that. Restricting this discussion to the propositional attitude is convenient
and straightforward, and a major hurdle of religious language is cleared simply by
replacing belief in statements with their less expressive belief that counterparts.
But is this an appropriate way to proceed? How important is this fiducial or
devotional aspect to an examination of fideism? Trusting that an agent is
authoritative, honest, and accurate is important when that authority is part of
one's evidence base. But our principle line of inquiry isn’t into the trustworthiness
of a given authoritative source, but over whether holding a particular belief is
rational.108 This is not a fiducial question, but a question regarding the
propositional attitude. This seems to capture the gist of what most fideists claim.
Fideists – at least the ones we shall examine here – are more concerned with
propositional attitudes toward religious propositions. They are interested in the
believing that P component of believing in P.109 Fideists are interested in
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supporting their attitude toward a proposition. This is a matter of explaining first
why S believes that P. This is not to say that the fideist never brings fiducial or
devotional elements into the discussion, nor that a de dicto sense fully captures
the meaning(s) of belief in. When such aspects play an important role in a
fideist's theory, I draw explicit attention to them, and attempt to avoid the
obfuscation that comes from the language of believing in. But unless otherwise
noted, I use belief as defined early in this section—as a disposition toward a
propositional object, and a disposition to which the belief holder has assented at
some point.
Much time has been spent on clarifying a notion of belief. But the
traditional focus of fideism isn’t necessarily on belief, but on faith. How are these
two terms related? As we shall see, there are several notions of faith, and
different fideists will use different notions. The next section examines several
construals of faith.
Faith
The name fideism suggests that at its core, such a theory deals with faith.
But faith is a nebulous term. This is evident in the awkwardness of Barbara Sher
Tinsley’s summary of Bayle: “[H]e insisted that, in the last analysis, faith had to
be accepted by faith, and could not be proved by reason.”110 Faith had to be
accepted by faith? In this single sentence faith is used to mean “a set of religious
can lead one astray.
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beliefs,” and also as a (presumably doxastic) disposition of an individual toward
that set of propositions. And this sentence by no means exhausts the variety of
meanings ascribed to the term faith.
Tinsley’s usage of faith as a set of religious beliefs (or as adherence to a
particular religious tradition) is a common usage, but not one that will be dwelt
upon here.111 I will use other less ambiguous terms (such as “religious beliefs”) to
avoid confusion. But Tinsley’s other usage—her speaking of accepting by faith—
is of critical importance. What does it mean, in this sense, to have faith?
We shall see seven models of faith in the following section. While I point out
problems along the way, the goal of this section isn’t to decide upon a single
notion of faith, but to identify a range of notions so as to rightly identify, in later
sections, which notion of faith is operative within a given theory.
Bishop’s Seven Models of Faith
In his article “Faith” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John
Bishop distinguishes seven models of faith.112 He suggests models of faith as a
purely affective state, as a special form of knowledge, as belief, as trust, as a
doxastic venture, as a sub-doxastic venture, and as hope.
Bishop begins by suggesting that faith has affective, volitional, and cognitive
aspects. It is affective in the sense that there is a psychological state of
confidence or trustingness associated with faith. It is volitional in that one
111
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chooses (to at least some extent) whether to have faith. Bishop suggests that
concerns over doxastic voluntarism are not a problem most accounts of faith. I
will discuss the particulars as necessary below. Finally, faith has a cognitive
component, as most accounts of faith appeal to reason to some degree. With
these characteristics in mind, Bishop offers seven different models of faith.
First, Bishop discusses faith as a purely affective state. In this account, faith
is a default disposition of “feeling confident and trusting.”113 Failure to maintain
this disposition (“losing one’s faith”) jeopardizes one’s flourishing. On this
account, faith has neither volitional nor cognitive components. Bishop finds this
characterization of faith to fall short of adequately encompassing the domain of
religious faith. This notion of faith, paying little regard to volitional and cognitive
aspects, does not seem to capture what most people have in mind when making
claims about faith.
Differences in the explanation of the cognitive aspect of faith play a role in
distinguishing a few of Bishop’s seven models of faith. Bishop points out the
presumed tension between faith and reason, a tension raised by Kant, James,
Kierkegaard and others. “It is thus widely held that faith goes beyond what is
ordinarily reasonable, in the sense that it involves accepting what cannot be
established as true through the proper exercise of our naturally endowed human
cognitive faculties—and this may be held to be an essential feature of faith.”114
113

Ibid.

114

Ibid.

52
Given this assumption, some have suggested that faith is superior to reason.
One such claim is that faith is produced by a cognitive facility higher than other
knowledge.
The second model of faith takes faith to be a special form of knowledge. In
this model (Bishop cites Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Alston
as proponents), faith is a variety of knowledge of specific truths. As Plantinga
puts it: “Faith is not to be contrasted with knowledge: faith (at least in
paradigmatic instances) is knowledge, knowledge of a certain special kind.”115
Plantinga argues that theistic beliefs are what he calls “properly basic,”
generated by the sensus divinitatis.116 Given Plantinga’s externalism, the fact that
the sensus divinitatis is a properly functioning belief forming mechanism means
that beliefs thus generated are warranted.117 And knowledge, on Plantinga’s
view, is warranted true belief. An individual can then be said to know one’s
religious beliefs.118 C. Stephen Evans, whose argument we will examine in the
next chapter, discusses Plantinga’s account of faith and knowledge while
elaborating his own theory of responsible fideism.119 In at least some cases, says
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Bishop, faith in this model isn’t merely warranted belief. It may also require
assent. To that extent, one can choose or resist faith.
While this account might provide theistic beliefs with warrant, Bishop
suggests that there is one thing it does not adequately provide to the reflective
believer. The reflective theistic believer is aware of a plurality of religious
traditions. Given that the religious tenets of all of these traditions are not mutually
compatible, one must be concerned with holding the right beliefs, avoiding a fall
into idolatry. The faith-seeker understands that there are competing
interpretations of the belief,120 and desires the correct interpretation. Thus, says
Bishop, a reflective believer is not just after what Plantinga offers under the rubric
of warrant. This is because the believer does not feel entitled to believe. The
externalist account “is still, it may be argued, insufficient to secure entitlement to
theistic faith—assuming that entitlement requires that one has evidence
adequate to establish one's knowledge, or even just one's justified belief, that
God exists.”121 Bishop suggests here that Plantinga’s account fails to capture a
requirement of foremost concern to a faith-seeker. Belief stemming from external
mechanisms cannot succeed here, for entitlement requires at minimum that the
supporting reasons be accessible (at least indirectly) to the believer. In
consequence, an externalist notion of faith as special knowledge does not
120
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succeed in capturing the needs expressed by the faith-seeker. Bishop’s notion of
entitlement is important, and I will return to it later in the section, but for the
moment we will continue to review Bishop’s models of faith.
Another possible model for faith is to treat faith as firmly held belief.
Proponents of this model focus on the relationship between belief (or faith-asbelief) and rationality. Recalling the issue of the tension between faith and
reason, Bishop suggests this as the challenge for the faith-seeker: “The
rationality of faith on this model will rest on the rationality of the firmly held
theological beliefs in which it consists.” Bishop is almost exclusively concerned
with epistemic rationality. This faith-as-belief model (with its epistemic
underpinnings) is compatible with various forms of epistemic evidentialism, which
seek to delineate rational beliefs from irrational beliefs based on evidence.122
Swinburne’s “evidential proportion” model is the first Bishop considers—and he
does so primarily to raise his objection which serves as a foundational claim in
his book Faith and Evidence: the so-called evidential ambiguity thesis.123 Stated
briefly, this is the claim that any purported evidence regarding God’s existence
(or other faith propositions) is unavoidably ambiguous, being subject to multiple
interpretations. If this is true, then there seems to be no hope of amassing
sufficient evidence for justifying a belief (or of satisfying the requirements of
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epistemic entitlement). Bishop summarizes thus: “If the ambiguity thesis is
correct, then—assuming evidentialism—firmly held theistic belief will fail to be
reasonable.” (I take Bishop to be using “reasonable” here to refer to epistemic
rationality only.) It is important to notice that the critique here isn’t against the
notion of faith-as-belief, but against a particular variety of evidentialism when
coupled with the evidential ambiguity hypothesis. But Bishop does have concerns
with faith-as-belief.
Bishop worries that treating faith as “belief that proposition P” invites danger,
as it suggests that faith-beliefs are competing with scientific beliefs, subject to the
same evidential criteria. This, thinks Bishop, will ultimately empower critics to
easily dismiss religious beliefs on the grounds of evidential deficiency. 124 Again,
the concern is over the entitlement to believe: If one claims faith is belief, the
same sort of thing epistemologists worry about justifying, and if that belief lacks
unambiguous evidential support, then one is not entitled to hold that belief.125
Thus, to consider faith to be belief is to mistakenly expose it to evaluation against
the wrong standard. While Plantinga, Evans, and others suggest that faith is
stronger than mere belief, it seems that here Bishop is suggesting that faith is
weaker than belief—perhaps weak enough to not even be considered a doxastic
state.
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The fourth model of faith is faith-as-trust. “It may thus be held that faith as
accepting propositional truths as divinely revealed rests on believing in God—
and it is this ‘believing in’ which is, fundamentally, the nature of faith.”126 Bishop
suggests that the trust model is best expressed as one’s having faith in God,
where this does not merely entail belief that God exists, but also indicate one’s
practical commitment to act with trust in God. In the previous section, we
discussed how some notions of belief in entail a fiducial component. Likewise, a
fiducial element plays an important role in the model of faith-as-trust. For the time
being, I suggest that faith as yielding and faith as obedience may be justly
subsumed under this model (though both are more robust notions of what is
required as a result of one’s trust).
Bishop suggests that trust requires a venture: When S puts trust in another,
S is acting as if the other has S’s interests in mind. This is a venture for S
because S is giving up some measure of control and yielding to the other. But
how do we determine in whom (or in what?) we should trust? Does it not seem
that for one to reasonably trust another, one ought to have evidence that the
other is trustworthy? Bishop offers two considerations here: First, we often trust a
hitherto unknown individual on the basis of having formed general ideas about
trusting others. Thus, if others are generally worthy of trust in a particular regard,
then it may be rational to trust in an individual without having specific evidence of
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that individual’s trustworthiness. Second, there are cases where one must make
an all-or-nothing decision to trust even when evidence is unavailable.
Such cases provide a particularly interesting class of exceptions to the
general evidentialist requirement to take a proposition to be true only as
justified by one's evidence. They are interesting because they do not
involve non-epistemic considerations overriding epistemic ones, as is
the case with some readily recognisable types of exception to trustevidentialism—for example, cases where being in an established
relationship with someone obliges one to trust contrary to the weight of
one's evidence; or cases of ‘educative’ or ‘therapeutic’ trust, where
others are trusted in order to develop or restore their trustworthiness. In
the target cases, the epistemic concern to grasp truth and avoid
falsehood is not overridden: they are cases where the truth that a
person is trustworthy may be beneficially grasped only if one first takes
it that the person is trustworthy beyond the possible support of
evidence—though once the venture is made conclusive evidence of
trustworthiness may happily soon accumulate.127
Trust, in a context such as this, is a prerequisite to having evidence of one’s
trustworthiness. What is unclear to me is how this second example can be
considered a case of insufficient evidence in light of the previous suggestion that
we have general ideas about trust. For if evidence of general trustworthiness is
sufficient for application in a particular case, then even these cases of “extreme”
trust seem to have the balance of evidence favoring trust. In consequence,
Bishop has not given an example of a case of an exception to general
evidentialism, though he may have suggested that supporting evidence, while
inconclusive, may be adequate for an agent to venture to trust.
One might further wonder why, if faith is the conjunction of belief (that) and
trust, the evidential insufficiency of the belief is not itself sufficient to defeat this
127
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model of faith. For the account does not seem to suggest that “faith in” does not
require “belief that,” but only that it is irreducible to “belief that.” And if that is so,
then the evidential ambiguity thesis seems still to weigh heavily against this
notion of faith. In the context of faith in God, the above account suggests that
belief that God exists coupled with trust in God together composes faith. Yet if
one is not entitled to believe that God exists, it is unclear how the fiducial
component plays an important role. Clearly, it does not grant entitlement or
justification.
Bishop moves swiftly from faith-as-trust to his fifth model: Faith as doxastic
venture, a model that he defends at length elsewhere.128 In faith-as-trust, the
fiducial aspect is captured in one’s trust in God. That is, one believes that God
exists and trusts that he will act with one’s best interests in mind. In contrast, faith
as a doxastic venture is not fiducial. Rather, it deals with the belief condition; it is
a venture that God exists. Against objections of the sort I identified above, Bishop
suggests that the faith-as-trust model might entail the doxastic venture model:
trusting in God may carry with it the doxastic venture that God exists.
F. R. Tennant develops a similar model, which he calls faith-as-venture or
faith-venture.129 “Faith,” says Tennant, “involves the determination to be guided
by such experiences as we have, rather than none at all, and to experiment in
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the realm of the merely possible or ideal.”

130

Two things stand out about

Tennant’s synopsis. First, faith is an alternative to suspension of judgment.
Second, it is undergone (on Tennant’s account, at least) as a preliminary step; it
may, in fact, lead to belief. But neither confirmation nor belief is guaranteed with
faith. “Faith has always to take the risk of disappointment and defeat”—thus its
venturesomeness.
Bishop’s account shares these features. As the name implies, a fixture of
this model is its implications for one’s beliefs. The doxastic venture model
suggests that one believes and does so as a venture. That is, one both believes
that P, and acts in accordance with that belief. Bishop circumvents concern over
doxastic voluntarism by pointing out that regardless of whether or not one has
volitional control over belief, one’s acting in accordance with a proposition is
indeed volitional, and it is thus that aspect of the model that counts as
venturesome.131 As Bishop puts it, “Doxastic venture is thus not a matter of
willing oneself to believe without adequate evidential support; rather it is a matter
of taking an already held belief to be true in one's practical reasoning while
recognising that its truth lacks such support.”132 Bishop sees this as the reunification of faith as a gift (that is, as a belief given by God and outside of direct
130
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doxastic control) and as one’s actions in regard to that gift. The fact that one
believes, in this model, without adequate evidence, and is cognizant of the
insufficiency of evidence, does seem to come into conflict with Alston’s argument
against doxastic voluntarism in that Alston suggests that one cannot believe
against evidence (willfully or otherwise).133
Unlike what Bishop calls elsewhere “hard-line evidentialism,”134 the doxastic
venture model does not attempt to base willingness to act on P upon one’s
evidence that P. One acts on a venture, aware that the evidence does not
conclusively show that P, and (as Tennant put it) aware of a risk of
disappointment and defeat.135
Bishop additionally points out that what he calls “highest-order framing
principles,” propositions that serve a crucial role in supporting large bodies of
beliefs, might be of the sort that simply cannot be adequately supported merely
by appeal to “a body of independent evidence.”136 Framing principles are, on this
account, a special sort of thing. “The framing principles of a doxastic framework
are those propositions whose truth must be presupposed if any of the beliefs
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belonging to the framework are to be evidentially justified.”

137

And because

evidence is incapable (in his account) of conferring adequate support to such
principles, accepting any framing principle carries with it an element of venture.
(Bishops notion of a framing principle is addressed in chapters 3 and 4.) And
religious faith is the paramount example. It is only the venture model that pays
due respect to the quandary of the religious seeker.
The doxastic venture model may thus be regarded as capturing the
spiritual challenge of faith more satisfactorily than evidential proportion
models do, since it involves a deeper surrender of self-reliant control,
not only in trusting God, but in accepting that there is a God—indeed,
this God—who is to be trusted.138
If all of this is the case, then how can the issue of epistemic entitlement be
addressed for faith propositions—those that Bishop now suggests are amenable
only to a venture model? The venture model’s challenge at this point is to
address the following concern (again, recalling our earlier discussion of
rationality): How can a faith venture satisfy epistemic obligations for rationality?
Bishop offers a couple of answers.
Bishop recounts one popular version of arational fideism, in which one
believes in spite of the evidence. At minimum, this suggests that one forgoes, in
this instance, one’s epistemic obligation, ostensibly in order to believe the truth.
We will deal with this confusing notion later. Bishop points out that the majority of
the so-called proponents of this model (including Kierkegaard) are misinterpreted
137
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139

on the point.

However, there is a notable proponent among

20th

century

fideists, though. While Bishop does not cite Shestov, the Russian ex-patriot does
indeed seem to be a candidate for classification here.
More often, proponents of the doxastic venture model rely on a notion of
supra-rationalism: faith does not oppose reason, but instead extends beyond the
limits of reason. C. Stephen Evans, whose version of fideism is the subject of the
next chapter, expounds a theory of supra-rationalism based on the argument that
reason, subject as it is to sin, is limited in crucial respects. Most crucially, it is
limited in its ability to grasp divine truths, even those having to do with God’s
existence. That granted, one must move beyond reason’s limits (to faith)
regarding those truths. Bishop makes the observation that “Whether the desire to
grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a
dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this
supra-rational fideist doxastic venture model.”140 Noteworthy is the fact that
nowhere is the issue on entitlement addressed on this account. Merely
suggesting that faculty A is deficient in some regards does not thereby grant one
the right to trust faculty B. That is, the imperfection of “scientific” reason does not
thereby show faith to be reliable, or even tenable. Furthermore, the faith model in
this sort of doxastic venture does not give guidance on how to determine which
faith propositions one ought to have faith in, and which ones she or he ought not.
139
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The sixth model of faith departs on a crucial detail from the doxastic venture
model. This sixth model is the sub-doxastic venture model, and as the name
implies, the crucial difference is in regards to an agent’s belief. Specifically, the
sub-doxastic model does not require that one actually believes in order to have
faith; instead, one need only act as if the proposition in question obtains. Faith,
here, is a decisive commitment to P without an accompanying belief that P. This
doesn’t necessarily entail that one does not believe that P. But faith, in this
model, is not contingent in any degree on one’s beliefs. Bishop draws from both
Tennant’s notion of faith venture and Alston’s “acceptance” in explaining this
model. Earlier we saw how Alston’s definition of acceptance was ambiguous with
regards to assent.141 Bishop’s model as explained in this context suggests an
ambiguity, though Bishop elsewhere eliminates the source of ambiguity:
People make a sub-doxastic venture with respect to the proposition p if
and only if they take p to be true in their practical reasoning, while
recognizing that it is not the case that p’s truth is adequately supported
by their total available evidence, yet without believing that p—i.e.
without actually holding that p is true.142
Holding-to-be-true, on Bishop’s account, strongly correlates with what we have
called belief. Bishop contrasts it with taking-to-be-true, which is assenting to P,
but while making certain acknowledgements about the evidence. Taking P to be
true is not accompanied by a disposition toward P, while holding P, on Bishop’s
account, requires not only sincerely and understandingly affirming that P but also
141
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having a doxastic disposition toward P.

143

This, then, is the clear contrast

between the doxastic and the sub-doxastic venture models: the doxastic model
requires belief. The sub-doxastic model does not. Importantly, the sub-doxastic
venture still requires sincerity in assent (a topic I discuss more in chapter 3).
Theories of “faith without belief” that espouse a form of fictionalism or
hypothetical (insincere) acceptance of a proposition are not, by this sincerity
requirement, forms of sub-doxastic venture.144
The seventh and final model that Bishop offers is the model of faith as hope.
In absence of conclusive evidence that P, one can adopt an attitude of wanting P
to be true or desiring that P obtains.145 But at the same time, one does not
assume (to any degree) that P. Bishop suggests this as the distinguishing point
between the hope model and the sub-doxastic model, for the sub-doxastic model
recommends taking P to be true in practical reasoning, at least.146 Yet one can
still act from the hope that P. But like the sub-doxastic model, it seems to be
primarily action-oriented, suggesting that one acts toward that which they hope
for. Be that as it may, it is unclear how, exactly, this model fits into an account or
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rationality. Under what conditions is one entitled to act in hope that P? To what
extent can hope-that-P be used as evidence in support of other propositions?
Tennant suggests, further, that hope is a weaker notion than faith:
Hope is a species of expectation fraught with pleasant feeling and
desire. It is relatively passive, whereas faith is a creative activity
provocative of effort. The opposite of hope is fear or despair: the
opposite of faith is mental inertia or indifference as to any spiritual
Beyond. Hope involves a slight degree of assurance: faith is assurance
sanguine enough to be called certitude.147
Hope is distinct from faith, says Tennant, and is by no means strong enough to
capture the notion of faith frequently employed in a religious context.
Of the seven models just outlined, neither faith as hope nor faith as an
affective state is important for our subsequent examinations. Neither adequately
captures the usage of the fideists we shall examine, nor of the subsequent
theory. Remaining are faith as a sort of knowledge, faith as belief, and the three
venture-based models of faith: faith as trust, faith as doxastic venture, and faith
as subdoxastic venture. In coming chapters we shall return to these notions
within the context of various theories of fideism.
Before leaving Bishop’s discussion of faith, though, one more thing
deserves our attention, and this is Bishop’s notion of entitlement.
Entitlement
The idea of entitlement figures prominently in Bishop’s assessment of
models of faith. Bishop introduces entitlement as a satisfaction of a need of the
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reflective religious seeker or believer: “From the perspective of reflective persons
of faith (or would-be faith), the question of entitlement arises: are they rationally,
epistemically—even, morally—entitled to adopt or continue in their faith?”148
Entitlement serves multiple purposes for Bishop.
First, it exposes what Bishop believes is missing in the externalist’s account
of faith. For the reflective believer is concerned with the right placement of his or
her faith. And the reflective believer seeks commitment, not just belief.
Plantinga’s warrant (having one’s belief generated by a properly functioning
facility) does not account for the reflective believer’s epistemic goals, for the
reflective believer wants to avoid idolatry—misplaced worship—while also
accepting one’s belief. This, suggests Bishop, requires what must be described
as an internal condition: the believer must be satisfied that his or her belief is
rightly placed. Rather than turn the argument toward the internalist/externalist
debate in epistemology Bishop introduces the notion of entitlement. It is not
enough that a belief be warranted; the believer must be entitled to believe it.
Second, entitlement serves as a differentiating point between a rationally
held faith proposition and an irrationally held faith proposition. Bishop does not
want to suggest that any proposition can rationally be held by a faith. Entitlement
is the watermark or certification that some proposition is held (by faith)
rationally.149 One’s faith that (or in) P fails to be rational faith if one is not entitled
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to have faith that P. Bishop talks about faith as a virtue only when one’s faith
satisfies that relevant entitlement conditions.
Third, entitlement captures a sense of the permissibility of holding a belief.
One way of viewing Bishop’s entitlement thesis is to consider the difference
between obligation and permissibility.150 Under this lens, entitlement is about the
permissibility of holding a belief, and not (directly) about epistemic obligation. In
his essay “The Nature of Epistemic Justification,” William P. Alton distinguishes
between epistemic obligation and epistemic permissibility: Epistemic obligation is
“doing what we can to achieve the aim of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity
within a large body of beliefs.”151 While this is slightly different than the
characterization made earlier in the chapter, the difference is not important in this
context.152 What is important, though, is how Alston moves from this
characterization of obligation to epistemic permissibility. S’s belief that P is
permissible if and only if S’s so believing does not violate any epistemic
obligations.153 The notion of epistemic justification introduced earlier in this

of course, can provide entitlement, but what else can? Bishop (2007) suggests certain moral
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chapter suggests that justification requires having sufficient undefeated evidence
in support of a belief. But perhaps the way to understand Bishop’s notion of
entitlement, and how it differs from justification, is best explained by drawing
upon Alston’s distinction above. Entitlement is a permissibility thesis stating that
S is permitted to hold B because S’s belief is not held in violation of S’s epistemic
obligations. Holding a justified belief is, of course, permissible (given that, by
definition, it satisfies epistemic obligations); but beliefs that are not justified may
be permissibly held, provided that they do not transgress one’s obligation to
maximize true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.154
Finally, entitlement broadens the scope beyond epistemic support.155 The
sort of justification discussed by Swinburne, Plantinga, and Alston is epistemic.
But one may be entitled to have faith in a proposition (or perhaps nonpropositional content) without epistemic justification. Bishop suggests that one
may be morally entitled to hold P, and we could readily imagine that one could
claim to be prudentially entitled in holding P. While Bishop concedes that some
may claim entitlement to be strictly epistemic, he suggests that such a restriction
is not likely to be successful. Bishop’s own account, which he offers at length in
his book Believing by Faith, is that strictly epistemic notions of entitlement are
154
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unsuccessful; moral entitlement achieves what epistemic entitlement cannot.

156

Given this description, Bishop’s notion of entitlement, considered as a
permissibility thesis, can be fitted into our existing model of rationality.
Bishop suggests that the reason why the notion of entitlement is necessary
(or desirable) is that believers need “to satisfy themselves of their entitlement to
their faith.”157 This, as Bishop notes, requires that the believer have at least some
level of cognitive access to the entitlement status of his or her beliefs. And he
goes on to suggest that the typical account of evidentialist justification is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of (presumably epistemic) entitlement.158
But there are cases where an agent is not evidentially justified in holding a belief,
yet may still be entitled (permitted) to hold that belief. Thus, in the end there
seem to be two defining characteristics of Bishop’s entitlement that distinguish it
from justification: First, if entitlement is required so that believers may satisfy
themselves that their faith is not misplaced, there is an cognitive access
requirement. Second, if entitlement is a permissibility thesis, as I have
suggested, then it does not require justification (as I have defined it).
A question arises at this point: Does the religious believer need to be
justified, or only entitled to believe? As we shall see, various fideists answer this
question differently. But it is fair to suggest that meeting one’s rational
156
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obligations, when possible, is better than merely avoiding transgressing rational
obligations. For rational obligations, per our model, are obligations that best meet
the preferences of the agent. Meeting one’s obligations is, then, the most
expedient route to achieving one’s goals.
In chapter 3, Bishop’s notion of entitlement is fitted into his own argument
for fideism. Entitlement and its implications will be examined more carefully there.
But at this point, we will move from faith and entitlement back to a more general
discussion of fideism as a theory.
Fideism
With an account of rationality and belief, and an examination of several
models of faith, we are now ready to return to fideism itself. Fideism is a theory
designed to address a particular epistemic problem: the purported resistance of
certain propositions to epistemic justification. (I will abbreviate this as justification
resistant, though this term is specific to epistemic justification.) In the context of
philosophy of religion, for example, thousands of years of philosophy have failed
to produce a conclusive argument or conclusive evidence for (or against, for that
matter) the existence of a divine being. Therefore, the story goes, holding such a
proposition is unjustified. Thus, on some accounts, the proposition “There is a
divine being” is an example of a justification-resistant proposition.159 Yet such
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propositions are, first of all, believed by many. And they are deemed by many to
be epistemically important. The result seems to be that for an important class of
propositions, we cannot have knowledge. S may believe P, and P may be true,
but if P cannot be justified, then how can S know P? Fideism purports to provide
an answer to this quandary in at least some cases—the exemplar being religious
propositions.160
The claim that certain propositions are resistant to justification is a crucial
claim made by fideists. For fideism is a response to the problem—a claim that in
such cases, one may (rationally) still hold (or take to be true) these justificationresistant propositions.161 The fideist claims that certain propositions, which I will
call faith propositions—are amenable to what I will for the time being call fideistic
support. That is, one may hold or take to be true such propositions by faith. Note
that this is not to claim that any proposition that is resistant to justification is
amenable to fideistic support. As we shall see in the next chapter, some (perhaps
most) fideists restrict which propositions may be held/taken by faith.
One might answer the question of justification resistance with another
question: Why be concerned at all with finding an alternative to justification in a
case when justification is not an option? Is it not the case that when P cannot be
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epistemically justified, the rational response is to suspend judgment? There are a
number of responses available to fideists. One is the Jamesian suggestion that
certain propositions cannot or should not be met with suspension of judgment
(they are, in William James’ parlance, immediate, live, and forced options).162
Another response, this time from John Bishop, is that there are epistemically and
rationally important “framing principles” that, while required for reasoning, are
resistant to (non-circular) justification.163 The suggestion common to these is that
suspension of judgment is not always the right response to justificational
deficiency. Indeed our general account of rationality makes this evident. Even if
what is epistemically reasonable is suspension of judgment, it may be morally or
prudentially rational to assent. It is sometimes rational to hold (or take) P even
when one is not epistemically justified in holding (or taking) P. While fideism is
sometimes taken to be irrationalism, the above shows that this is not necessarily
the case, and the examples of fideism examined herein are all theories that claim
to be rational.164
The fideist, then, claims that (a) there are certain propositions that resist
epistemic justification, and (b) that one may still rationally hold (or take) P.165
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With these two claims in view, we can then characterize fideism (generally) as
the theory that there are at least some propositions that a given subject is
epistemically rational to hold or take to be true without regard for evidence. Any
specific theory of fideism must elaborate on the conditions under which a given
faith proposition may be held or taken without violating epistemic rationality.
By using the phrase “without regard for evidence,” I do not intend to place a
requirement that for a theory to be fideist, it must require ignoring available
evidence. Rather, this phrase is intended to capture three possible cases: (1) the
case where the available evidence is insufficient, (2) the case where the
evidence is ambiguous, and (3) the case where the evidence is disconfirming or
defeated. Debatably, one might also suggest a fourth case: (4) the evidence is
conclusive, undefeated, and supportive, but is rightly ignored. This position
suffers, though, from the problem that said belief is already justified, and it is
unclear what it would mean to fideistically hold a justified proposition. (Arguably,
the fact that one chooses to ignore evidence does not have bearing on whether
that evidence actually justifies a proposition.)
Given the above, there are three obvious avenues by which one may
attempt to defeat fideism: One may contend that there are actually no cases of
propositions that are resistant to epistemic justification. By my lights, for such a
claim to be satisfactorily defended, it would require showing that reason is in fact
complicated, for they clearly do not hold that P. The question then is whether their acting as if
qualifies as assent. I do not think that is does, as the acknowledgement of the fictionality of P is
contrary to the requirement that one sincerely take P.
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unlimited. That is, one would have to show that there are no propositions beyond
the ken of reason. Given that we are not concerned with a conception of fideism
for an ideal reasoner, but for real human agents, examples of human cognitive
deficiencies—including generally observable psychological dispositions such as
the confirmation bias and cognitive difficulties of processing counterfactuals—
suggest that attempting this line of argument against fideism is unlikely to be
fruitful.166
A second avenue is to show that there are no cases in which one can
rationally assent to a proposition that is resistant to epistemic justification. Yet I
have already argued counterexamples to this in the general discussion of
rationality. Clearly there are cases where one can be (all things considered)
rational in believing a proposition even when that proposition is not epistemically
justified.
The third route is to suggest that, given the proposed theory of rationality,
fideism is not the best theory for meeting our rational obligations, all things
considered. Phrased more specifically, when it comes to important propositions,
such as religious beliefs, one does not best fulfill one’s rational obligations
through fideism. Developing this argument, though, is not a simple matter of a
few paragraphs. It requires closer examination of various theories of fideism, for
individual theories have crucial differences that must be addressed. This third
route is the line of argument that I take in the following chapters.
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Conclusion
The goal of this introductory chapter has been to set the stage for the
examination of fideism that is to come in the following chapters. Fideism, as I
have characterized it, is grounded in an epistemic problem: certain propositions
are important, yet (at least in some accounts) seem to be resistant to epistemic
justification. To many fideists (and many non-fideists), religious propositions
seem to be members of this class. But if these important propositions cannot be
justified (and hence cannot be known), then how can a religious believer be
rational? Early in the chapter, I sketched a model of rationality that includes
epistemic, moral, and prudential notions of rationality (and of justification). And I
sketched a general All Things Considered (ATC) rationality, as well. This
provides us with tools to assess the rationality of fideism, and we can see that at
least prima facie fideism is not necessarily irrational. It may be possible to
develop a theory of fideism that is rational.
Belief and faith are two other notions that figure largely in discussions of
religious belief. Drawing from Moser, I have sketched a notion of belief that at
once captures the dispositional aspects as well as the assent requirement. While
doxastic voluntarism may yet have unclear elements, the account sketched here
includes a moderate doxastic voluntarism. Finally, the section on belief closed
with an examination of the difference between believing in and believing that. I
have suggested that both de re and de dicto beliefs have propositional objects,
and it is belief as belief that P that is of principle concern in our analysis of
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fideism. That said, there are important senses in which de re beliefs differ, and
those will be discussed, too, when necessary.
Fideism ascribes tremendous importance to the role of faith on the behalf of
the reflective religious person. Yet, following John Bishop, we have seen seven
models of faith. Fideists, it seems, have multiple candidates when considering
the notion of faith. While I have hinted at a few of the weaknesses in some of
these models, I have not limited the following examinations to a certain notion of
faith. As we examine different fideist theories we will see different notions of faith.
Finally, I have offered a general theory of fideism, intending to capture the
commonalities between versions of fideism that range from Bayle and
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian fideism to Evans’s supra-rational fideism and to Bishop’s
Kantian notion of fideism as a morally grounded doxastic venture. I summarized
fideism as the theory as the claim that some propositions may be held without
regard to evidence.
In the next chapter I turn to C. Stephen Evans’s account of what he calls
rational (or supra-rational) fideism. There, I examine Evans’s use of externalist
epistemology, coupled with a strong model of faith-as-belief, as groundwork for a
theory of fideism.

CHAPTER TWO
RATIONAL FIDEISM
Introduction
“Faith enables human beings to move beyond the limitations of finite, fallen
human reason.”1 With these words C. Stephen Evans concludes his defense of a
version of fideism that he calls responsible fideism.2 Evans’s theory, elaborated
in his book Faith Beyond Reason, is the subject of the present chapter. In this
chapter, I examine Evans’s account of responsible fideism, an example of
epistemically focused fideism. Evans combines the fideism he locates in
Kierkegaard with contemporary externalist epistemology, particularly so-called
Reformed epistemology.3 In doing this, Evans argues that religious knowledge is
not an unattainable goal, and where certain beliefs cannot be justified, faith gives
one the epistemic entitlement to rationally hold those beliefs. Ultimately, I argue
that Evans’s account is flawed in important respects. For that reason, Evans’s
responsible fideism does not best address the concerns of a rational agent.
Evans’s argument illustrates the difficulties inherent in attempting to build an

1

Evans 1998, 153.

2

Ibid., 52.

3

Evans uses Kierkegaard’s Climacus pseudonym as the source for this fideism. Evans seems to
think that Climacus is reflecting Kierkegaard’s own considered view.

77

78
account of fideism that remains committed to epistemic rationality.
In the previous chapter I provided a general model of rationality and reason,
outlining three important forms of rationality: epistemic rationality, prudential
rationality, and moral rationality.4 Furthermore, I suggested an account of a
general (all things considered) rationality by which it is possible to solve rational
conflicts wherein two or more types of rationality came into conflict. Evans’s
account of fideism is focused almost exclusively on epistemic rationality. That is,
the gist of his argument is that one can be an epistemically rational fideist. Moral
and prudential rationality do not play substantial roles in Evans’s account.
Evans employs a variety of technical terms in his argument, and in a few
cases the technical terms are used in more than one way. Because Evans draws
deeply on various historical texts and movements, and also works broadly within
contemporary externalist epistemology, certain terms, such as justification, faith,
and reason are used in various ways in various contexts. For these reasons, I
spend time examining and explaining the key terms. The first two sections of this
chapter are devoted to Evans’s models of epistemic rationality and faith.
In the first section, I discuss Evans’s model of rationality, and then move to
one of Evans’s key arguments. Evans sees reason as flawed in two important
ways: First, reason has cognitive boundaries. These limitations mean that certain
things cannot be understood or even reasoned about. Second, reason is tainted
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by sin—notably pride and selfishness. For these reasons, one cannot assume
that reason is the best way to address all propositions or beliefs. Religious
beliefs—and in particular beliefs about God—are in such a class. With this
argument, Evans opens the door to fideism as an alternative to what he calls
rationalism—a position he characterizes as wrongly dependent on epistemic
reason.
The second section focuses on faith. As we saw in the previous chapter,
there are a variety of models of faith. There we looked at several models
identified by John Bishop. Evans suggests a model that he calls Biblical faith.
Drawing from what Bishop called faith-as-belief and faith-as-trust models, Evans
elaborates an account of faith that includes three components: belief, trust, and
obedience.
The third section is devoted to Evans’s responsible fideism, a variety of
fideism that begins with a commitment to religious realism and also to epistemic
rationality. In this section, I show how Evans integrates contemporary Reformed
epistemology with several themes he finds in Kierkegaard’s middle
(pseudonymous) works in order to create an account of fideism that retains
strong epistemic claims while also forwarding faith as an alternative to
justification (in certain cases).
In the final section I critique Evans’s responsible fideism by asking three
questions. In addressing each question, certain issues with Evans’s argument
come to the fore. Ultimately, I argue that the issues are enough to suggest that
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the needs of a rational seeker are not best met by Evans’s fideism.
Rationality
Before exploring Evans’s fideism, it is necessary to understand Evans’s
notion(s) of rationality, and also to understand why Evans casts a jaundiced eye
toward reason, particularly when it comes to religious beliefs. Evans’s fideism is
largely couched in a pair of notions familiar to the philosopher of religion: faith
and reason. And there is no small amount of tension between the two in Evans’s
account. The interplay between faith and reason is an important theme
throughout the book, with a core thesis being reason’s inadequacy in certain
domains. That is, reason is incapable of justifying, or even entitling, one’s
religious beliefs. Consequently, one must turn to faith. Before we can examine
the second half of this claim, we must first assess what Evans means by reason,
what reason’s shortcomings are, and how those direct one toward fideism.
In the previous chapter I offered a model of rationality in which I described
three different sorts of rationality (epistemic, moral, and prudential), as well as a
general “all things considered” rationality. Further, I suggested that one seeks to
fulfill rational obligations in order to satisfy certain goals. I will draw on this
previously defined model in order to explain Evans.
In Faith Beyond Reason, Evans has a great deal to say about rationality, but
what Evans means by rationality is sometimes unclear. This is partly due to the
fact that Evans is often engaging with enlightenment period notions of
knowledge, understanding, and reason. Kant, Locke, Hegel, and Kierkegaard
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operate with notions not strongly in line with contemporary usage, and Evans
attempts to engage these thinkers on their own ground. But this usage is the
exception rather than the norm. Evans’s work is not a history of philosophy.
Rather, it is largely an engagement with contemporary philosophy of religion and
epistemology. When stepping back from the historically oriented passages, a
clearer picture of Evans’s notion of rationality emerges. Here I attempt to capture
Evans’s own notion of rationalism, rationality, and reason.
First of all, Evans refers to a philosophical standpoint that he calls
rationalism. His usage differs from what the historian of early modern philosophy
might mean by this term. The salient claim of this form of rationalism is “that
religious beliefs ought to be completely governed by reason.”5 Evans suggests
Bertrand Russell and Richard Swinburne are contemporary proponents of such a
standpoint, while John Locke and W. K. Clifford are historical proponents.6 Evans
links rationalism strongly to evidentialism, the epistemic theory that suggests that
justification is best understood in terms of evidence: S is justified in believing B if
and only if S has sufficient undefeated evidence in support of that belief.7
“Theological rationalists,” says Evans, “often seem to assume that religious
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8

beliefs must be based on evidence.” This linkage between rationalism and
evidentialism is an important detail, as it accounts for Evans’s further linking
between one’s having reason for belief B and evidence for belief B. Importantly,
the “opposite of rationalism” (and thus the “the denial of evidentialism”) is
fideism.9 I suggest that we best understand (theological) rationalism as the
doctrine that religious beliefs require sufficient undefeated evidential support.10
This leads to a second related term: reason. Evans uses reason in two
ways: First, there is reason as “an autonomous, relatively competent human
faculty.”11 Reason, in this first sense, refers to our ability to critically evaluate
evidence. Evans’s notion of an autonomous faculty seems to carry with it an
almost personification of this faculty, as we shall see throughout. But what is
most important about this formulation of reason as a faculty is that reason can
come into conflict with other faculties, notably the faith-producing faculty. While
Evans’s notion of reason has strong epistemic connotations, it is not fully clear
that he has in mind only epistemic rationality. However, with only a few nods in
the direction of other types of rationality (notably in the context of Kant’s moral
argument for God’s existence), Evans restrains his own argument to epistemic
8
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reason.
The related term rationality seems to be consistently used in this
epistemically oriented sense as well. Instead of a notion of a general “all things
considered” rationality that may be able to arbitrate between conflicting rational
obligations, Evans draws a distinction only between (epistemic) rationality and
faith. Reason, in the sense explained here, is on Evans’s account a deeply
flawed faculty—flawed enough that in certain cases we ought not rely upon it.
Later in this section we will explore the two ways in which Evans thinks reason is
flawed. But there is a second way that Evans uses the term reason, and it, too, is
crucial to understanding Evans’s argument.
Evans also talks about reasons as individual items. In this usage, a reason
is (a piece of) evidence. When Evans talks of reasons to believe or a reason to
believe, he is talking about evidence in support of a belief.12 Evans discusses two
types of belief. First, there are some beliefs that are supported by evidence. Such
evidence is in turn supported by other evidence. He suggests that this form of
evidence “is derived through some process of conscious inference….”13 By
inference what Evans wants to capture is not so much the reasoning process, but
that such evidence is in some way reliant on other evidence. This dependence
causes Evans to worry about an infinite regress argument. To avoid this, he
suggests that not all beliefs are evidentially supported. Evans employs
12
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Plantinga’s notion of properly basic beliefs to demarcate a class of beliefs that
are in some way exempt from evidential support.14 Evans suggests that certain
beliefs are properly basic, such as beliefs about self-evident truths and
phenomenological experiences.15 Importantly, Evans, again following Plantinga,
suggests that belief in God—and perhaps other religious beliefs—is properly
basic.16 While Evans does accept that there may be evidential support for God’s
existence, he states that such evidence on its own cannot be conclusive. 17 Basic
beliefs can then serve as foundational evidence for other beliefs, and in this way
Evans believes he has circumvented the infinite regress argument. There are
problems with aspects of Evans’s notion of evidence, and to those I will return
later in the chapter. But when Evans talks about reasons, it is with this notion of
evidence that he operates.
Finally, Evans uses the terms reasonable and rationality in a more general
sense than the related terms rationalism and reason might otherwise suggest.
Reasonable, as Evans uses it, simply means to accord with reason. And
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rationality is “a commitment to practices that are aimed at truth.”

18

While being

reasonable is not a commitment to rationalism, it is also a rejection of blanket
irrationalism. Evans’s responsible fideism espouses this moderate rationality,
which is evident in this turn of phrase: “[O]dd as it may sound, it may be
‘reasonable’ to hold a belief for which one has no reasons.”19 One may be
reasonable, as we shall see shortly, in assessing the faculty of reason and
finding it limited and tainted by sin.
While Evans considers rationalism the wrong way to approach religious
belief, he maintains that one should commit to rationality. While reason may be
flawed, and while one may believe without reasons, one should be reasonable in
one’s beliefs. As we shall see in the next section, these distinctions become
important as Evans argues that while reason is limited, one ought to be
reasonable in one’s beliefs.
Evans maintains that his version of fideism is rational fideism. What he
means by this, given his epistemological notion of reason, is that one can remain
epistemically rational even while holding certain unsupported religious beliefs.
How can this be rightly construed as rational fideism? This is what Evans calls
responsible fideism: The reason one can remain rational in this case isn’t
because one ignores reason, but because one discovers reason’s flaws and
boundaries, and thus (reasonably) moves beyond rationalism. Reason’s limits
18
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then take center stage.
The Failure of Reason
As we have seen, reason is principally an epistemic notion for Evans, and
he ties it closely to evidentialism. As Evans sketches man’s search for
justification of religious beliefs—notably, beliefs about God’s existence—he
interprets this quest as one of finding sufficient evidence to justify such beliefs.
But it is an endeavor that has largely been unsuccessful. Why is this so? Is it
because there is not sufficient available evidence? Is it divine hiddenness?
Perhaps in part. But Evans believes that the primary culprit is nothing other than
reason itself. Reason (alone) cannot justify belief in God, and this is so for two
reasons. First, reason is limited in crucial ways. Second, reason, like other
aspects of humanity, is tainted by sin, and this stymies its ability to adequately
address certain beliefs—beliefs about God being the foremost examples.
Reason’s limitations prevent it from functioning properly when it comes to
gathering and evaluating evidence for this crucial class of religious beliefs.20
As we move into a discussion of Evans’s fideism, there are certain limits that
must be set. Evans draws heavily on Aquinas, Kant, William James, Calvin, and
Kierkegaard (among others). In fact, he claims that his positive argument is
inspired by his reading of Kierkegaard.21 An examination of any of these thinkers
is a tremendous undertaking. Kierkegaard, with his many pseudonymous
20
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writings, is notoriously difficult to interpret. My analysis does not focus on the
works of these authors, but on Evans’s interpretation. Furthermore, to maintain
the course of the examination of contemporary fideism, I do not devote attention
to comparing Evans’s interpretation of Kierkegaard with any other interpretation. I
simply take Evans’s argument for what it is.22 Because Evans is both advancing
an argument and interpreting Kierkegaard, this leads to several situations where
Evans’s interpretive remarks become points in his own positive argument. Where
I think it is correct to do so, I take Evans’s interpretive remarks on Kierkegaard
(“Kierkegaard believes that reason has what we might term a restless,
domineering quality….”)23 as reflective of Evans’s own thought; I restrict this only
to cases where Evans seems to presuppose Kierkegaard’s point of view in
building Evans’s own argument. With this clarification in mind, we can move on to
Evans’s historically grounded claims about the two ways in which reason fails.
With this boundary set we may look at what Evans thinks are the two
problems with reason. The first claim we shall look at is Evans’s claim that
reason has certain cognitive limitations.
The Limitations of Reason
First, there is the claim that reason is limited. In what ways? And is this an
irremediable condition? Evans draws on Aquinas, pointing out beliefs that
22
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Aquinas says cannot be reached by reason, such as what the essence of God is
and what it means for God to be triune.24 Aquinas’ notion of scientia (scientific
knowledge) does not extend to such beliefs. Yet Aquinas suggests that we can
have a kind of knowledge about such propositions. Evans interprets Aquinas as
suggesting a knowledge-by-faith model, wherein one’s faith provides entitlement
to believe.25 “It is not knowledge in the strict sense because it does not include a
direct vision of the truth of what is believed. Nevertheless human beings can by
faith apprehend ‘intelligible truths about God’ that they could not know if they
relied solely on natural human reasoning.”26 Evans is not asserting that Aquinas
is a fideist. Rather, he points out that he considers the limitation of human reason
as a familiar claim in Christian theology and philosophy.
To Aquinas’ arguments that reason is limited, Evans adds Kant’s. Kant
famously divides pure reason from practical reason. Knowledge of God is beyond
the grasp of pure reason. Evans explains Kant’s theory this way: “In a strong
sense… an Idea of reason, such as the Idea of God, marks the boundary or limit
of reason. The Idea of God is meaningful to reason; it is an Idea that reason must
think. However, it [is] an Idea that can never become an object of knowledge.”27
While knowledge of God may be beyond the ken of pure reason, Kant suggests
24
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that the idea of God is necessary for morality. Kant identifies God with the
highest good, and claims that in order for an agent to act morally, to act with
good will, one must believe in God.28 Again, Evans talks about this as a kind of
knowledge of God: “The heart of Kant’s philosophy of religion is his insistence
that the knowledge of God is practical in character. The discovery of God’s reality
is not like the discovery of the neutrino or some other exotic sub-atomic
particle…. Knowing God, however, is supposed to make a difference to how
people view themselves and their task.”29 One’s “knowledge” of God is not from
pure reason; instead, any “knowledge” we have is from practical reason, where
the concept of God is necessary for one to properly reason morally.
Critical to Evans’s analysis is the fact that neither Aquinas nor Kant are
dealing with a notion of knowledge that matches the contemporary notion of
defeasible justified (or warranted) true belief.30 Regardless, points out Evans,
these thinkers do show ways in which reason has its boundaries. It is in
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Postscript, though, that Evans finds his most
important arguments. Kierkegaard suggests that reason is limited in two crucial
ways.
First, reason is limited in its ability to grasp certain concepts. Kierkegaard
moves a step beyond Kant and Aquinas, who suggest it is the essence of God
28
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that confounds us. For Kierkegaard, it is the incarnation that causes reason to
founder. As Evans reads Kierkegaard, the incarnation doubly exposes reason’s
limits:
The point of the incarnation, according to Kierkegaard, is that it is a
concept that reason cannot understand. This is so not because reason
has a perfectly clear grasp of what it means to be God and what it
means to be human and properly judges that the two concepts are
logically contradictory. In fact, just the reverse is the case. Human
reason is baffled both by human nature and by God.31
Evans is here seeking to explain Kierkegaard’s talk of the paradox of the
incarnation. It is not that the incarnation gives rise to a logical contradiction.
Rather, it is that humans understand neither God’s nature nor our own.
Furthermore, we display what Evans calls a synthesis of the eternal and
temporal. Evans describes this as our ability to consider, plan, and set goals.
That is, we are forward-looking and take the future into account when we make
decisions in the present. We are, in fact, so deeply entrenched in this way of
thinking that it is easier for the individual to imagine his existence continuing on
than to contemplate his or her own demise. But, points out Evans, even while we
display such abilities and proclivities, we also often fail to match our current
behaviors to our stated long-term goals. “In reality… all human beings
experience life, at least at some points, as a process in which we diverge from
our ideals.”32 In Christ, explains Evans, we discover the perfect synthesis of the
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eternal (forward-thinking) and the temporal. Evans suggests that we find this, or
at least Kierkegaard finds this, such a jarring revelation that we cannot properly
comprehend it.33
But there is a second limitation of reason that Evans finds in Kierkegaard.
Reason is limited “by the historical finite character of human reasoners.”34
Kierkegaard’s criticism here springs from the disparity between our high
conception of reason and our everyday cognitive situation. For we have what
Kierkegaard calls false but comic presupposition that reason is equipped to
understand the world as a complete system, and in a detached way—a “view
from nowhere.”35 It is important to see that there are two prongs to this complaint.
One is directed against the claim (particularly dominant in Kierkegaard’s milieu)
that reason is capable of understanding the world. This is a limitation of reason.
The second is that it can do so in a dispassionate way—a result of sin. We will
thus shelve the second point for the moment and focus on the first prong.
Whereas Kierkegaard’s first limitation is based on the limits of
understanding, the second focuses on the inability of human reason to generate
sufficiently accurate theories about the world.
When reason attempts to know the world, it can produce wonderful
theories, but when those theories are applied to the actual world, they
can never be more than ‘approximations’, since both the world that is to
33
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be known and the knower are in constant temporal flux. [footnote
removed] My knowledge of the world is both approximative and
tentative, always subject to revision. As a temporal being I can never
see the world as Spinoza attempted to do, ‘under the aspect of
eternity’, as God himself sees things.36
Again returning to Kierkegaard’s paradox of the incarnation, Evans points out
that historically, human thought has stumbled on the juxtaposition of the eternal
and the historical. From Parmenides to the present, endeavors to provide
systematic explanations of the world have failed, for they cannot explain both the
unchanging, law-like features of the universe in conjunction with the seriatim
change of temporal existence. Neither Kierkegaard nor Evans is suggesting that
the world is not governed by laws, nor that it is possible for an ideal mind to
grasp it. The point is merely that human reason is ill-equipped to do this, in spite
of our nearly obsessive attempts to generate adequate theories. Reason, in other
words, is hindered by its inability to handle complexity.
So two cognitive limitations hobble human reason: The first is that certain
things seem to be beyond reason’s ken, appearing to us as “paradoxes” (to use
Kierkegaard’s language). The second is that even within the realm of notions we
ostensibly can grasp, human reason is still incapable of dealing with the
complexity that must be accounted for in explanation.37 As we shall see in a
moment, Kierkegaard (along with Calvin and others) also suggests that reason is
36
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tainted by sin. But before moving to that argument, a few remarks are in order.
First, the argument uses “reason” a little differently than the definitions
offered earlier in the book. Here, reason has more to do with cognitive
capabilities, and is less epistemically oriented. Called into question are matters of
whether we can understand, whether our cognitive machinery can hold enough
information, and whether we can process sufficient amounts of information. What
is importantly not called into question is whether or not we can be justified in
holding certain beliefs. In other words, nothing in this criticism defeats an account
of justification—especially evidentialist justification. Justification does not require
complete understanding of a belief, or of the object of the belief. One’s belief that
electrons exist is not contingent on one’s understanding of the true nature of an
electron. A similar point holds for beliefs about God, the incarnation, the trinity,
and so on. Yet I think Evans is correct in pointing out that this broader notion of
rationality (as cognitive capabilities) is indeed limited in crucial ways. While
Evans may have run afoul of his own definitions, the general point is legitimate. It
may not call into question our evidential practices specifically, but it does properly
challenge any claims that reason is boundless, capable of solving any problem
thrown its way.38
Second, there is little in the arguments of Aquinas, Kant, or Kierkegaard that
would come as a shock to contemporary philosophers. The suggestion that
38
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reason is limited is now well accepted, and the close ties between knowledge
and certainty in the Enlightenment conception of knowledge no longer holds
sway. Knowledge is now widely regarded as defeasible. How does this impact
the argument at hand? Jose R. Maia-Neto’s take on Kierkegaard may be the
most revelatory.39 He suggests that Kierkegaard (in particular) utilizes skeptical
arguments to show that we cannot be certain, which then makes it impossible to
know. Consequently, faith is all that can keep us from despair. But if certainty is
not a requirement for knowledge, one need not accept that the only alternative is
faith.40
In light of these points, it does not at present seem that the limitations of
reason, as elaborated here, force one into fideism. What about the effects of sin?
The Effect of Sin on Reason
The second claim Evans makes about reason is that, because of sin, reason
does not function as it ought.41 In this sense, faith comes into opposition with
reason, seeking to remedy reason’s sin-based failure. “The claim that faith is not
only above but against human reason is rooted, not merely in the recognition of
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human finitude, but in the charge that human reason is radically defective.”

42

There are two ways that Evans thinks reason is tainted by sin. First, reason is
hindered by its pride. Second, it is egoistic and selfish.43 Again, Evans finds both
of these reasons in Kierkegaard, and suggests that these are the grounds upon
which Kierkegaard bases his argument that faith and reason are in conflict, and
one must sometimes choose faith over reason. In Evans’s words, while the
limitations of reason push us toward a model of “faith above reason,” the damage
done to reason by sin pits “faith against reason.”44 Whether or not faith is the
appropriate response to reason’s limitations and failures is the topic of the next
section. In this section, we will look at Evans’s Kierkegaardian argument that
reason is tainted by sin.
Evans identifies pride as the first of two ways in which reason is impacted by
sin. Again drawing from Kierkegaard, Evans states that “Kierkegaard believes
that reason has what we might term a restless, domineering quality, in that it is
always striving to master or appropriate whatever it encounters.”45 When, for
example, the scientist makes a startling discovery, her or his reaction isn’t merely
to marvel, it is to master. And this, suggests Evans, is because reason is prideful.
It tests its limits, constantly pushing for dominion over the world. But herein lies
42
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the problem: “Insofar as reason is confident that it will always be victorious in its
continued quest, it will necessarily reject any claim that there is an ultimate
mystery, anything that is in principle resistant to reason’s domination and
control.”46 Previously we encountered Evans’s arguments that reason is limited—
that there are in fact mysteries that human reason cannot unravel. Here, though,
Evans takes the argument a step further, and suggests that reason pridefully
refuses to accept this, and this pride is damaging. Pride becomes a barrier for
reason. When reason approaches something mysterious, but is then incapable of
understanding or mastering it, reason rejects the mystery: “The attitude is, ‘What
(in principle) I cannot understand must be nonsense’.”47 For Evans, one’s
encounter with a mystery, and subsequently foiled attempts to understand it,
becomes the separation point: Here, one must decide between faith and reason.
The second form of sin that taints reason is selfishness. The crucial point of
contrast here is in reason’s assertion of neutrality: “Reason in fact prides itself on
its disinterestedness and objectivity.”48 Evans is building an ethical case on top of
his previous case for reason’s limitations. Earlier, he argues that one of reason’s
limitations is that it is incapable of taking the “view from nowhere.” Now he
argues that sin compounded with this limitation results in blind selfishness.
Reason maintains that it is capable of taking an objective, neutral view. The
46
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scholar works hard to achieve an objective stance on her or his topic, and views
disinterestedness as a goal to be achieved. In contrast to disinterested
reasoning, there is interested reasoning—reasoning that is done with the goal of
attaining a specific result.49 Evans, via Kierkegaard, argues that the existential
aspects of our daily life necessitate interested reasoning. Ethical and religious
thinking, with its profound influence on day-to-day life, is thus interested
reasoning. Here is where the idea of disinterested reasoning begins to unravel
for Evans, for in our practical reasoning, as a result of sin we are primarily
concerned with ourselves. We are self-centered, says Evans. And this selfcenteredness does in fact extend into areas in which we attempt to maintain
disinterestedness. "Even the disinterested scholar looks first to the index of a
new book to see how many times he or she may be cited."50 Evans is not here
calling into question the veracity of the scholar, but suggesting that even the
application of disinterested analysis is in service to a goal that is self-interested.
The scholar of history may well apply the proper apparatus of critical distance,
but surely the scholar's own pursuits are motivated by a desire to be recognized,
to be understood, and to contribute to her or his field. In the human proclivity of
self-interestedness Evans finds a problem. Our own selfishness is what prevents
us from faith in God, foremost because we cannot understand God's nature for
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our own weakness: "The problem is that God's nature is love and we are so selfcentered that we cannot understand God's love, even when, especially when, it is
expressed in human form."51
Much of Evans’s characterization of selfishness suffers from the absence of
a crucial distinction: There is a difference between acting in self interest and
acting selfishly. Notably, acting selfishly is acting at the expense of others, while
acting in self interest does not imply causing harm, and can be morally and
prudentially justifiable.52 One can act in a self interested way without acting
selfishly. In not making this distinction, Evans seems to have opened up an
interesting moral issue: One's faith is often (if not always) motivated by self
interest as well. A desire for life after death, a fear of eternal condemnation, even
an earnest longing to be in the presence of a benevolent God—all of these carry
no small amount of self interest. Can one therefore condemn the faithful, claiming
it is sinful to have faith because of self interest seems to suggest that one morally
ought to suspend belief? I see no reason to claim that self interested, when it
does not transgress into selfishness, is in any way morally reprehensible.
Interestingly, Evans does not explore what I think may be a more powerful
argument about the effects of sinful selfishness (and one that might help distance
the notion of selfishness from self-interest). It is not only, or not so much, an
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understanding of God that is put in jeopardy by selfishness. Selfishness stands in
stark contrast to what a loving God asks of us, for God requires that we display
the same selfless love toward others. Accepting God's gift is intertwined
inextricably with becoming part of God's gift to the rest of the world by becoming
an avenue through which God's love is expressed.53 For a selfish agent, such an
idea may well be repugnant—repugnant enough to make unbelief a more
pragmatic route than belief. While Evans does not develop this line of argument,
he does point out the result, citing both pride and selfishness as contributing:
There is of course a link between the two ways sin operates to damage
our rational capacities. It is our self-centeredness that makes us
prideful and self-sufficient. It is because we are so fundamentally
concerned with self that we want to make ourselves the centre of the
universe and become as gods. Or, looking at things from the other
direction, it is our prideful self-sufficiency that makes it impossible for us
to love, that blocks us from truly seeing and caring about the other for
the other’s sake.54
At the end of this quote, Evans identifies selfishness as a blocker to the
expression of genuinely other-directed love. If reason is tainted by selfishness
and God requires that one love in this sort of way, then it does seem that one
may cling to selfishness and for that reason make certain decisions against belief
in God.
The Impact
To what extent is Evans successful in arguing for the failure of reason? On
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one hand, I find Evans’s conflation of reason and the agent’s psychological
dispositions to be troublesome. Reason is not prideful. An agent is prideful in
regards to her or his rationality. One can be just as prideful in one’s faith. I
develop this argument later in the chapter, because I think it reveals a crucial
weakness in Evans’s account.
Be that as it may, Evans has uncovered a troubling supposition that we
often make: namely, we forget about the interestedness of our endeavors. Even
in our scholarly detachment, we have intentions that motivate us. While Evans
does not explicitly use the same model of rationality as the one introduced in
chapter 1, the quandary he points out can be seen even more clearly in our
model of rationality: an agent can have a rational preference in favor of, say,
prudential rationality—to selfish extremes, even—over against other forms of
rationality. In that way, we can certainly understand Evans’s suggestion that
reason is tainted by sin. I suggest that if Evans’s main point is that rationality is
not immune from the effects of sin, then he is correct. That said, I’m not quite
sure what it would mean to say that epistemic rationality is tainted by sin, unless
one is using the sin language here to identify cognitive limitations. For as we
have sketched epistemic rationality, free of the personification of reason as a
faculty, it does not have its own “agentness”—it is not the actor; the agent is the
actor. I will return to this later in the chapter.
Then there is the question of whether or not reason is limited, and so limited
in important ways. There are myriad documented ways in which humans have
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cognitive limitations—occurrent capacity, memory, understanding complex
counterfactuals, and so on.55 Cognitive limitations impact reasoning in a very real
way. For that reason, humans cannot act as the ideal reasoners in spite of the
loftiest hopes of philosophers. Again, the point deserves re-iteration that there is
nothing in this account that calls evidentialism directly into question. Evans’s
ambiguous use of “reason” and “rationalism” can sometimes lead to a conflation
of reason—the faculty—and evidentialism or evidentially oriented accounts of
justification. Showing that reason is flawed does not by that fact show that
evidentialism is untenable, for contemporary evidentialism does not require an
ideal faculty of reason. Most evidentialists accept that knowledge is defeasible,
that one cannot occurrently (or even dispositionally) hold all evidence, and that
evidence can be forgotten or otherwise lost. The correct conclusion to draw from
Evans’s argument is that, yes, reason is limited in critical ways. But these
limitations do not show evidentialism untenable.56
Cognitive limitations and the effects of sin both contribute to reason’s
incompetence in matters of religious belief. This is the direction of Evans’s
argument. If this is so, if reason is really so incapacitated, then where ought the
religious seeker look? Whence comes the believers entitlement to believe?
Evans argues that the solution is faith.
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Faith
In the previous chapter we saw seven distinct models of faith. Early in his
book, Evans highlights one of many difficulties in defining faith: “In both secular
and religious contexts, we sometimes speak of faith to highlight uncertainty….
Paradoxically, we sometimes use the term in a way that connotes some kind of
certitude, if not objective certainty….”57 The term faith is used in many ways, and
it can be far from clear what the operative notion behind the term is in any given
context. To clarify what would otherwise be a highly problematic ambiguity,
Evans devotes substantial time to characterizing faith. Yet he stops short of
giving a single unified definition. For that reason, we will need to do some work to
clear away a few difficulties. As with Evans’s description of reason, his
description of faith is sometimes interleaved with analysis of late modern
philosophers, the most notable being Kierkegaard. Evans’s frequent references
to Kierkegaard introduce a difficulty, as it becomes difficult at times to separate
Evans’s notion of faith from Kierkegaard’s (assuming that Evans wishes to
distinguish his from Kierkegaard). For these reasons, understanding what Evans
means by faith requires a bit of reconstruction from his descriptions.
In the previous chapter, I outlined John Bishop’s several models of faith.58
As we begin to examine Evans’s conception of faith, we will see elements of
three of Bishop’s models. Bishop suggests that some so-called Reformed
57

Evans 1998, 2.

58

cf. Bishop 2010.

103
epistemologists (such as Alvin Plantinga) treat faith as a special sort of
knowledge. Evans’s argument has strong Reformed elements, but what we will
see is that his notion of faith diverges from other Reformed epistemologists. 59
Then there is the model of faith as a particular variety of belief—belief, we might
say, with a high degree of certainty or conviction. And the third relevant model is
Bishop’s model of faith as trust. My reading of Evans is that he intends to be
most closely related to the third model, but often falls back into the second
model. And this, as we shall see, is no surprise given his characterization of faith
as consisting of three elements.
Biblical Faith
Evans is interested exclusively in what it means to have religious faith. In
fact, he is most interested in what it means to have faith in God. While he
acknowledges a wide variety of conceptions of faith, Evans thoroughly introduces
only one account of faith, and this he calls Biblical faith.60 Yet he does not claim
that this is his operative notion of faith. After examining this characterization we
will need to determine whether this is in fact his operative notion as well.
Biblical faith, says Evans, has three components: belief, trust, and
obedience. Belief, the first component, is propositional in nature. Biblical faith is
faith in God, not necessarily faith that God exists. Evans treats faith that as
59
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merely propositional, reducing in all important ways to belief (that).

61

Evans is

skeptical, though, that faith and belief in these contexts are sufficient to capture
religious faith—and Christian faith in particular. The belief component in his
tripartite faith model is indeed belief that God exists.62 In what remains, I treat this
as the principle meaning of Evans’s belief condition. But Evans expands on his
belief condition, claiming that it is also “believing what God has said.”63 This
suggests that Evans has a more robust model of belief than epistemologists tend
to immediately attach to the term. Belief of the sort required by faith is belief that
extends beyond its initial target (God) and well into doctrine. What did God say?
There are two ways to interpret what Evans is suggesting here. On the one hand,
one may read Evans as claiming that believing in God (in his sense) entails
holding several related beliefs, such as that the Bible is God’s word. On the other
hand, perhaps he is merely pointing out that Biblical characters believed what
God told them. But this introduces an ambiguity that Evans does not unpack. For
one may then ask what is the difference between belief in this later sense—belief
that what God says is true—and trust. For we might just as readily say “I trust
what S has said” in exchange for “I believe what S has said” and prima facie
mean the same thing. But trust is a separate component in Evans’s
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characterization of faith.

64

To trust someone, says Evans, “is to say that one would be inclined to
believe the person even when that person says something that one has some
reason to doubt.”65 It is tied closely to an epistemic notion of authority and
credulity: Well-placed trust is trust in one recognized as an authoritative source.
That is, to believe a source when one has reason to doubt, one ascribes greater
authority to the trusted source over the other source or sources. “So trust in
another person is linked to beliefs about that person in a double way; it seems
not only to require that we believe what the person tells us, but to require that we
do so partly because we have certain beliefs about the character of that
person.”66 On this account, both belief and trust involve the recognition of
authority. Not only are we to take God as a moral authority; Evans suggests here
that to have faith in God is to consider God an epistemic authority as well.
The third component of the so-called Biblical model of faith is obedience.
This final element is linked primarily to our ethics and actions. Faith in God
includes an action component. That is, a necessary condition of faith is that one
acts in accordance with that faith. If God is to be viewed as an authority—moral,
epistemic, and otherwise—then faith necessarily involves acting as if that were
64
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so. Evans draws upon an historical rift between the Roman Catholic and
protestant theologians over what Luther called “the straw epistle.” Evans
suggests that the Epistle of James be understood as essentially focusing on the
obedience aspect of faith.67 The historical arguments, suggests Evans, were
primarily rooted in a misunderstanding of terminology: The Catholic doctrines did
not explicitly include obedience, while the protestant notion of faith did. Both
understood the necessity of a “willingness to be obedient,” so the dispute was
largely a failure to begin with the same notion of faith. Biblical faith, reiterates
Evans, can only be understood as having three components: belief, trust, and
obedience.
This three-part notion of faith serves as the basis for Evans’s argument that
one ought to believe “by faith” beyond or even occasionally against reason. But
while Evans does pose faith against reason on numerous occasions, it should be
clear that there is nothing inherent in this notion of faith that necessitates the
juxtaposition of faith and reason. That is, faith and reason are not contradictory,
contrary, or “opposites.” But when it comes to further characterization of faith,
there is one additional step Evans takes: He explains faith as a capacity or a
faculty, using much the same language as he does when talking about reason as
a faculty.
Faith as a Capacity
Again drawing on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Evans explains
67
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how faith is a capacity which one developers through certain actions and
attitudes.
For Kierkegaard, faith in God in the general sense we are here
discussing… is essentially a developed spiritual capacity. Cognitively
this capacity expresses itself by giving a person an interpretive skill, an
ability to see a pattern and discern its meaning, where those who lack
the skill in question might see nothing.68
Faith is a capacity, says Evans, to trust God and see God’s presence.69 The trust
aspect of the Biblical model is apparent in Evans’s description here, and the
belief aspect is also readily inferred (one must have a host of beliefs about God,
says Evans earlier, before one can trust in God). Remarking on the effectiveness
of natural theology, Evans states that the so-called proofs of natural theology are
only effective for the believer: “In the beginning of the proof I presuppose that
God exists and actually begin with trust in him.”70 Only with that presumption can
one accept the conclusion.71 It seems clear, then, that faith-as-a-capacity is only
possible if one already has faith in God as explained by Evans’s Biblical faith
model.
What does Evans gain in construing faith as a capacity? Why make this
addition to the model? The primary utility in explaining faith thus is in the
juxtaposition one can then maintain. Recall that on Evans’s account, reason is a
68
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faculty. Evans frequently personifies reason such that reason is making
decisions, reason is prideful, and reason is acting in a certain way. By framing
faith as a capacity or faculty, Evans can now talk about faith in similar terms.
Faith can see the evidence, faith can approach God, and so on. If reason is an
agent-within-an-agent (a homunculus), yet faith is but a disposition of an agent,
the juxtaposition between faith and reason is in some sense strained. However if
both are active within a human, each pushing the agent in a particular direction,
then one can more readily sketch an account of faith versus reason.
I disagree with Evans’s personification of faith just as I do with his
personification of reason, and I will return to that point later in the chapter. But I
think there is another answer to the question of why faith is construed as a
capacity.
Faith, on Evans’s middle-Kierkegaardian account, becomes a faculty of
evidential evaluation. What do I mean by this? Consider Evans’s Biblical model
of faith: Faith is belief that God exists, trust in God (as an authority), and
obedience to God. On this model, to say that one believes that God exists by
faith implies that one has assented to the proposition that God exists and that
one now has a disposition to believe thus. Now consider this modified conception
of faith as a capacity. As a result of Biblical faith one now has a capacity to—
what? To see evidence previously unavailable? Or to interpret certain evidence
in different ways? What is Evans claiming?
Is faith the capacity to see evidence previously unavailable? Suggesting that
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believing E1 may enable one access to evidence E2 is not, by my lights,
problematic. One may look at mathematical beliefs as an example: believing (or
assenting to) a particular theorem or proof may indeed become a foundation for
discoveries that would have been otherwise inconceivable.72 The subsequent
discovery may then become further evidence for yet other mathematical beliefs
(perhaps even beliefs already held). Or consider the case of a doctor evaluating
a patient who may be suffering from one or more heretofore undiagnosed
ailments. When assessing the sick patient who is displaying a litany of
symptoms, the doctor may accept (or even believe) that symptom S is indicative
of disease D. In so accepting this, the doctor may then begin to probe for other
confirming evidence, prompting the patient to disclose more information or
running tests designed to discover latent symptoms. While simply accepting S
does not in itself lead to the immediate availability of other symptoms, it leads the
doctor to direct her investigation in a particular way, thus uncovering previously
hidden evidence. If Evans is suggesting that faith may open one to further
evidence, I do not object. But it strikes me as a category mistake to suggest that
by virtue of opening a route to other evidence, faith is now a capacity. To be a
capacity, it seems to me that faith must also augment one's cognitive abilities
such that one can now do something that one could not otherwise do.
There is a second way of interpreting Evans’s faith-as-capacity model that is
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not in danger of this category mistake. If faith is the ability to interpret evidence
differently, to interpret evidence in a way fundamentally impossible in the
absence of faith, then it does seem that faith is rightly called a capacity. But what
is this new ability that is gained? Here I think Evans’s account is problematic, for
the few examples he gives—acceptance of proofs of God's existence or
openness to seeing God's purpose revealed in nature—do not seem to require
new cognitive capacities. By my lights, they seem to require only holding certain
beliefs (namely, belief in God) as preconditions for holding other beliefs. And as
previous examples show, this is by no means a capacity limited to the religious
believer. It is, in fact, a cornerstone of internalist accounts of evidentialism: Two
people may hold belief B, but while one is justified because she has evidence
that B, the other is not justified because he does not hold evidence that B. 73 We
do not say that our first believer has a capacity that the second does not merely
because she has access to evidence that the second does not. Likewise, I think
that ascribing to faith the status of capacity is ill-conceived.
Evans’s operating notion of faith is the Biblical model discussed previously.
Nevertheless, by calling faith a capacity, Evans now personifies faith in the same
way as he personifies reason.
Fideism and Responsible Fideism
Thus far we have examined Evans’s models of rationality and faith. Reason,
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construed in largely epistemic terms, is a faculty devoted to evaluating beliefs on
the basis of available evidence. But reason is not the pure, wholly objective
faculty that some suggest that it is. It is both cognitively limited and tainted by sin.
Evans defines faith according to what he calls the Biblical model. It is the
conjunction of belief that God exists, trust that what God communicates is in fact
the truth, and obedience to God. Evans treats both faith and reason as
independent faculties, active parts of one’s mental life capable of coming at odds
with each other. Against this backdrop Evans proffers his theory of fideism. We
have already, in the previous chapter, seen a generic account of fideism. Here
we will look at Evans’s own variety of fideism, responsible fideism in that it does
not attempt to dispense with rationality altogether, but rather responds to
reason’s limitations.
Evans introduces fideism this way, contrasting fideism to evidentialism:
The fideist says rather that faith must be accepted as at least partly
autonomous or independent of reason, or even that reason must in
some ways be corrected by or be made subservient to faith… In other
words, the fideist typically rejects the rationalist assumption that reason
is our best or even our only guide to truth, at least with respect to
religious truth. The fideist sees human reason as limited, flawed, or
damaged in some way. Thus, humans who rely on it to obtain religious
truth will not achieve their end. For Christians, the flaw is usually linked
to the sinfulness of human beings.74
Fideism is a response to the recognition that reason is critically flawed. All
varieties of fideism, suggests Evans, have this distrust of reason in common. But
this does not mean that all varieties of fideism reject reason entirely or even
74
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within the context of religious beliefs. In fact, Evans claims that reason is a
necessary component in a successful theory of fideism.75 Evans calls his version
of fideism responsible fideism in order to distinguish it from the caricature of
fideism as stubborn irrationalism. He also seeks to distance his version of fideism
from varieties of fideism based on anti-realism or language-game approaches.76
Though he does not make the overt statement of this as his goal, Evans provides
an account of fideism that combines elements of contemporary analytic
epistemology with a form of fideism he finds in Kierkegaard (mostly in the
pseudonymous writings).
Evans distances his account from irrationalist and skeptical fideism. For
Evans, the irrationalist is one who “rejects reason as a whole.”77 That is,
irrationalism is the rejection of the claim that reason (a faculty) can or ought to
offer any guidance in matters of religious belief. Lev Shestov, whose anti-rational
quips we saw in the previous chapter, is clearly an irrationalist in this way. Evans
also seems to group the theologian Cornelius Van Til with irrationalists as well,
citing Van Til’s claim that only the miracle, and nothing else, can bring one to
faith.78
It is not only irrationalism, but also varieties of language-game and anti75
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realist theories of fideism that Evans wishes to distance from his responsible
fideism. Evans dismisses the fideism he finds in Norman Malcom, D.Z. Philips,
and the theologian Don Cupitt, suggesting that a critical characteristic of religious
belief is lost in these models.79 His argument against these can be summarized
thus: The typical religious believer does not believe she or he is using language
symbolically, or merely trying to express certain feelings or affective states
through a certain use of words. Rather, he says, they are expressing their belief
in certain facts. “[M]ost religious believers will continue to see their faith as linked
to claims about the character of reality, and there is no reason why they should
not do so.”80 Because anti-realism and language game accounts cannot
accommodate this, they are inadequate theories.
Against irrationalist and anti-realist forms of fideism, Evans positions his
responsible fideism as one that recognizes the benefit and usefulness of
rationality. But it suggests that the faculty of reason has certain deficiencies. As
we saw earlier in the chapter, reason is both limited and tainted by sin. In certain
circumstances, the appropriate response to this deficiency is faith. That is, some
beliefs must be held by faith because reason cannot provide the necessary
support.
This is the gist of Evans’s theory. As we unpack it, we first must look at how
justification is related to knowledge, both explicitly and implicitly, in Evans’s
79
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account. We must also examine how faith is supposed to fill the perceived gaps
left by reason’s inadequacy and sinfulness. Answering these questions should
leave us with a succinct account of Evans’s fideism, an account which we can
then assess critically.
Epistemic Justification and Knowledge
It is important to not get our epistemological wires crossed. Historically, at
least some forms of fideism may have arisen as a reaction against the strong
coupling of certainty and knowledge.81 And even in contemporary epistemology,
questions about epistemic justification become inextricably entangled with
questions about knowledge. But a careful distinction between talk about
epistemic justification (herein just justification) and the role (or potential role) of
justification in knowledge will make understanding Evans’s argument easier.82
Some philosophers make a useful distinction between epistemic justification
and warrant. One such recent example is Richard Foley, who views the
differentiation between the two as playing an important role in distinguishing
questions about knowledge from questions about the rationality of belief.83
Warrant, as Foley uses the term, is that which is added to true belief (perhaps
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with a Gettier-defeating clause) to make that belief knowledge. Any given theory
may suggest that warrant is satisfied internally, externally, or by some
combination of the two. Justification, on the other hand, is about rationality of
belief, and as such is generally internal to an agent. One is justified in believing P
when one’s belief is correctly mentally supported.84 When S is justified in
believing P, S is epistemically rational to believe that P. It should be readily
apparent that Foley’s description of justification works in conjunction with the
model of rationality provided in the last chapter. Evidentialism, on this reading, is
an account of justification.85
With this division between warrant and justification in place, we can then
leave it as an open question whether or not justification confers warrant (and
whether justification is the only way to be warranted). Evans’s own view is
nuanced. While he does make a distinction between warrant and justification, he
is not strict about the terminological distinction. He sometimes uses the term
justification to mean only evidentialist justification, and other times uses the term
to mean warrant.86 I attempt to clarify any cases where justification seems to be
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used ambiguously.
Evans’s defense of fideism is not principally about knowledge, but about
epistemic justification. Above I characterized justification along an evidentialist
vein. Evans has the same thing in mind when he talks about internalism and
evidentialism. Insofar as Evans is critiquing “rationalism” and evidentialism, he
conceives of epistemic justification primarily as an internal condition. It seems,
though, that Evans himself espouses a form of externalism about knowledge. 87
He relies upon Plantinga’s notion of a properly functioning belief forming process
to account for how certain beliefs may arise and be warranted.88 For Evans,
(internal) justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Some beliefs
may be properly held without evidence, and hence without justification. Warrant,
in contrast, is necessary. “Having evidence for a belief is clearly one type of
warrant,” says Evans, but it is not the only source of warrant.89 Later in the
chapter, we will explore Evans’s use of warrant and externalism, but for the time
being the salient detail is that there is a clear distinction between (internal)
justification and warrant, with warrant being a necessary component of
knowledge.
Hidden in this brief characterization is a premise that ought to be brought to
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the surface. If knowledge does not require (internal) justification, why is
justification important? Evans does not explicitly give an answer, but I think the
answer can be gleaned from the context.90 What is important about Evans’s
distinction between justification and warrant is not so much what it says about a
theory of knowledge, but of what it says about the importance of having internal
truth-indicators about a belief. In the last chapter we saw how John Bishop
captures the importance of this need in his account of faith. The religious faithseeker, says Bishop, is wary of falling into idolatry. 91 Thus, the seeker wants not
just true belief, or even (externally) warranted true belief, but a sense of
entitlement to believe.92 Evans, too, recognizes the same need to which Bishop
has drawn attention: Evans recognizes that the faith seeker wants reasons to
believe. And reasons, in Evans’s lexicon, is evidence. Evans goes so far as to
suggest that one’s beliefs ought to be reasonable to the greatest possible extent.
This comes through when Evans says, “For fideism, at least as I have interpreted
it, does not wish faith to come into conflict with logical truths and cannot simply
embrace genuine logical contradictions. Nor can the believer simply assume
without argument that reason is completely powerless when it comes to looking
at religious questions.”93 I find at least two reasons Evans thinks that justification
90
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is important for an epistemic agent: First, the rational agent should genuinely
seek to avoid cognitive dissonance—and especially contradictions—whenever
possible.94 As we shall see later, Evans maintains a role for defeaters that can (at
least in theory) defeat even faith-beliefs.95 Second, religious naiveté ought to be
avoided. Even while Evans defends fideism, he seems to acknowledge the
danger of what Bishop calls idolatry: misplacing one’s faith, even if wellintentioned.96 There is the third possibility, and Evans mentions this explicitly,
that justification can be warranting.97 However, in spite of the fact that Evans
thinks justification may confer warrant, this particular reason cannot account on
its own for Evans’s emphasis on justification, especially in light of Evans’s claim
that religious beliefs are properly basic (and thus not in need of justification).
Furthermore if warrant were the only reason justification is important, there would
be no need for a substitutionary faith (as faith very clearly does not confer
warrant). Within an externalist conception of knowledge, fideist faith only has a
role if it can meaningfully supplant justification in the conference of warrant.
Consequently, faith must be understood as having to do primarily with
entitlement, and not as having a role in conferring warrant.
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Justification is a general tool for entitling one’s belief.
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But Evans is

particularly concerned with religious beliefs. Are these in any way a special case
when it comes to questions of entitlement? As Evans puts it, many see
evidentialism as the way to meet the entitlement challenge even for religious
beliefs.99 Evans does not think this is a goal that can be attained. When he pits
evidentialism against fideism what he is suggesting is that there are at least
some cases where faith can replace evidence (and evidentialism) in the role of
granting entitlement to believe. Instead of reasons for belief, Evans’s responsible
fideism proposes that one believe by faith. By faith, Evans is not suggesting that
one has carte blanche to believe anything. As he develops his theory of fideism,
he provides controls intended to combat both naive belief and irrational belief,
though as we have seen, he intentionally leaves room for beliefs that are, as he
puts it, above reason.
Another important issue must be raised here. In the previous chapter I
suggested that John Bishop’s entitlement thesis is based on permissibility. That
is, one is entitled to believe if it is not the case that one ought not believe.
Justification typically has a stronger sense of obligation: If one is justified in
believing P it is the case that one ought to believe P. Justification satisfies the
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requirements of entitlement as understood above.
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If one is justified in believing

P, one is entitled to believe P. But as we shall see, Evans suggests an alternative
to epistemic justification, an alternative rooted in faith. Is this alternative merely a
claim that it is permissible to believe, or does (or can) Evans claim that this faithbased alternative leads to epistemic obligation? I will suggest here that Evans’s
notion of faith tends toward a permissibility thesis. That is, I think Evans is best
understood as claiming that one is rationally permitted to hold beliefs in virtue of
one’s faith.101 But I will add the caveat that Evans himself does not make this
distinction between permission and obligation, and this occasionally seems to
lead him to confuse permissibility with obligation, and thus directly compare
fideist faith with epistemic justification. I return to this issue when I question
Evans’s strong ties between faith and knowledge.
Thus far we have distinguished between justification and warrant, where
justification captures an internal state, and warrant is construed as that which,
when added to true belief, makes knowledge. And we have suggested that
justification may confer warrant in some cases, though we have not made it
necessary that a justified belief is a warranted belief. This model seems to best fit
100
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Evans’s argument. We have also looked at the role of justification in Evans’s
model, with an eye toward understanding why Evans thinks faith can, at least to
some extent, stand as a substitute for justification. Bishop’s notion of entitlement
has helped capture this point.
But what we haven’t seen yet is how Evans construes knowledge. Because
Evans frequently talks about knowledge of God and religious knowledge, to
understand Evans’s fideism we must understand what Evans means by
knowledge.
Warrant and Knowledge
I have suggested that to best understand Evans, we must distinguish
between notions of justification and warrant, and I briefly suggested how
justification may be important even in cases where it does not confer warrant.
And I have stressed that on Evans’s account, justification is not a necessary
component of knowledge. However, Evans frequently talks about knowledge,
particularly knowledge of God. How is this to be understood? Here I want to
sketch what I take to be Evans’s theory of knowledge, an account based
substantially on Reformed epistemology.102
Early in Faith Beyond Reason, Evans introduces externalism, but does so
primarily as a foil to a certain variety of evidentialism. Not until the last chapter
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For that reason he

sometimes sounds as if he is explaining what others believe when he is in fact
enunciating his own theory. Evans explicates his externalism piecemeal,
beginning with the introduction of properly basic beliefs, then adding the notion of
grounded belief, and finally suggesting that a belief may be warranted even if it is
not internally justified.
Evans introduces the notion of a basic belief in the context of a traditional
problem for foundationalism: the so-called regress problem. Evidentialist
justification, suggests Evans, is based on the idea that a belief is justified by
other beliefs, which in turn are justified by other beliefs. This chain of beliefs,
though, cannot go on forever. Some set of beliefs, whether large or small, must
(on Evans’s account) be held without justification.104
[I]f the chain of evidential reasons is not going to be infinitely long, it
seems that I must believe some things without believing those things
on the basis of any other beliefs…. Presumably, then, some of our
beliefs are not only basic, but properly so, in the sense that the person
holding the belief not based on any other beliefs has not violated any
epistemic duty and is not guilty of any intellectual failing.105
Evans suggests here that there is a class of beliefs that are basic—not requiring

knowledge (170).
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any further justification—and that one may rightly hold these beliefs without
justification. Such beliefs he calls properly basic beliefs. But what makes a belief
properly basic? How is it distinguished from other non-basic beliefs? To answer
these questions Evans draws on an argument that Plantinga offers in “Reason
and Belief in God”: We need no criterion or criteria for determining which beliefs
are properly basic. Rather, the question is inductive: we must discover such
beliefs as we go. However, one feature of a basic belief is that it has a ground.106
Evans defines a ground thus:
The ground is not properly thought of as a belief at all, or even as an
experience, but rather as a set of circumstances which includes an
experience of a certain kind… The circumstances in these cases
function as grounds by virtue of the fact that God is said to have
created the mechanisms by which these beliefs are formed.107
A ground is not evidence, and Evans goes to pains to ensure that one does not
misunderstand him thus.108 Grounds have more to do with external
circumstances and belief-producing mechanisms. As Evans explains it, grounded
beliefs are formed immediately because of the circumstances, having no
evidence, but arising spontaneously.109
When Evans considers the question of what knowledge is, and what makes
warrant, Evans invokes the arguments offered by Plantinga, Alston, and others in
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the tradition of Reformed epistemology. Knowledge, on Evans’s account, is
warranted true belief, where warrant is to be understood in an externalist way. He
gives a rough characterization of externalism: “The externalist insists that
whether a belief amounts to knowledge depends upon many factors that are
external to my consciousness and not completely within my control.”110 However,
when it comes to specifics, Evans is non-committal on which precise formulation
of externalism he espouses. Yet while he sketches both Alston’s version of
reliablism and Plantinga’s earlier proper-function account, it is from Plantinga he
most frequently draws.111
What is important about Evans’s externalist theory of knowledge is what it
confers on the fideistic believer: If S believes that P, and in fact (it is the case
that) P, yet S cannot be justified in believing P, then on the internalist account of
knowledge, S cannot know P. But Evans wants to make the stronger claim that
we can have knowledge about God (and not strictly in the acquaintance sense
that he sometimes uses, but in the propositional sense, too). However, if warrant
can be had externally, then one may in fact be able to have knowledge of God
without being justified. And to turn a Kantian phrase, this makes room for faith.
Now we are ready to turn to Evans’s responsible fideism, and see how Evans’s
accounts of knowledge and justification combine with his view of faith and reason
110
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to produce what he calls responsible fideism.
Responsible Fideism
Thus far I have sketched Evans’s models of rationality and faith and I have
outlined Evans’s epistemology, with emphasis on his views on (internal)
justification, warrant, and knowledge. Now we can formulate Evans fideism in its
epistemic context.
Reason, we have seen, is deeply flawed in two ways. First, it is limited. Its
capacities do not extend indefinitely, and clearly reason cannot comprehend all
that it encounters in the world. Second, reason is tainted by sin. It is prone to
selfishness and pride, refusing to acknowledge its limits, and subverting its own
claims of objectivity by pursuing (subjective) interests and agendas. This, more
than anything, becomes Evans’s impetus for fideism. Reason is most critically
flawed in its approach to religious matters, specifically in its approach to the
question of whether there is a transcendent God who is an absolute authority.
Reason cannot understand this, nor does it, in its pride and selfishness, wish it to
be the case that it is accountable to a greater authority. Thus, reason cannot on
its own be trusted to lead one to truth.112
This leads to the problem of justification of beliefs about God. Justification,
understood along evidentialist lines, requires that one have sufficient undefeated
evidence in support of a belief. But because of reason’s limitations, we cannot
rely upon it to produce such justification. Whether there is available evidence for
112
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God’s existence is inconsequential, for a deeper problem exists. Reason may
operate well enough for our run-of-the-mill beliefs, but when it comes to religious
beliefs, when it comes to inquiry about God, reason’s litany of shortcomings have
the combined effect of rendering our everyday evidentialism useless or, at best,
highly dubious.
But, says Evans, this should neither foreclose the possibility of being entitled
to believe that God exists (and hold other religious beliefs), nor foreclose the
possibility of having knowledge about religious things. On the one hand, faith can
entitle belief, and on the other hand, the externalism of Reformed epistemology
shows that knowledge does not require justification. Accepting these propositions
is not wholesale acceptance of irrationalism, though it is fideism. Rather, it is
accepting rationalism only to the point where one ought to accept rationalism—it
is accepting that reason functions properly in certain domains, while in others its
limitations prevent it from autonomously functioning correctly. In such
circumstances, faith is the better alternative.
Divested of its Kierkegaardian, Thomistic, and Kantian trappings, this is the
outline of the argument that Evans is making. All of this is what Evans has in
mind when he offers this characterization of his own theory:
[F]aith is against reason only in the sense that it runs into conflict with a
concrete form of reason that is damaged. Perhaps it is best to describe
such a faith as beyond reason rather than against reason, since there
is no necessary conflict with reason, but only a conflict with reason that
has suffered damage but refuses to recognize this.113
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Evans offers a partial taxonomy of fideism. First, there is fideism in general,
characterized as it is by its distrust of reason, and it’s forwarding of faith as the
remedy. Within fideism in general, Evans offers three strains he sees as
untenable, or at least undesirable. These we have addressed before:
irrationalism (including at least some types of skeptical fideism), anti-realism, and
Wittgensteinian fideism (or language-game fideism). But there is also a type of
fideism that maintains a commitment to religious realism and also rejects the
blanket dismissal of rationality as espoused by irrationalists.114 This is the sort of
fideism Evans calls responsible fideism.
There are several reasons why Evans characterizes his fideism as
responsible: First, he suggests that reason is the appropriate tool in most
epistemic situations. Thus, reason cannot be discarded. Second, while reason
may be critically limited, Evans thinks that one can become aware of this and
adjust accordingly. While, on Evans’s account, this requires humbling oneself
and accepting both one’s own limitations and God’s authority even on epistemic
matters, Evans seems to suggest that a sort of epistemic rehabilitation occurs
thereafter.115 While reason’s deficiencies are not remedied, an agent’s reliance
on reason may continue because the agent is aware of those deficiencies and
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(Without the rehabilitation that comes from faith, one

cannot work around the deficiencies.) Third, reason in responsible fideism plays
the role of assessing defeaters to faith. That is, faith can be defeated
rationally.117
But following his interpretation of Kierkegaard, Evans takes one further step
to claim that faith is in some sense against reason. There are religious truths,
says Evans, that stymie reason. They appear in the form of Kierkegaardian
paradoxes.118 The incarnation of the God-man is the foremost example. When
one encounters these “absurdities,” these challenges to a faculty of reason that
will not and cannot accept such propositions, one must make an informed choice
between faith and the conclusions of reason. Such areas are precisely the ones
in which, Evans points out, reason is at or beyond its limits. To assent, to believe,
is to go against reason. But it is to go against reason where reason is not reliable
anyway.
Where does this fideism leave the believer, epistemically speaking? Faith
does not confer justification; rather it replaces it in its entitling role. That is, in
these cases where reason has reached its limit, one is entitled to believe by faith.
116

It never becomes clear what this rehabilitation is or entails, but it seems that the principle gain
comes in the form of having a new evidence base of faith beliefs that can then support other
beliefs.
117

118

Evans 1998, 106-112.

Evans devotes substantial space to explaining Kierkegaard’s usage of the terms paradox,
absurdity, and contradiction. In all three cases, the salient point is that these are not indicators of
logical contradiction, but of deep difficulties at the notional level. Evans likens them to Kant’s
antinomies. Evans 1998, 80-86, 91, 93-94.

129
It is, epistemically speaking, permissible for one to believe. But without
justification, can one have knowledge about these faith beliefs? Here, the
externalism of Reformed epistemology provides a clear yes: knowledge does not
require internal justification. So long as one’s faith is formed by a reliable or
properly functioning belief forming process, one’s belief may be justified. John
Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, or the guidance of the Holy Spirit, may play that role of
a reliable process.119 Thus it is reasonable to suggest that one may indeed have
religious knowledge, even when one is not justified in one’s belief.
This is Evans’s account of responsible fideism. With an externalist
epistemology that preserves knowledge in absence of justification, and a model
of faith and reason that suggests that there are areas of belief that extend
beyond the ken of reason, Evans argues that when it comes to religious beliefs—
especially beliefs about an absolutely authoritative God—we would do best to
shelve the arguments of natural theology and take the advice of Kierkegaard,
having faith beyond reason, and perhaps even faith against reason.
Three Questions
So far we have seen how Evans construes fideism. By examining what
Evans means by faith, reason, and justification, we have seen how Evans’s
fideism suggests that human rationality is both limited and flawed. We have seen
how Evans uses this argument to dismiss the efficacy of evidentialism in
justifying belief in God and in other religious propositions. And we have seen how
119
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Evans suggests that faith can bridge the gap purportedly impassable to reason.
Evans calls fideism that is committed to reason responsible fideism.
But there are questions that arise about Evans’s theory. In this section I
raise three that are particularly telling. In answering these questions, certain
issues with Evans’s theory come to the surface. I suggest that these issues
indicate that Evans’s fideism may not be the best grounds for believing in God,
and may not even admit permissibility of such beliefs.
The first question is in regards to Evans’s suggestion that reason plays an
evaluative and corrective role in faith. Evans suggests that defeaters may rightly
defeat faith. The second question has to do with the conflict between faith and
reason. Evans suggests that in some circumstances we are confronted with faith
on one hand, and reason on the other, and we ought to select faith. And the final
question focuses on the relationship between knowledge and faith. Here I
question Evans’s use of externalism.
What is the Role of Defeaters?
Defeaters play a curious role in Evans’s overall scheme. Evans spends
considerable time developing an account of the limitations of reason. As a
remedy, he suggests faith. Given his externalist bent, justification is not a
requirement on his account, as beliefs may be warranted even when unjustified.
But just as it seems that Evans has departed wholesale from internalism, he
suggests a new role that reason plays in relation to faith. Faith, he says, may be
defeated by undefeated defeaters. This claim, which is the subject of the present
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section, is then further complicated by Evans’s other claim that in some cases,
“paradoxes,” “absurdities,” and “contradictions” ought to be accepted against
reason. But if this is so, what exactly are we to make of defeaters? How powerful
are they, and under what circumstances are they a concern?
Defeaters
From Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Evans draws the conclusion
that there is no role for evidence in supporting religious beliefs. But Kierkegaard,
he thinks, has gone too far. Evans makes this remark: “Objective evidence may
be neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. However, it does not follow from this
that objective evidence is simply irrelevant for faith, or that the believer will have
no concern for evidence. Even a belief that is properly basic is subject to being
‘defeated’ or overturned by evidence.”120 Evans thus suggests that for any given
belief, evidence may arise that overturns or defeats the belief. And this is a
proper role for reason.
Evans does not spend substantial time developing a notion of defeaters in
Faith Beyond Reason. In an earlier book, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of
Faith, he outlines a theory of defeaters in the context of basic and non-basic
beliefs, though even this characterization is brief: There are defeaters that
suggest belief B is false, and there are defeaters that suggest the process of
arriving at B is not truth conducive.121 Either type may possibly overturn one’s
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belief if left undefeated. Much has been written in contemporary epistemology
about the nature of defeaters.122 But rather than dwell on details and edge cases,
Evans suggests that, “It is not always clear when it is reasonable to think a belief
has been defeated,” and with this acknowledgement he moves on to cases that
he thinks are clear cut.123 The particular case he chooses reveals what I take to
be the most perplexing aspect of his claim that reason can play a role in fideist
faith.
[I]t seems wrong to say that the believer would always be right to ignore
evidence that falsified the belief. Suppose, for example, that we found
overwhelmingly powerful evidence that Jesus never existed, and that
the whole of Christianity, along with its early history, had been invented
in the fifth century. If the evidence were really powerful, would it still be
possible to continue to believe that an historical figure from first-century
Palestine, Jesus of Nazareth, was divine?124
What is the responsible fideist to do? Evans’s conclusion: In this case, the
evidence is a defeater. Rationality wins out over faith. I find this perplexing for a
few reasons, but before explaining those, there is the matter of defeating the
defeater.
Evans claims that even while reason may alight upon evidence that is rightly
a defeater for a belief held by faith, that defeater can be defeated. That may
seem unsurprising, but there is a twist: In cases where the original (defeated)
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belief is held by faith, “[t]he intellectual inquiry and amount of evidence that might
be necessary in order to ‘defeat the defeater’ is quite different than what would
be required if the belief itself were based simply in objective evidence.” 125 And it
is not that a faith-defeater defeater needs more evidence—on the contrary, it
needs less. Evans suggests that for a faith belief, the criterion for defeating a
defeater is only that there “is no overwhelmingly powerful evidence,” while the
requirement for the evidentialist is that the truth be “proved.”126 That is, in the
case of the alleged fifth century Christianity fraud, the faith-holder need only
discover that there is no overwhelming evidence that the Jesus story was a myth,
while presumably a believer who believed on the basis of evidence would
require, it seems, conclusive evidence that the alleged first century fraud story is
itself untrue.127 The rationale for this perplexing dual standard is not explained.
Even granting Evans’s initial claims about fideism, I do not see any reason
to accept the suggestion that defeaters are defeated differently for beliefs held by
faith and beliefs supported by evidence. More detailed accounts of defeaters and
defeating defeaters may better address what is required for defeating defeaters,
but for the present, I suggest that Evans is mistaken in claiming that evidentially
held beliefs have a higher onus when confronting defeaters. If anything, it seems
that the opposite would be true: faith beliefs, absent sufficient evidence, ought to
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be more readily jettisoned when confronted with an undefeated defeater.
Drawing on the earlier distinction between faith and justification, it seems clear
that psychological conviction notwithstanding, faith is on weaker epistemic
footing than a justified belief in virtue of the fact that it is not evidentially
supported. Suggesting that an evidence-less belief is less susceptible to defeat
than a justified belief borders on irrational, as it clearly does not align with the
rational obligation to maximize true beliefs while minimizing false ones.
Defeating the defeater, as troublesome as it appears here, is the lesser
problem. The greater problem is Evans’s account of defeaters and one’s
response.
What Defeats What?
The main point of Evans’s introduction of defeaters is this: While one may
hold a belief by faith, reason may reveal defeaters that can (and perhaps ought
to) defeat faith. That is, when an undefeated defeater against a belief held by
faith comes to one’s attention, one must assess whether, as a result of the
defeater, one ought not believe. While defeaters are traditionally posed against
justification or warrant, Evans acknowledges that they may operate against faith
as well. There are, however, two difficulties with such a use of defeaters.
First, it is not clear what part of faith the defeater defeats. All things
considered, this may be a minor point, but I find it troublesome. Evans’s account
suggests that defeaters work against faith in the same way that they work against
justification. The context of Evans’s discussion, too, is on internalist notions of
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justification—and more specifically, it is about evidentialism. A defeater works
against evidence in that it can rebut or undercut that evidence. In the typical
account of defeaters, when E is evidence in support of P, a rebutting defeater E*
indicates that not-P.128 Evans’s example above is an example of a rebutting
defeater. A defeater is undercutting when it calls into question the connection
between evidence E and P. Undercutting defeaters capture the case where E’s
relation to P is not such that P follows by virtue of E, or, as Pollock and Cruz put
it, an undercutting defeater shows that E does not guarantee P.129 In short, a
defeater presents a challenge to the source of support for a proposition.130
But how do defeaters work against faith? Faith, in Evans’s Biblical model, is
a combination of belief (that), and trust and obedience to God. Even in the
traditional account of defeaters, a defeater is not a defeater of belief, but of
justification. Thus, there is no reason to suggest that a defeater in this context
defeats belief. Indeed, it is not clear what that would even mean. So does a
defeater defeat obedience, or defeat trust? Both trust and obedience seem to be
about a relationship tangental to the actual belief. I may trust God and I may
obey God, but what part of Evans’s example of the alleged fifth century
Christianity scandal undermines that specific trust? I may continue to trust and
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obey God, but reject propositions about early Christianity, perhaps even about
the incarnation. I think the actual role that the defeater is playing here is in regard
to entitlement. This defeater theory suggests that in light of an undefeated
defeater, it is simply no longer epistemically permissible to believe that which has
been defeated. But entitlement is something I have added to Evans’s account.
Thus, it seems to me that importing the notion of a defeater and using it in
relation to faith exposes a weakness of Evans’s account—an overzealous
attempt, perhaps, to make faith act like justification. Only when faith is properly
understood as only entitlement, and not a direct analog or alternative to
justification do we see how faith can be undermined by a defeater. Again, this is
a minor problem, one that the present account has already corrected. The other
looms large.
Secondly, there is the matter of reason defeating faith. How does this
concept of a defeater coexist with Evans’s claim that sometimes reason is
incapable of addressing certain propositions simply because it is too limited?
Evans cites Aquinas, Kant, and Kierkegaard all on this matter, concluding that
reason sometimes falls short.131 Evans believes reason is critically flawed. But in
light of reason’s incapacity to understand how God could become a person,
reason’s incapacity to understand triunity, reason’s incapacity to understand
God’s authority or power, and so on how can reason suddenly be competent to
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defeat faith?
I find it odd that while evidence for or against a religious proposition does
not count toward entitling a religious belief, evidence against an already held
proposition does count. Evans reiterates throughout the book that when it comes
to certain matters, and religious propositions are the foremost example, reason’s
limitations and sinfulness make it an ill candidate for supporting religious beliefs.
Evans does not argue that there is no evidence for God’s existence, nor does he
argue even that the evidence is necessarily unavailable or underdetermining. He
argues that reason is the problem. Regardless of whether there is evidence for
God’s existence or for the historical works of Jesus, reason is incapable of
justifying such religious beliefs because of its own flaws. Broaching such
religious topics is beyond reason’s capabilities. This, of course, is what makes
faith an indispensable component of rational religious belief. Why, then, is reason
suddenly qualified to defeat faith? Are not those same limitations of reason—its
pridefulness, its selfishness, its limitations in capacity and understanding—
reasons that should also disqualify it from presenting defeaters?132 One might
attempt to circumvent this argument by claiming that, once aware of its
limitations, reason can properly operate in cooperation with faith, and thus in this
renewed capacity rightly present defeaters. But this borders on begging the
question, for if reason presents defeaters that undermine faith in propositions
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about God’s existence, one does not then say it is by God’s rehabilitation of
reason that reason properly undermines belief in God.133
It does seem, though, that Evans’s intuition about defeaters is correct: When
overwhelming evidence presents itself, one ought to follow the evidence. If Evans
indeed wants to maintain an air of epistemic rationality, such a move is, it seems,
necessary. To refuse a role for defeaters is to concede the point to the irrational
fideist: reason plays no role in faith. To avoid this, acknowledging a role for
defeaters seems to be a requirement. Yet it also does not work, for it must, to
turn a phrase, place reason above faith.
Finally, Evans’s introduction of defeaters brings into sharp relief a nagging
issue with his characterization of reason in general: Repeatedly we see reason
characterized as imperfect—“fatally flawed,” says Evans. Yet he continually
returns to the claim that fideism can be reasonable. Even with the hairline
differentiation between rationalism, rationality, and reason, Evans still seems to
have transgressed on an important detail: ultimately faith (on this account) has to
be judged to be reasonable, and so judged by a faculty Evans says is decisively
unreliable. This account of defeaters is but one example of how Evans smuggles
reason back in as a counterbalance to faith while still maintaining that reason is
not competent in such matters. Evans does argue that even a flawed reason
133
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would be capable of recognizing its own limits, but can it compensate for these
limitations? The best answer Evans has to offer is that reason is in some way
redeemed by faith.134 However, it is unclear what this redemption looks like, and
the context indicates that all Evans really means by redemption is that once one
has faith that P, one can then proceed to use P as the basis for other beliefs.
In the end, the re-introduction of reason and evidence in relation to
defeaters is problematic. We are left with three problems arising out of two
questions: First, there is the ambiguity of what is defeated by a defeater. Second,
there is the question of how reason can play a role regarding raising and
defeating defeaters when it was deemed to deficient to bring to bear on the
proposition in question. Third, there is the fact that in the end, reason becomes
the judge of faith, reversing the roles Evans has so assiduously asserted. What
all of this illustrates is the tension that arises when epistemic goals of maximizing
true beliefs and minimizing false ones come into conflict with the very notion that
is central to fideism: that some beliefs can be held by faith, regardless of the
evidence. Evans’s attempt to introduce reason back into the picture as a check
and balance to faith unveils the weakness in the theory. If reason is incapable of
providing positive support for a belief, why is it capable of undermining faith? If
evidence plays no role in supporting religious beliefs, why can it play a role in
defeating religious beliefs? But if defeaters are not allowed, we end up in the
position Evans thinks is so undesirable: faith is unchecked by reason.
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If Knowledge is External, How Can It Depend on Faith?
In the previous section I suggested that Evans’s attempt to incorporate a
theory of defeaters into his model of faith-based epistemic entitlement suffers
from several flaws. In this section, I change tack from talking about entitlement
and justification to examining what Evans has to say about knowledge. Evans
defends a form of externalism strongly influenced by Reformed epistemology.
But he also integrates faith into this knowledge model. I argue that Evans’s
attempt to integrate faith into an account of knowledge causes problems for his
overall theory of fideism.
Knowledge, Warrant, and Justification
While Evans discusses externalism at various points in Faith Beyond
Reason, it is in chapter 10 that Evans incorporates externalist epistemology into
his account of knowing God. What purpose does an external account of
knowledge serve? Given that Evans is intent upon producing a strongly epistemic
fideism, what I see Evans doing here is preserving the idea that there can be
knowledge of God, while also attempting to preserve faith-based beliefs against
the failed attempts at justification he broadly criticizes.135 How does his
externalism mesh with his concern for evidential (internal) justification and faith’s
substitutionally entitling role?
To begin answering this, we can inquire into the role of justification in
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Evans’s epistemology. As we saw earlier in the chapter, Evans does maintain a
deep concern for evidentialist justification of at least some propositions. Why is
Evans so concerned with internal justification (and thus with providing an account
of faith to “fill the gap”)? Earlier I suggested two reasons: The first is that Evans is
committed to epistemic rationality—applying reason in cases where reason is
qualified for that application (i.e. where reason’s deficiencies do not disqualify it).
While Evans is an externalist, this notion of epistemic rationality always plays out
in his works in a primarily internal fashion: We seek justification (or entitlement) in
order to avoid conflict and eschew contradiction, and rightly so. The epistemic
import of justification, then, is to meet in whole or in part this requirement.136 The
second reason that justification is important is that one of our rational goals is to
maximize our true beliefs while minimizing false ones. Justification is a tool for, if
nothing else, satisfying our own questions as to whether or not we have done
this. John Bishop adds what I consider an appropriate religious spin on this when
talking about religious beliefs: The religious seeker wants to avoid idolatry. That
is, the religious seeker wants to avoid believing the wrong things about God or
about ultimate reality, the religious seeker wants to avoid misdirecting her or his
devotion. As we have seen, Evans suggests that faith may also meet this need.
The version of externalism Evans finds in Plantinga does not necessarily
accommodate these needs. Thus it seems that justification, in its internalist
136
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sense, retains an important role in describing a common epistemic goal. But
Evans does not alter his externalist theory of knowledge. What we are left with is
Evans’s separate accounts of knowledge and of justification/entitlement.
Knowledge is warranted true belief, where warrant may arise externally.
Justification is a primarily internal matter of evaluating one’s beliefs, as is
entitlement. But Evans’s view of justification differs in another way: He is not so
much interested in being obligated to hold a faith belief, as traditional justification
models might indicate. He is more interested in whether one is permitted to
believe. While justification caries with it a sense of epistemic obligation,
entitlement is about the permissibility of holding a belief. That is, if S is justified in
believing P, one epistemically ought to believe P; if S is entitled to believe P, then
it is not the case that S ought to believe not-P. Thus, for Evans, epistemic
justification that P implies epistemic entitlement to believe P.
At first blush, it seems that we can then make a clear segmentation between
justification and entitlement on the one hand, and warrant (and knowledge) on
the other. However, the separation is not so clean as the picture above may
indicate, for Evans describes faith as necessary for knowledge.
Externalism
In the chapter entitled “A Fideistic Account of Knowing God,” Evans makes
a curious claim:
What I wish to argue is that a fideist does not have to deny that there is
any such thing as a natural knowledge of God. What the fideist must
deny is that there is any knowledge of God, or at least any worthwhile
knowledge, that can be had independently of faith. Such a claim is
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consistent, however, with affirming the possibility of real knowledge that
is dependent on faith.137
How can knowledge be dependent upon faith? Evans is an externalist about
knowledge, characterizing externalism as being free from dependence upon just
this sort of internal state. The traditional externalist does not require justification,
or even entitlement as a criterion for knowledge. So how can faith be required for
knowledge?
There are a few ways to understand what Evans claims. The first is to
suggest that Evans has not wholly jettisoned his notion of internal justification,
even as he espouses a form of externalism. And this is born not so much from
any attempt to build an integrated internalist/externalist epistemology, but out of a
terminological misstep. It is a confusion introduced by ambiguous use of the term
justification to sometimes mean warrant (as we have defined it) and to
sometimes mean internalist justification.138 This dual usage becomes more
problematic when combined with Evans’s negligence in distinguishing
justification from entitlement, which sometimes leads to the posing of faith as a
replacement for internal justification.139 And what we are left with is the
unqualified suggestion that faith is required for knowledge regarding religious
propositions even while it is seemingly not necessary in “garden variety” cases of
137
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knowledge.
If we are to read Evans in this way, then it appears that he makes a critical
mistake in his characterization of belief. Evans suggests that certain religious
beliefs, such as the belief that God exists, are properly basic. On Evans’s
account, such a properly basic belief arises from an external ground, from a
properly functioning belief forming process. (In this case the sensus divinitatis is
the likely candidate.)140 But here arises the confusion: Evans suggests that in
regards to one’s internal relation to certain religious beliefs, one cannot have
justification, and instead one has faith. Note a crucial detail of this argument: faith
does not produce the belief. It cannot, by definition, produce the belief, as belief
is a component of faith. Perhaps it arises with the belief, and is as Evans remarks
at one point, a gift. Or perhaps taking the belief by faith is the result of rational
deliberation, as Evans argues in a sustained way. 141 But the belief itself is a
result of the properly functioning process.
So we have two things. First there is the externalist explanation of a belief B
arising from a properly functioning belief forming process. Also we have the
internalist explanation that one is entitled to believe by faith. But Evans’s claim is
that faith plays a role in knowing. Where does faith come in to the question of
knowledge? Here I think Evans’s terminological overload causes a problem. He
mistakenly takes the internalist sense of entitlement to be serving as warrant for
140
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the belief. I think this arises from Evans’s argument that faith can replace
justification, conjoined with Evans’s usage of the term justification to sometimes
mean internal justification and sometimes mean warrant. But this claim clearly
cannot hold. Faith does not justify a belief, and faith cannot warrant a belief. This
is quite simply not the role that faith is deemed to play.
If this is the confusion that causes Evans to claim that religious knowledge is
dependent on faith, then it appears that such a claim has been overturned. But
perhaps there is another way to interpret this difficulty.
What if what Evans means when he claims that (natural) knowledge of God
is based on faith is merely that for one to attain knowledge of God, one must first
hold certain fideistically held beliefs?142 This can roughly be abstracted into
something like this: S believes B1, S has faith that B1, and S then uses B1 as
evidence in support of some other belief, B2. Faith, in this account, is then
necessary in that it is S’s faith that brings B1 as evidence for B2. While Evans is
an externalist, he does suggest that evidence sometimes plays a role in
warranting some beliefs.143 In this case, the claim might be better understood as
S knows B2 because S has faith that B1 and hence can use B1 as evidence for
B2 (and B1 is sufficient evidence for B2). It seems that such an account does not
142
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fall victim to the argument I raised above. However, it has its own problem.
The problem with this attempted escape is it is based upon a mis-construal
of how warrant works, for if B1 is a basic belief, faith is altogether superfluous to
the account. First, by definition, S already believes B1. So we do not need faith
merely for the belief component. Second, neither obedience nor trust have any
bearing on B1. Third, at no point has entitlement been a requirement for warrant,
or for evidence. The opposite seems to be the case for externalism. S can have
B1 as evidence without B1’s being a faith belief (or without S’s being entitled to
believe B1).144 In fact, to suggest otherwise defeats externalism’s most
trumpeted claim: that one can know P without needing to possess some internal
state linking one’s belief to P. Take, for example, the early version of Plantinga’s
externalism of which Evans makes use. Basic beliefs (on this account), in virtue
of their basicality, obviate the need for S to produce support for one’s belief.
Their support is found in their arising from a properly functioning belief forming
process. To make Evans’s claim that basic beliefs (specifically, here, basic
religious beliefs) cannot be justified—and thus faith is required—is to undercut
the claim that external support is sufficient for warrant. If B1 is a basic belief, then
B1 is warranted if and only if B1 arose from a properly functioning belief forming
process. Neither internal justification nor entitlement have any bearing on B1’s
warrant. Nor do they have any bearing on belief, or the truth of B1. Thus, faith
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has no bearing on B1’s being known.
Even granting that B2 is warranted by evidentialist means, and that B1 is
sufficient undefeated evidence for B2, faith does not play a role in either B1’s
being evidence or B1’s warranting B2.145
In the end it does not seem that faith is necessary for knowledge of God,
even of natural knowledge of God. We have already examined at length why
entitlement is important for a reflective believer—for one inquiring into their
beliefs. But to retain an externalist notion of knowledge, it seems best to not
attempt to add an entitlement requirement.
The Result
Evans wants to link faith to knowledge, yet retain an externalism about
knowledge. As we have seen, this does not work without coining an
epistemology with the strained requirement that religious knowledge is a special
case of knowledge, requiring not just warranted true belief, but also an extra
internalist condition of faith. This clearly is not what Evans intends. I suggest that
the right response is to eliminate the faith-knowledge connection.
Thus what we are instead left with is another role for faith: Faith is an
internalist entitlement condition, an “assurance,” as it were, that one is not
irrational in holding one’s religious beliefs; that one is epistemically permitted to
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hold such a belief. One might ask what value entitlement offers. And is this what
we, as epistemic agents, really ought to seek? Evans says yes, we must,
because there is no better epistemic route for us to take. We are epistemic
irrationalists, naive believers, or responsible fideists. We can be nothing more,
says Evans, because reason is fatally flawed. Thus of the three, Evans has
argued, fideism is the most preferable. This raises our last question: Is faith
really a better candidate than reason?
Should We Really Side with Faith Over Reason?
The single most important conclusion Evans claims to have drawn is that
responsible fideism is the best route to take for epistemic entitlement of faith
beliefs. I have already raised questions about Evans’s attempts to re-integrate “a
role for reason” in the form of a theory of defeaters, and also about Evans’s
attempt to make faith a condition for religious knowledge. But Evans’s critical
point is his argument that due to reason’s flaws, the move to faith is one’s best
option for entitling certain religious beliefs. Now I want to address the question of
whether Evans has given sufficient reason for accepting this conclusion. Should
we really side with faith over reason?
Earlier, I devoted a substantial part of this chapter to exploring what Evans
has to say about reason. I noted that for Evans, reason is an epistemic faculty.
Evans ties it to evidentialism as a faculty that evaluates evidence and produces
justification. Most notably, Evans reiterates countless times that reason is flawed
in such a way as to render it unreliable in certain important domains, most
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importantly in regard to religious beliefs.
Evans personifies reason, and to an extent does the same with faith. Like
dueling homunculi, Evans portrays reason and faith as battling capacities. He
conjures images of inner turmoil in which a person’s will is caught between
warring forces within herself or himself. But ought reason and faith be construed
in such terms? Or in doing so is Evans introducing a false metaphor? I suggest
that his characterization is inaccurate and leads to a confused conclusion. Once
we jettison the talk of “faith versus reason” we see the great problem in Evans’s
outcome: There is no reason to accept that faith is a better candidate than
reason. A rational agent, even a limited one whose judgment may be clouded by
sin, is not best served by abandoning reason and espousing a doctrine of
“believing by faith.” On such grounds, one may embrace all sorts of abhorrent
beliefs.146
What does Evans mean when he says “reason attempts to know the
world”?147 What about suggesting that it “is possible, however, for reason itself to
recognize its own ‘neediness’, if it is properly ‘educated’ by a transforming
encounter with God’s revelation.”148 What does it mean to suggest that reason is
prideful or restless or domineering or confident? What does it mean to say that,
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“Reason… prides itself on its disinterestedness and objectivity”?
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In these

passages, showing samples of a literary device used throughout the book,
reason is personified, treated as if it is in some way capable of making decisions,
having feelings, and setting agendas independently of the agent. I call it a literary
device because I do not think that Evans is really suggesting that reason is a
homunculus-like independent agent operating within the human mind. But I think
that this literary device introduces a flaw into the argument.
Evans talks about two deficiencies in reason. The first is its cognitive
limitations. Reason is incapable of understanding everything, or of grasping
everything, or of holding large amounts of data simultaneously, or even of
intuiting the details of all arguments. As contemporary empirical psychology has
shown with ample evidence, reason is not without its ticks and quirks. That
reason is limited seems to be a broadly accepted thesis, and the fact that Evans
personifies reason when talking about it does not seem to adversely impact the
argument.
But then Evans talks about reason as being tainted by sin. Reason is
prideful. Reason is selfish. Reason balks at being placed under the authority of
God. This characterization is problematic. It indicates that reason has some
degree of isolation from the human agent. It suggests that reason, not the agent,
is the culprit. In and of itself this might not present a problem. But Evans chooses
to frame the argument in terms of reason and faith, where faith takes on an
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analogous personality. Thus Evans makes statements such as “faith does not
even want objective certainty; it thrives on uncertainty….”150
With this personification of two faculties, it is no surprise that there is an
intra-agent tone to Evans’s positioning of faith and reason. Here is an account of
faith versus reason, a battle within an agent, with reason pushing one agenda
and faith pushing another. And while reason comes across as the demon on the
left shoulder, faith is the angel on the right shoulder, seemingly untainted by
selfishness, pride, and the other sins and deficiencies.
With a setup like this, it is easy for Evans to argue that in light of reason’s
obvious deficiencies, faith is the better candidate. With sinful reason bound to
lead us astray, faith alone seems capable of leading us into the light. While pride
prevents reason from correctly assessing, or even locating, evidence in support
of a religious belief, faith dutifully bridges the gap. But is this not taking the
metaphor too far? It no longer sounds like a literary device, but an attempt to
describe mental faculties as actually agent-like, and this is a misstep.
To make this point, the relationship between an agent, sin, and reason can
be altered slightly. Instead of ascribing sin to reason, let’s ascribe sin to the
human agent—S is prideful, S is selfish—and then suggest that S’s sin can have
a profound impact on S’s rationality. We can enumerate a few ways in which this
is possible, drawing from our model of rationality offered in the first chapter.
One’s overall rational goals may change as a result of sin. One might, for
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example, selfishly favor prudential rationalism over moral and epistemic
rationalism. Sin may lead one to ignore some evidence, discount legitimate
defeaters, or simply fail to inquire. Sin may, in fact, lead one to intentionally seek
disconfirming evidence while avoiding confirming evidence.151 I see no reason to
personify either reason or faith.
Sin is tied to the agent rather than to a faculty of reason. Where does this
leave faith? It leaves faith equally susceptible to sin. One may misplace one’s
faith—we call this idolatry. One may exercise bad faith.152 One may exercise
blind faith. One may have faith for selfish reasons, hoping, for example, that faith
in God results in health, wealth, and power—even at the expense of others. To
me, this account seems far more plausible than the suggestion that reason alone
is prone to sinfulness. But to what extent does this conflict with Evans’s
argument?
Evans gives no reason to accept that faith is immune to the effects of sin.
Evans does, though, clearly acknowledge that faith propositions are defeasible.
As the defeater account suggests, faith could lead one astray. Otherwise there
would be no reason to attempt to introduce an account of defeaters. But the point
remains understated. In assessing Evans, I think it must be concluded that faith
is just as susceptible to cognitive limitations and sin as reason is. It certainly
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seems broadly consistent with observable fact that at least some people at some
times have had misplaced or mismotivated faith. But if we accept this, where
does it leave Evans’s argument?
If nothing else, this changed approach to reason and faith leads to an
important question: Under what set of circumstances am I more epistemically
rational in believing “by faith” instead of seeking justification for my beliefs? Even
granting all of Evans’s claims about the epistemic shortcomings of human
beings, we are still left with the very real possibility that those shortcomings will
have as much impact on faith as they will on epistemic reasoning. To the
potential fallibility of faith, an additional point must be added: faith itself doesn’t
seem to come with any overt relationship to truth-indicators. Evidentialism is a
theory based on the idea that one ought to follow one’s evidence, one ought to
follow the direction of truth indicators. But faith as Evans has presented it does
not seem to have this same characteristic. Faith, as Evans has described it, is a
move without evidence, and sometimes against evidence. Again, attention must
be drawn to the fact that Evans does not deny the possibility of evidence, or even
the real existence of evidence. His argument rests on reason’s limitations. But if
faith suffers those same limitations, yet has a weaker relationship to truth
indicators, it seems to me that faith is a dubious guide.153
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If Evans is to maintain his position that reason is the culprit, that reason has
transgressed to an extent that one must look to faith, then Evans must show that
faith itself escapes the problems of reason. This he does not do, and I do not see
any clear route to claiming that while reason suffers from the impact of cognitive
limitations and sinful proclivities, faith remains unscathed. On the contrary, faith
without the guidance of truth indicators is doubly dubious, claiming (as Evans
states) a high degree of certainty, but without any support.154
Evans’s central claim in Faith Beyond Reason is that because of reason’s
faults, we ought to believe by faith. But I suggest that this conclusion is not
without its faults—faults severe enough that it seems better to accept our
epistemic limitations, yet forge on ahead in our evidential quest rather than resort
to Evans’s faith. In the last chapter, I shall return to this point, asking whether
evidentialism is still the best candidate for meeting rational obligations—
specifically epistemic obligations.
Conclusion
To what extent is Evans’s responsible fideism a successful theory? Among
its stronger traits, and what distinguishes Evans’s fideism from other popular
forms, is Evans’s use of epistemic externalism. This enables Evans to make
stronger epistemic claims than most fideists can muster. For example, Evans can

154

Ibid., 11, 106ff. The suggestion that faith provides a high degree of certainty is one Evans
draws from Kierkegaard/Climacus’ idea of “infinite interest.” While his response is nuanced, he
does seem to maintain here and elsewhere that faith comes with some variety of certainty that is
beyond what reason can produce (at least about a posteriori matters).

155
claim that one may have religious knowledge. But as we saw, there are several
problems with Evans’s fideism. His account of defeaters highlights a difficulty of
fideism in general: faith seems to bring with it a sense of arbitrariness. Free from
the restraints that rationality imposes, beliefs held by faith seem to be
unchallengeable. This rightly leads to concerns about bad faith, misplaced faith,
and idolatry. But as Evans’s theory of defeaters shows, remedying this while still
maintaining that reason is deeply flawed (to the point of requiring faith) is a
difficult task. In my estimation, Evans is unsuccessful in his attempts. What this
discussion brings to the surface is the seemingly unresolvable tension between
the claim that reason is fatally flawed and the claim that fideism is reasonable.
A second difficulty for Evans arises from the externalism upon which Evans
relies. Evans maintains strong contact with internalist notions of justification, and
suggests that sometimes justification confers warrant. But he makes a further
move, suggesting that faith is required for knowledge. I have argued that this
cannot be the case. Faith does not and cannot play a warranting role (doing so
undermines externalism). Nor can this suggestion be re-cast in terms of faith
making available evidence otherwise unavailable, for to do so also undermines
his externalism.
Finally, I have raised what I think is the most significant difficulty. I have
argued that when the personification of reason and faith is stripped away, a
substantial problem becomes visible: is faith more reliable than reason? In
absence of an argument showing that faith is immune to the effects of sin and
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cognitive limitations, there is no compelling reason to take faith to be more
reliable. Even with its flaws, reason is grounded in truth indicators. Faith is not.
This leads to a conclusion contrary to Evans’s argument: even in matters of
religious propositions, one is most likely to satisfy one’s epistemic obligations by
seeking to hold justified beliefs, not by accepting propositions by faith.
While Evans’s argument may not be compelling, in the final analysis, it is
nonetheless interesting in part because it is epistemological through and through.
Evans constrains his discussion of rationality to just epistemic rationality, and he
proposes a solution that, as he presents it, is epistemically oriented. Faith plays
an epistemic role. Faith, he claims, is an adequate guide to truth. His introduction
of epistemic externalism aids this argument, as it allows Evans to maintain focus
on questions about justification, warrant, and knowledge. Yet the difficulties in
Evans’s theory are suggestive for any epistemically oriented fideism: an attempt
to substitute (to any degree) a notion of justification with a notion of evidenceless faith must somehow produce a theory of belief-holding that does not admit of
arbitrariness. I have argued that ultimately Evans’s argument does not succeed
in overcoming the difficulties inherent in any fideist theory.
Two major questions are left open at this point. The first is whether or not
Evans’s critique of evidentialism, and his suggestion that evidence is incapable of
supporting certain religious beliefs, is conclusive. In the forth chapter, in which
evidentialism is contrasted with fideism, I will return to this argument. Secondly,
there is a larger threat to the sort of fideism that Evans suggests than any I have
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offered thus far. And this is skepticism. A mark of a good epistemic theory is its
resilience to skepticism. As we shall see when I return to the point in chapter 4,
responsible fideism does not address the skeptical challenge.
In the next chapter we will turn to John Bishop’s articulation of fideism.
While Evans has chosen to focus on the agent as he develops his account,
Bishop focuses on the evidence.

CHAPTER THREE
FAITH AS VENTURE
Introduction
Is there conclusive evidence for the existence of God? In the previous
chapter we saw how Evans suggests that this is the wrong question to ask. He
suggests that epistemic reason itself is too flawed to reliably approach such a
question. As we saw, this led Evans to offer a theory of fideism. In this theory, in
cases where justification is unavailable, one may hold a belief “by faith.”
John Bishop’s answer to the question of evidence is different, and it leads
him to formulate a different kind of fideism. In his book Believing by Faith,
Bishop suggests that the evidence for many religious propositions—with the
question of God’s existence being one such example—is ambiguous.1 This,
suggests Bishop, accounts for the impasse between various philosophers of
religion. Such evidential ambiguity poses a serious problem for epistemologists
who urge that one must “follow the evidence.” Bishop offers a response to this
ambiguity thesis, and this response is a new variety of fideism that he calls
supra-evidential fideism. Inspired by William James, Bishop suggests a model of
faith as a venture, and he suggests that in some cases, undertaking a faith
venture is preferable to accepting the hard-line evidentialist’s conclusion that
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evidential ambiguity ought to be met with suspension of judgment.
Epistemically speaking, Bishop’s theory is a refinement of evidentialism, but
Bishop’s fideism is not just epistemological. In the previous chapter, we
examined C. Stephan Evans’s responsible fideism, which I characterized there
as epistemically oriented fideism because of its nearly exclusive focus on
epistemology, epistemic justification, and epistemic rationality. But Bishop’s
fideism is oriented differently: Instead of approaching the question in a strictly
epistemic fashion, Bishop inquires whether moral rationality might, in certain
cases, trump epistemic rationality even in an area more frequently approached
epistemically. In certain circumstances, suggests Bishop, one ought to take what
he calls a doxastic venture, accepting an epistemically unjustified proposition on
moral grounds, and thereafter giving it full weight in epistemic contexts. Bishop
calls this a form of fideism.
Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism is the subject of this chapter. I explain
several key components of Bishop’s theory, and then elaborate the core behind
his supra-evidential fideism. Bishop’s account has its difficulties. In the course of
the chapter, I point out those that I find threaten the success of his theory of
fideism. In the end, I ask whether Bishop’s theory is ultimately the most
compelling for the religious seeker.
This is how we shall proceed. The first section of this chapter covers
Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis, which states that the total available
evidence for (or against) religious beliefs is ambiguous. This is a crucial part of
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Bishop’s argument, for if it is true, certain avenues of justification are closed to
the religious seeker. Bishop argues that the evidential ambiguity thesis does not
necessarily lead to Reformed epistemology (as some epistemologists have
suggested), but to fideism. And his own variety of fideism is largely a response to
the ambiguity thesis. In this first section, I explain the thesis along with the
implications Bishop identifies.
Second, I discuss Bishop’s emphasis on moral rationality, how it is
positioned in regard to epistemic rationality, and what this relationship says about
solving rational conflict. Bishop’s rationality can be compared with the model of
rationality offered in the first chapter, and in so doing we gain a level of clarity in
assessing Bishop’s central claim. This claim is that when it comes to religious
beliefs that are evidentially ambiguous, one may rightly solve a rational conflict
by setting moral rational preferences above epistemic rational preferences. This
is a critical step in Bishop’s development of a theory of fideism.
The third section introduces Bishop’s venture model of fideism. Bishop’s
fideism is oriented around a notion of faith-as-venture. In important cases, where
morality dictates and epistemic rationality does not contradict, it may be
appropriate to act as if a belief is true, even while acknowledging that one is not
justified in holding this belief. While this approach may stand in conflict with
traditional “hard line” evidentialism, Bishop suggests that the approach best
meets one’s rational obligations, and is thus the preferable model. Bishop offers
what he calls thesis (J+), which provides conditions under which a faith venture is
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morally acceptable, and under which one may rightly hold certain faith
propositions with full epistemic weight.
As I move through these sections, I point out a few issues with Bishop’s
account. At the conclusion of this chapter, I ask whether these issues, when
taken in concert, recommend Bishop’s fideism. Bishop offers a compelling theory
for dealing with cases of evidential ambiguity. But in the end, I argue that his
notion of evidential ambiguity is flawed. Furthermore, his model of rationality
raises questions as to whether his argument is quite as conclusive as it may at
first appear. I question whether Bishop’s model best addresses the epistemic and
rational (ATC) goals of an agent. Finally, I suggest that there are a few problems
with his (J+) thesis that, when conjoined with the previous issues, indicate that
fideism is not the best stance to take when one finds oneself in the evidential
situation described by Bishop.
Clarifications
At the outset of Believing by Faith, Bishop develops several key terms along
similar lines to how I developed them in chapter 1. In this first section, I gloss
some of this terminology, pointing out any important differences, and also
drawing attention to those facets that play a major role in Bishop’s version of
fideism.
First, Bishop defines belief as holding a proposition true, while he also
identifies a second state of taking a proposition to be true.2 Holding a proposition
2

Bishop 2007, 33ff. Note that his distinction between holding and taking differs slightly from
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to be true requires both assent to the proposition and an enduring disposition
toward that belief. Thus, in the case of propositional beliefs (which are the
primary sort of beliefs we are here interested in), to hold P is to assent to P and
to have a disposition toward P. Thus Bishop’s notion of holding P is not dissimilar
from the notion of believing P I introduced in the first chapter. Bishop makes the
further observation that one who believes P is also generally inclined to act as if
P. In practical reasoning, one performs a mental act (consciously or perhaps
unconsciously) in favor of P.3 This act is what Bishop calls taking a proposition to
be true. An individual, points out Bishop, can take P to be true without really
believing P. In the language we have already employed in chapter 1, one can
assent to P and act accordingly, but not develop any long term disposition toward
P. Bishop’s division into holding and taking is most pronounced when it comes to
action. It is one’s taking a proposition to be true (an event, says Bishop, that
occurs in reasoning) that leads one to act as if P. There are some minor ways in
which Bishop’s definition of taking-to-be-true differs from assent as explained in
chapter 1. Perhaps one noteworthy difference is that Bishop does not explicitly
require that one sincerely take P to be true, while our characterization requires
sincerity for assent.4 Yet as this plays out in Bishop’s discussion, the differences

Bishop 2007 to Bishop 2010.
3

4

Ibid., 55.

Ibid., 39. Bishop notes that here “taking to be true” is more like assent, not belief. Acceptance
can be done insincerely, such as “for the sake of argument.” However, Bishop reserves this sort
of acceptance for special cases only, and where that is the case I will mention it explicitly.
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between assent and taking-to-be-true are minor enough that I treat taking-to-betrue as assent.5
Second, a certain amount of doxastic voluntarism is required by Bishop’s
theory. Bishop offers an account of doxastic voluntarism in which he identifies
what he calls the two loci of doxastic control.6 He suggests there are both direct
and indirect ways in which we can exercise doxastic control, though direct
doxastic control is restricted in certain ways. In the first chapter I also dealt with
doxastic voluntarism, suggesting a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism. My
claim there was that there are clearly areas where assent is under doxastic
control. While Bishop’s account differs from mine on minor details (and may be
more restrictive), the differences do not impact the present discussion. The most
salient aspect of Bishop’s account of doxastic voluntarism is found in his notion
of the second locus of doxastic control. Bishop claims that when one is taking
action, one has doxastic control over whether or not one assents to certain
propositions7. The sketch of doxastic voluntarism I offered in chapter 1 also
allows for doxastic control at this level.8
Finally, throughout this work I have used the terms religious seekers or faith
5

Bishop makes this point on Ibid., 41, fn. 18, where he compares assent, acceptance, and
taking-to-be-true.
6

Ibid., 28-41.

7

In other words, Bishop suggests that even if one has a disposition toward P, one may still
choose at time t to refuse to assent to P.
8

Bishop notes that doxastic control does not entail conscious or deliberate assent (Ibid., 37).
This, too, is compatible with the account I have offered.
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seekers as a label for those who are in some way engaged in reflective
examination of religious beliefs. Bishop uses the term reflective believers to
identify that same group. Bishop is quick to point out that a reflective believer
may not necessarily be a believer in a particular faith, and I should also qualify
my own usage to indicate that it is not the case that a seeker is one without
religious beliefs.9 A lifelong believer may, in virtue of her or his reflectiveness
about those beliefs, be a religious seeker, just as an atheist reflectively
examining the claims of Christianity may be rightly called a reflective believer. In
short, both terms describe agents reflectively seeking to hold only rational
religious beliefs (where religious beliefs may include atheism).
One more refinement is in order, and this is in regards to Bishop’s notion of
entitlement.
Entitlement Refined
In the previous two chapters, I have used Bishop’s notion of epistemic
entitlement as a point of contrast with the stronger notion of epistemic obligation.
Epistemic entitlement is a permissibility thesis suggesting that it is not the case
that S should not hold/take P. Bishop’s use of the term entitlement in his book
Believing by Faith has a few additional nuances beyond the characterization he
offers in the Faith article used in the first chapter.
Bishop recognizes a distinction between different types of rationality—moral,
epistemic, and otherwise. Entitlement, like justification, plays out differently in
9

Ibid., 50.
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each rational context. In a general sense, entitlement plays a normative role in
one’s reasoning. Following Plantinga’s distinction between de jure and de facto
objections to faith, Bishop suggests that entitlement is the indicator that one is
within one’s rights (de jure) in holding a belief.10 Thus, moral entitlement is about
whether one is within one’s moral rights to believe. “[T]he de jure question about
Christian belief is ultimately just the question of moral entitlement to take
Christian beliefs to be true….”11 One is morally entitled to hold P if holding P
does not cause S to commit a moral transgression.
Bishop offers a more thorough characterization of epistemic entitlement in
this book. And here the notion is more refined than the generic sense of
entitlement that appears in his “Faith” article.12 As Bishop characterizes epistemic
entitlement here, S is epistemically entitled to hold belief B only if S’s belief is
“made through the right exercise of their epistemic capacities.”13 Bishop expands
this characterization to impose three requirements on the believer:
[T]he right exercise of those capacities comes to this: reflective believers will
need to have paid proper attention to the question of the truth of their faithpropositions, to have judged that issue properly (in accordance with the
correct application of the objective norms applicable to such judgments),
and to have taken proper account of that judgment in deciding to commit
themselves practically to the truth of their faith-propositions.14
10

Ibid., 49.

11

Ibid., 49 fn 25.

12

Bishop 2010.
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Bishop 2007, 57, italics removed.
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Ibid., 57.
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What Bishop has provided here are a list of criteria that must be met before S is
epistemically entitled to hold P.15 One must properly reflect on the epistemic
status of one’s faith beliefs, one must judge the issue properly, and one’s
practical commitments must “take proper account” of that judgment. How should
we understand the second requirement—judging the issue properly? Bishop first
explores the notion that epistemic entitlement requires epistemic justification in
the form of adequate evidential support (a suggestion he rejects later). 16 He calls
this first possibility hard-line evidentialism.17
This hard-line evidentialism has an interesting consequence: because
entitlement requires justification, when the evidence is ambiguous one ought to
suspend one’s belief about P—one is not entitled to believe P.18 Prima facie,
Bishop thinks this requirement seems overly stringent, for it suggests that one is
not epistemically entitled to hold any unjustified beliefs even if holding such
beliefs does not conflict with available evidence.19 This is particularly problematic
for Bishop, for he wants to claim that entitlement allows for making what he calls
15

Note that in no way can these requirements for entitlement be read back into the discussions in
the last two chapters. The term as used here ought to be viewed as a different, more specific
notion of entitlement than that offered in chapter 1, and applied to Evans’s view in chapter 2.
16

Ibid., 58.
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Ibid., 22.
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Ibid., 69.

19

Of course, the actual stringency of this requirement is largely determined by the requirements
for epistemic justification. The question of the permissibility of holding beliefs that accord with
available (though perhaps inconclusive) evidence is a topic worthy of examination. But in the
present context I remain focused on Bishop’s comparison between hard-line evidentialism and a
more permissive model of entitlement.
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a doxastic venture—taking a belief to be true (in practical reasoning at least)
when the evidence is not (yet) conclusive.20 Faith-ventures are doxastic ventures
regarding religious belief. Such ventures become the basis for Bishop’s fideism.
Consequently, a notion of entitlement that requires justification becomes an
apparent road-block to Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism, denying as it does that
one can be entitled to hold any unjustified belief.21
Against this strong, hard-line sense of entitlement, Bishop proposes a
weaker requirement that one needn’t be justified in holding a belief, but only
permitted to hold such a belief. “[E]pistemic entitlement in making such faithcommitments requires that their truth not be evidentially excluded under the
applicable evidential practice.”22 That is, provided that the available evidence
does not foreclose P, one is entitled to hold P. This version shifts from epistemic
obligation to epistemic permissibility—from requiring justification to merely
requiring that one not be required not to believe. Distinguishing between
entitlement and justification on this ground opens up “the possibility that taking a
proposition to be true in reasoning may carry epistemic entitlement even though
the person concerned is in no position to certify the epistemic worth of his or her

20

Ibid., 22-23, 161-162.

21

Ibid., 161-162.

22

Ibid., 162. Here Evans has elaborated a shift from hard-line evidentialism to what he calls
“realist integrationist doxastic values” (explained on 155-162). Evans sees the tempering of the
justification condition to be a significant departure from hard-line evidentialism.

23

holding that proposition to be true.”
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This last bit about an individual’s ability to

certify the epistemic worth of holding a proposition is of crucial importance.
Warrant, or any externalist construal of “justification”, does not give an agent any
sense of assurance that she or he meets the three requirements for entitlement
that Bishop enumerates in the quote above.24 Entitlement requires that the agent
has mentally judged the belief, has found the belief not at odds with the
evidence, and has also assented to this belief.25 Using epistemic entitlement in
this specific way, Bishop suggests that even if externalist epistemologies provide
the best (or even a plausible) theory of knowledge, there remains an evidentialist
requirement that plays an important role for a reflective inquirer (and this is not
limited to strictly religious inquiries).
At this point, we have revisited a few terms introduced earlier in this
dissertation, but have clarified them in the context of Bishop’s present argument.
The notion of entitlement, as revised here, provides the foundation for Bishop’s
subsequent argument that it is sometimes permissible to make doxastic
ventures. What makes doxastic venture (and entitlement) such a crucial part of
Bishop’s argument? The answer for this lies in Bishop’s thesis of evidential
ambiguity.
23

Ibid., 177.
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Bishop makes this argument on Ibid., 61.
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In this particular context Bishop is unclear as to whether or not this all must be conscious,
though he implies elsewhere that it does not. cf. Bishop 2007, chapter 2. It is unclear why assent
is required for entitlement.
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The Evidential Ambiguity Thesis
Religious belief has enjoyed widespread philosophical analysis since the
birth of philosophy. Arguments for God’s existence—the usual suspects,
teleological, ontological, cosmological, and so on—prove a perennial interest for
philosophers of religion. But in the thousands of years during which they have
been debated, no single argument has been either conclusively demonstrated or
conclusively shown to be false. Or consider claims about divine hiddenness—the
idea (roughly) that if there is a God, evidence is not readily available. Atheists
and agnostics claim that divine hiddenness supports their position while theists
suggest that hiddenness is compatible with God’s character, and is perhaps even
a necessary aspect of it.26 A litany of epistemological questions arises as well. Is
there evidence for the existence of God? Is it sufficient (or conclusive) evidence?
Is it publicly available evidence? Should we expect it to be public evidence? 27
While such questions have enjoyed broad debate, no answer has enjoyed broad
agreement. It is thus no wonder that some philosophers have thrown in the
proverbial towel and proclaimed that the search for evidence is a doomed
endeavor. When considering this debate, Bishop remarks on the evidential
problem, and then gives it a name.
Although this debate has often been assumed to be at the heart of
26

An excellent example of this debate can be found in the Schellenberg/Moser debate in
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Schellenberg 2004, Moser 2004).
27

The proposition “God exists” is of course only one of a multitude of religious propositions that
might also be substituted here.
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Philosophy of Religion, there is also a long-standing view that it is a debate
which neither side can win. This view may be expressed as a thesis of
evidential ambiguity which accepts that the question of God’s existence is
left open—perhaps necessarily—because our overall evidence is equally
viably interpreted either from a theistic or an atheistic perspective.28
Bishop suggests that it is now an attractive option to accept that the total
available evidence for God’s existence does not clearly indicate whether God
does in fact exist: “the evidence is ‘open’ in the sense that it neither shows the
truth of the claim that God exists nor the truth of its denial to be significantly more
probably than not.”29 Bishop suggests that calling this conundrum an ambiguity
most aptly describes how competing perspectives have interpreted the evidence
differently. This is attested, at least to some degree, by the fact that after
centuries of debate no single conclusion has been reached. “I myself incline to
the view that the arguments of both natural theology and natural atheology
typically exhibit epistemic circularity by resting on hidden presuppositions
acceptable only to those already convinced of their conclusions—and, if that is
correct, the case for the evidential ambiguity of theism is strengthened.”30
Evidential ambiguity is not merely inconclusiveness of evidence. Evidence may
be inconclusive, but still have directionality—that is, one might not have
conclusive evidence for the existence of Higgs Bosons, yet of the evidence that
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Bishop 2007, 1.
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Ibid., 71.
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Ibid., 71-72.

one has, it may point toward the existence of these particles.
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In contrast, for a

body of evidence related to P to be ambiguous, that same body must be
interpretable as supporting P, supporting not-P, and possibly even supporting the
claim that one should withhold judgment regarding P. Ambiguity is a far more
troubling situation than inconclusiveness.
As strong as Bishop believes the argument for evidential ambiguity is, he
does not claim to have conclusively shown it to be the case. Instead, he claims
only that it is “plausible enough” for it to be taken seriously when examining faith
commitment.32 The reflective believer, suggests Bishop, will recognize that the
longstanding debates over natural theology may best be explained by the
evidential ambiguity thesis.
Does the Evidential Ambiguity Thesis Hold?
The idea of the evidential ambiguity of theism is crucial for Bishop’s
argument, and his argument in support of it is compelling. But there is one
difficulty that Bishop mentions, yet does not develop. The evidential ambiguity of
theism is based on the total available evidence. How do we characterize this
notion of total available evidence?
As Bishop initially sketches his account of total available evidence, he
introduces it as pertinent to what he thinks are widely held epistemic practices
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Conee and Feldman (2004b, 102) suggest that when the directionality of evidence supports P
over not-P, that may in fact be sufficient for claiming S’s belief in P is justified.
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regarding religious propositions: “judgments of evidential support for theistic
beliefs are to be made taking into account all the evidence that ‘we’ have
available that could conceivably be relevant to their truth….”33 Bishop is careful to
clarify here that this includes not only public evidence, but evidence “private to
them or to some local community to which they belong.”34 He is equally careful to
note that one cannot limit evidence to only private evidence; to remain
intellectually honest, one is epistemically (and perhaps morally) obligated to
include all available evidence.35
But a complication arises. Bishop suggests that total available evidence is
all the evidence ‘we’ have. Who is ‘we’? Bishop claims it is “no less than the
entire human race over its full history to date.”36 Bishop tempers this grandiose
claim by noting that any individual human agent is also fallibilist and limited when
making judgments. But when attempting to build a coherent picture of total
available evidence from these glimpses, certain difficulties threaten the
coherence of a notion of total available evidence that at once admits public and
private evidence, but also encapsulates the evidence of the “entire human race
over its full history to date.” Here are four ways one may try to construct a theory
of total available evidence.
33

Bishop 2007, 67.
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First, we may say that total available evidence is all publicly available
evidence, excluding private evidence by fiat. For the moment we will ignore
Bishop’s inclusion of private evidence, for by doing so, we can ask whether
evidential ambiguity can be rendered consistent. As he considers evidential
ambiguity, he limits his examination to natural theology and public evidence.37
Therefore this characterization is intended to capture all of the evidence
traditionally relied upon by natural theology. The intent of labeling evidence
public is to suggest that this evidence has an air of neutrality, approachable
“objectively” by believers and unbelievers alike.38 By so categorizing it, we can
see already why the evidential ambiguity thesis is a plausible outcome. For
centuries, the same evidence has been at the center of debate. Thus, it is no
surprise that the condition Bishop wishes to avoid—that of ceaseless back-andforth arguing between theists and non-theists—is in fact the most likely state of
debate around public evidence. This is the first way we may understand total
available evidence, and with this understanding, Bishop’s thesis of evidential
ambiguity does make sense.
The problem with this account arises when examined in the context of using
evidence. Bishop’s reflective believer is one who evaluates her or his evidence,
and makes a conscious decision thereupon. As Bishop explains this, such an

37

cf. 69-74. This reading, then, assumes that Bishop’s footnote inclusion of private evidence is an
afterthought, and not a central claim of the argument.
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agent possibly has access to private evidence, not merely public evidence. And
Bishop does claim that it is imperative (epistemically and morally) that evidence
should not be ignored when available. While Bishop himself seems to limit his
examinations to the arguments of natural theology, based as they are on public
evidence, it seems clear that he does not intend to disqualify the individual’s
private evidence from the total available evidence. If, as Bishop suggests, one
has an epistemic (and perhaps moral) obligation to include all evidence—public
and private—to which one has access, the notion of total available evidence as
described here does not adequately capture all of the evidence to which an
individual may have access. To try to expand this notion of total available
evidence to include private evidence leads us to the next few characterizations.
The second way to characterize total available evidence is as the totality of
all evidence, both public and private, of all agents at all times. From the natural
causal order of the world to St. Augustine’s vision in the garden, from cosmology
to answered (and unanswered) prayers, all actual evidence falls within the scope
of total available evidence. Is this what Bishop is suggesting? Such a construal of
total available evidence may superficially sound compelling to the proponent of
evidential ambiguity. If we look at it all and still find it ambiguous, then it truly is
ambiguous. But, of course, the problem is simply that no human agent has
access to the totality of evidence. Private evidence, by definition, is inaccessible
to all but those who experience it, and even public evidence is not therefore
globally available to all reasoners.
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It is important to note, in passing, that there is nothing necessarily mystical
about private evidence.39 Phenomenological evidence (beliefs whose nonpropositional content is phenomenological) is private, and yet clearly admissible
as evidence. The fact that it is private divests the evidence neither of its
evidential import nor of its epistemic relevancy. Be that as it may, it remains
private, and thus inaccessible to some people at some times.
With such a broad view of total available evidence as suggested here, to
include all real private evidence is to eliminate the possibility that any one human
agent could assess the evidence. And Bishop does not intend to build a theory of
fideism based on a notion of the ideal reasoner. Evidential ambiguity is
something Bishop believes many and perhaps all reflective believers encounter
as a result of their own fallible, finite adventures in epistemology. In absence of a
“view from nowhere,” a notion of total available evidence that includes evidence
beyond the evidential purview of an individual renders the notion impractical. One
cannot meaningfully draw conclusions from inaccessible evidence. Thus this
characterization of total available evidence fails to fit Bishop’s theory.
The third way to characterize total available evidence is as the total
evidence available to a particular subject S at a particular time t. Such a
characterization would include both public and private evidence, but only the
evidence to which S has access. This is the notion of total evidence often
operating in internalist accounts of justification. But were Bishop to accept it, the
39
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consequences would not be so good for his theory of fideism. Evidential
ambiguity, on this understanding of total available evidence, is no longer the
global problem it is purported to be. Theists don’t appear to feel it—reflective
believers claim to have evidence in favor of their religious propositions. Atheists
don’t appear to feel it, either—they claim to have evidence against those same
religious propositions. Might it be the case that at least some of these are
justified in their beliefs by the body of evidence available to them (including their
private evidence)? Perhaps only some percentage of religious seekers suffer the
tyranny of evidential ambiguity, and perhaps this is a consequence of the fact
that such seeker’s available evidence is ambiguous or incomplete. While
accepting this conclusion does not defeat Bishop’s fideism, it weakens the
central claim that evidential ambiguity is the right, and perhaps the necessary,
conclusion to draw in regard to evidence for religious propositions.
The fourth and final way to characterize total available evidence may also
be the most difficult reading of Bishop. Bishop displays deep concern for
recognizing and respecting the religious beliefs of others—a stance laudable in
itself.40 What if we suppose that this concern may be the undercurrent pushing a
theory of evidence in which the evidence that counts in favor of P is that
evidence which is not currently disputed by the community surrounding the
examiner. Evidence admitted in support of P is not all available evidence, but all
of the evidence that does not raise the hackles of one’s peers in the epistemic
40
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community. Thus relevant evidence—whether public or private—is nothing but
community-accepted evidence. In an epistemic community divided over an issue,
the evidence base agreed upon by the community is far more likely to result in
the sort of ambiguity Bishop describes. In a hotly disputed area, such as religious
beliefs, ambiguity of religious evidence is an unsurprising conclusion. Evidential
ambiguity may even be, as Bishop suggests, unavoidable in such circumstances.
The major problem for such a social epistemology has to do with the
vagueness of the epistemic community: which epistemic community or
communities determine which evidence is included in total available evidence?
Are we to infer that a community of stout theists would come to the same
conclusion about evidential ambiguity that a community of atheists would? Or are
we to assume that “the relevant community” includes both of those communities?
Is there a specific community that appropriately decides about evidence, or is
Bishop suggesting that all communities would (necessarily?) arrive at the same
conclusion? Or are we once again back at a “view from nowhere” in which “the
community” is that grand community of all religious seekers, past and present?
Without an answer to these questions, the claim of ambiguity of religious
evidence seems itself terminally ambiguous.
Of the four ways of characterizing Bishop’s notion of total available
evidence, none looks to be an unproblematic fit. All four theories fall short of
supporting Bishop’s claim that the evidence for these important religious
propositions is in fact ambiguous in a pervasive sort of way for every human
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agent. At best, we must settle for a weakened notion of evidential ambiguity.
What is the consequence of this evaluation? We have seen that evidence
may be ambiguous to some people at some times, and perhaps taking the “view
from nowhere” may in fact be ambiguous, but it no longer seems to be the case
that evidential ambiguity is a pervasive or systemic problem for all reflective
believers. It seems that many believers may in fact have evidence for their
religious beliefs, and unproblematically so. At least some religious disagreement,
then, may not be so much a result of evidential ambiguity, but rather of the fact
that different people possess different evidence at different times.
Epistemic and Moral Rationality
The evidential ambiguity thesis, if taken in its strongest form, leads the socalled hard-line evidentialist to the epistemic conclusion that one ought to
suspend judgment on each of those beliefs that fall under the canopy of
evidential ambiguity. Thus, if many of the crucial tenets of religious faith, such as
belief that God exists, are evidentially ambiguous, hard-line evidentialism claims
that one ought not hold such tenets. On Bishop’s characterization, the hard-line
evidentialist will then draw the conclusion that rationally, one ought to suspend
judgment.41
But Bishop suggests that here the hard-line evidentialist may be incorrectly
privileging epistemic rationality. Might one have moral grounds for accepting
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such beliefs even if the evidence is ambiguous? Bishop thinks so. In this section I
focus on Bishop’s model of rationality. Bishop explains, in his account of fideism,
under what circumstances one may choose to make what he calls a faith venture
on moral grounds, even when epistemic rationality is stymied by evidential
ambiguity.42
There are two aspects of Bishop’s model of rationality that I will examine
below. The first is Bishop’s claims about how moral rationality sometimes must
be privileged over epistemic rationality (a much stronger claim than what I
sketched in the model of rationality offered in the first chapter). This is grounded
in Bishop’s underlying claim that epistemic obligations are in many or all cases
reducible to moral obligations. The second is Bishop’s so-called moral-epistemic
link principle. This principle suggests that one can believe P morally only when
one is epistemically entitled to believe P.43
Privileging Moral Obligation
In the first chapter I sketched a general account of rationality. Bishop’s
fideism is founded not just on epistemic rationality, or even on moral rationality,
but on a general account of rationality that takes into considerations both moral
and epistemic rationality.44 On the one hand, Bishop is deeply concerned with
42
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moral obligation. Yet to be morally rational in holding (or taking) P, one must be
morally justified. As we shall see shortly, Bishop regards moral justification as, at
least in many cases, requiring epistemic justification.45 Later I will contrast this
with the model of rationality explored in the first chapter, but for the present the
focus is on understanding Bishop’s model and how it pertains to his argument for
fideism.
Bishop introduces the relation between moral and epistemic rationality not
by sketching a general account of rationality, but by suggesting that epistemic
rationality has a goal: “Why… should we care in general about the epistemic
justifiability of our beliefs? Because, the standard answer maintains, our beliefs
influence how we act.”46 Bishop does not give what I would consider to be the
standard answer: because we want to maximize our true beliefs and minimize
our false ones. Instead, he gives an ethically oriented response: because our
beliefs influence our actions. This leads Bishop to make the following claim:
“While agreeing that practical, moral, and epistemic evaluation are indeed not to
be confused, I nevertheless wish to argue that—at least when it comes to faithbeliefs—it is reasonable to hold that our doxastic responsibilities are ultimately
moral responsibilities.”47 An ethics of belief, then, is a morally charged ethics of
45
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belief. Bishop claims that because our epistemic goal is to act “rightly,” our
epistemic obligations are subsumed under moral obligations.
The goal of Bishop’s discussion of rationality is to establish a connection
between epistemic concerns and moral concerns, a crucial step in his
development of an account of fideism. Bishop here refuses a role for an ethics of
belief that has to do with purely epistemic goals. Instead of acknowledging
epistemic goals as legitimate goals in themselves, Bishop claims that epistemic
aims are ultimately moral aims—that one wants true beliefs only because they
aid one in action, and if they are related to action, then they are within the
domain of morality.48 Thus, when Bishop talks of an ethics of belief, he has in
mind a moral evaluation of the consequences of holding a belief. Bishop gives as
an example the case of the Inquisitor who believes that by burning the heretic at
the stake, he is saving the heretic’s soul from eternal fiery torment. The
Inquisitor, we are to infer, has what he deems adequate evidence that burning a
heretic saves the heretic’s soul. Yet, is not the Inquisitor’s assenting to this belief
a morally wrong action? “[I]t seems clear that the Inquisitor’s taking it to be true in
his practical reasoning that heretics will burn everlastingly if they are not burnt
briefly here must itself be a morally wrong action.”49 Perhaps Bishop is right that
one may be morally culpable for holding such a belief. But as I have argued,
asking whether the Inquisitor ought to hold this belief is an ambiguous question.
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Is this a moral ought? Or is it epistemic? Or perhaps something else altogether?
If, as Bishop suggests, an epistemic goal is really bound to moral
considerations, then an epistemic “ought” is reducible to a moral “ought.” There
is, on this account, no way that an epistemic obligation can arise that is contrary
to a moral obligation simply because epistemic obligations are rooted in moral
rationality. We are morally obligated to hold beliefs conducive to morality, and our
epistemic goal is to hold beliefs that conduce to moral rationality.50 Can an
epistemic ought be separated from moral considerations? Bishop does not think
so. “One could, perhaps, reply that this ‘ought’ is an epistemic ‘ought’. But that
reply is, in effect, a way of refusing the question—or it is tantamount to answering
it with the implausible essentialist claim that it is just in our nature as believers
that we accept these epistemic duties.”51 Bishop finds it untenable to claim that
an epistemic ought is something other than a moral ought. An epistemic ought is
a practical ought, because it is focused on action, and a practical ought is a
moral ought because the practical goal is to act in a morally right way.
In the model of rationality I offered in the first chapter, I suggested that
rational obligations are directed by rational goals. Moral goals are one kind of
rational goal. Prudential goals are another, and the epistemic goal of maximizing
truth and avoiding falsehood is yet another. Here, the “ought” of rational
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obligation captures the stipulation to reason in a certain way in order to achieve a
goal. Thus, to satisfy an epistemic goal, one’s epistemically rational obligation is
to hold epistemically justified beliefs. Similarly, to satisfy one’s morally rational
obligations, one ought to hold beliefs that are morally advantageous. It is, for
example, morally advantageous to hold beliefs that lead one to act morally. As
the Inquisitor example amply illustrates, assuming the Inquisitor is justified in his
belief, the Inquisitor may find his moral obligations in conflict with his rational
obligations. What Bishop is suggesting, though, is that the Inquisitor transgresses
both epistemic and moral obligations in holding his belief that burning a heretic
saves the heretic’s soul from eternal damnation.52
Does Bishop’s folding of epistemic obligations into moral obligations then
lead to the undesirable conclusion that one cannot be epistemically rational in
holding beliefs that conflict with moral rationality? It would seem that this is so,
and with an odd consequence: it turns the immoral (or amoral) genius into an
epistemic lunatic. To illustrate, consider the case of two individuals intent on
acquiring a great deal of justified beliefs about weapons of mass destruction. The
first individual (Agent A) acquires such beliefs in order to be able to dismantle
such weapons should she ever find them, while the second person (Agent B)
intends to build and use such weapons against an unsuspecting general
populace. Both have the epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs about said
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weapons, while also minimizing false beliefs about them. Let’s say that the two
acquire an identical set of beliefs about these weapons, and hold them based on
identical evidence bases. By my lights, it is undesirable to say that Agent A is
epistemically rational in her beliefs, while Agent B is not epistemically rational. If
Agent A has satisfied the epistemic requirements for belief, surely so has Agent
B. Likewise, it seems that if we claim that Agent A’s epistemic goal is best served
by pursuing evidence (Agent A epistemically ought to…), we seem bound to
extend the same epistemic obligation to Agent B. The question of moral
rationality is separate. Agent B may be morally irrational in her beliefs about the
destruction of human life and motives for acquiring knowledge, but this does not
translate to the claim that one’s epistemic “ethics of belief” have been violated as
well.53 It should be clear though that this is not to suggest that one is immune to
moral considerations when engaged in epistemic evaluation.
In summary, there are two problems in Bishop’s ethics of belief. The first is
that it does not follow that just because holding or taking P is open to moral
evaluation, one’s epistemic obligation in regard to P is in any way contingent
upon one’s moral obligation in regard to P. Secondly, there appears to be a
confusion about epistemic goals. Epistemic goals may indeed be distinct from
moral goals. Even granting for a moment that one’s epistemic goals are action-
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oriented (which does not seem to me to be completely correct), it still does not
follow that one’s epistemic goals are ipso facto moral goals. One may act
according to the truth of a proposition, but act immorally. We may be able to call
such an individual immoral, but can we call such a person (all things considered)
irrational?
In the end, I think Bishop’s desire to privilege moral rationality is laudable,
but not sufficiently defended. Furthermore, I think a simpler claim can be made.
Bishop may well proceed under the assumption that the genuine religious seeker
is nobly motivated by moral goals. In this case we can continue to understand
Bishop’s argument with the preface: Assume one privileges moral obligation over
epistemic obligation [when it comes to religious beliefs]. I think this provision best
represents what Bishop means when he says “reflective believers’ concern for
the justifiability of their faith-beliefs should be regarded primarily as a concern
about whether it is morally justified to take faith-beliefs to be true in one’s
practical reasoning.”54 Epistemic obligation cannot be as conveniently collapsed
into moral obligation as Bishop suggests. While this weakens Bishop’s argument,
it does not defeat it. Bishop is targeting the same audience: “This inquiry into the
justifiability of faith-beliefs takes it[s] origin, then, in the situation of reflective faithbelievers (or would-be faith-believers) who are interested in the question whether
they are morally justified in taking, or continuing to take, the relevant faith-beliefs

54

Ibid., 48.

to be true in their practical reasoning.”

55

186
The religious seeker is, on this account,

one who has a rational preference for morally rational religious beliefs.
Bishop has more to say on the relationship between moral rationality and
epistemic rationality. As we shall see, he suggests that in some ways moral
justification is contingent upon epistemic justification. This he calls the moralepistemic link principle.
The Moral-Epistemic Link Principle
Already we have looked at how Bishop ties moral and epistemic obligation.
Bishop raises another case where epistemic and moral rationality are intertwined:
justification. He calls this second area the moral-epistemic link, and he initially
characterizes it as the principle that “it is morally justifiable to take beliefs to be
true in our reasoning only when it is epistemically justifiable to do so.”56 Bishop
sees this particular formulation of the link as the culprit of many misdeeds in
epistemology, for by this principle one may rightly suspend judgment on morally
important propositions by citing evidential ambiguity. By Bishop’s action-oriented
perspective, the result of this is the rather troublesome possibility that one will fail
to act upon certain moral beliefs because one has not achieved epistemic
justification (and hence has not achieved moral justification) regarding those
beliefs. Yet while he thinks this version of the principle has flaws, Bishop does
not reject it wholesale. Instead, he seeks to revise it.
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Why does Bishop think the principle, as stated above, is problematic?
Bishop’s concern is with the case made by the hard-line evidentialist. As he
characterizes it, the hard-line evidentialist claims that it is morally justifiable to
take/hold a belief only if one is epistemically justified to do so; by the evidential
ambiguity thesis one does not have sufficient evidence to justify pertinent
religious beliefs, and hence once cannot be epistemically justified. Consequently,
by the link principle, one is not morally justified in holding/taking religious beliefs:
“If epistemic entitlement as certified under this evidential practice is required for
the moral probity of living by theistic beliefs, then the upshot is that it is not
morally justifiable to make theistic faith-commitments.”57 Even if one has a
disposition toward certain religious propositions, one ought not assent. In one’s
practical commitments, says Bishop, one must not take religious beliefs to be
true.58
Must we accept the moral-epistemic link, asks Bishop, “Or do people have a
perfect moral right to commit themselves beyond their evidence to the truth of
faith-beliefs if they so choose—and have the necessary psychic resources?”59
Bishop thinks the moral-epistemic link, in this initial form, is too strong. Perhaps
by beginning with the intent, it can be reformulated to be more broadly
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accommodating.
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Upon examination, says Bishop:

The moral-epistemic link principle, at its most basic, may thus be interpreted
as claiming that their moral conscience can be clear only if, so to speak,
their epistemic conscience is clear also: people may be morally justified in
practical commitment to the truth of their faith-beliefs only if, I shall say, that
commitment carries epistemic entitlement.61
Bishop believes the hard-line evidentialist has made a mistake in requiring
epistemic justification that P as a necessary condition for moral justification that
P. Moral justification requires that one has done one’s epistemic due diligence.
But requiring epistemic justification is too strong. This requirement is better
captured as a permissibility thesis. Thus, Bishop’s final characterization of the
moral-epistemic link principle is expressed as follows: “People are morally
entitled to take their beliefs to be true only if they are epistemically entitled to do
so.”62 Here and elsewhere, Bishop shifts between moral justification and moral
entitlement, but he does not clarify the difference as carefully as he does with
epistemic justification and epistemic entitlement. In regard to the moral-epistemic
link principle, Bishop seems to suggest that epistemic entitlement (not epistemic
justification) is the correct requirement for moral justification. But when he comes
to formulating the principle, the term moral entitlement is used.
Given this revised version of the moral-epistemic link principle, moral
justification (or at least moral entitlement) still requires an epistemic element. But
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does this rule out conflict between moral and epistemic rationality? Let’s take one
of the standard cases for rational conflict: Bob has some evidence that his wife
Susan has been unfaithful. But Bob recognizes his faith in his marriage as a
strong source of moral goodness in his life. Following the evidence leads to the
epistemically rational conclusion that Bob’s marriage is dissolving while the
conclusion of moral rationality is that Bob’s faith in his marriage promotes
morality. The important question for Bishop is whether Bob remains epistemically
entitled to believe that his marriage is not dissolving, in spite of the fact that the
evidence points to the contrary. Assuming for a moment that we have a
satisfactory definition of sufficient evidence, one might perhaps claim that until
one has sufficient evidence for P, holding not-P is still epistemically permissible
even if it is perhaps more epistemically responsible to hold P.63 Under such
circumstances, it appears that one could be morally entitled to hold not-P (in
virtue of one’s epistemic entitlement to hold not-P), while also being epistemically
entitled to hold P. (Keep in mind that to be entitled is a state, and does not
require assent or any other mental action on the part of the agent.) Thus, it
seems possible to experience rational conflict while still satisfying the moralepistemic link principle. As Bishop has characterized it, the hard-line evidentialist
cannot admit rational conflict between moral and epistemic obligations because
one cannot be morally justified in holding a belief that is not epistemically
justified. And perhaps we might be able to define evidential requirements in such
63
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a way as to rule it impermissible to hold not-P whenever evidence points to P.
That, too, would make it impossible to gain moral justification for not-P, and thus
would once again rule out moral-epistemic rational conflict. But as we have seen,
there is at least one plausible way to interpret Bishop in such a way that leaves
open the possibility of a rational conflict.
The consequence of this is that, based on this examination of Bishop’s tying
of moral and epistemic rationality, it still seems that it is most appropriate to
acknowledge the possibility of rational conflict, which in turn leaves open the
question of how one ought to solve such problems. Bishop’s preference, as we
saw in the previous section, is to countenance moral rationality over epistemic
rationality. He believes this is most coherent with the goals of the true religious
seeker. But perhaps that later claim is anything but sure. Religious seekers may
well privilege epistemic, prudential or other rational goals above moral goals.
Thus far, we have examined Bishop’s claim that the evidence for many
religious beliefs is ambiguous. The religious seeker, says Bishop, is concerned
with holding (or taking) morally rational beliefs. But to be morally justified in
taking P one must be epistemically entitled to take P. In the face of evidential
ambiguity, can the religious seeker satisfy epistemic entitlement in regards to
religious propositions? Bishop answers this question by suggesting his own
variety of fideism.
Supra-evidential Fideism
Bishop’s discussion of rationality identifies a general problem for rational
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agents: When evidence about a practically important matter is ambiguous, how
should a rational agent respond? Bishop frames the problem in terms of rational
and moral obligations. The hard-line evidentialist, says Bishop, claims that
because one is morally justified in taking P only when one is epistemically
justified in taking P. In regard to religious belief, if the evidential ambiguity thesis
holds, the hard-line evidentialist claims that (all things considered) an agent
ought not assent to religious beliefs.64 But Bishop claims that this conclusion is
based on the too-stringent requirement that one must be epistemically justified
before one can take P to be true. Might S rationally take P to be true if S is
morally and epistemically entitled to take P? Answering this question in the
affirmative opens the possibility for what Bishop develops as supra-evidential
fideism. As we shall see in this section, Bishop develops an account of fideism
that suggests that under certain circumstances one is rational in holding religious
beliefs even in the case where the evidence is ambiguous.
Returning first to Bishop’s models of faith, we will see in this section how
Bishop develops a notion of doxastic venture, and from this Bishop introduces his
fideist thesis, first as thesis (J), and then as the revised thesis (J+).
Faith
As Bishop begins to unfurl his particular type of fideism he offers his own
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characterization of faith. The model he offers ultimately emphasizes doxastic
venture—a particularly important aspect of his fideism. But venture alone does
not describe faith.
Bishop suggests that there are at least three components to faith. The first is
the cognitive component, which involves propositional beliefs. One necessary
condition for S to have faith in God is that S believes that God exists. And to talk
more generally of a religion as a faith, Bishop suggests that for one to hold to the
Christian faith, one must believe certain propositions about God, Jesus, and so
on. The epistemic origin of these beliefs is not at issue here, says Bishop.
Calvin’s claim that these beliefs arise as revelations from God is not, says
Bishop, incompatible with this characterization of faith.65 In making such a claim,
Bishop is sidestepping an early challenge from the externalist, and as we shall
see later, this is important.
The second component of faith is what Bishop calls the evaluativeaffectional component of faith. This is “the believer’s welcoming the content of
the cognitive component of his or her faith.” This entails assent, as I
characterized it in the first chapter. But is this evaluative-affectional component
just assent?66 Bishop indicates that there is more to it, that there is a certain
affectional character to it that distinguishes this welcoming from mere assent.
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It seems more likely that Bishop intends for assent to be part of the first component. But one
could read Bishop as suggesting that one have a disposition toward a belief (1), and an assentlike attitude toward a belief (2).
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Citing James 2:19, Bishop points out that it is possible to believe, yet not be one
of the faithful: “You believe that God is one; well and good. Even the demons
believe that—and tremble with fear.” Bishop suggests that what differentiates
between the demons—enemies of God—and the followers is beyond mere faith.
One must also be receptive to these faith-beliefs. The evaluative-affectional
component requires a degree of receptivity and affection that is beyond the
doxastic stance of the demon in James’ epistle. Perhaps it is better to liken this
component to trust, as in Evans’s model, if one understands trust as an
affectional attitude.67
In addition to these, Bishop enunciates a third requirement: “Faith is not just
a matter of holding faith-beliefs, and being glad of the truths so held. Faith
involves commitment so some kind of act is thereby essential to faith.”68 While
Bishop suggests the term commitment, what he means, it seems, is closer to
what Evans calls obedience: one seeks to do God’s will.69 It is not just that one
continues to hold faith propositions, but that one allows one’s faith to give
direction in one’s practical life.
These last two elements, says Bishop, have an element of risk, of
venturesomeness.
Christians rely on God for their ultimate welfare, and must therefore
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relinquish the egotistic fantasy of trusting only themselves for directive
control over their lives—and that involves genuine risk and real venture.
That is common ground: what is contentions is the nature of the venture or
ventures involved in authentic Christian faith.70
Thus faith involves a transition from determining one’s own goals and
motivations, determining one’s own fate, to trusting another (namely, God) as an
authority and seeking to conform one’s will to the will of that authority. And it is at
this point that Bishop makes an interesting move from what might initially seem
like a trust-based model of faith to what he calls a doxastic venture model.
Doxastic and Sub-doxastic Ventures
In the first chapter we surveyed the seven models of faith that Bishop
enumerates in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Faith.”71 That
section introduced general notions of faith as doxastic and sub-doxastic
ventures. As Bishop develops his account of supra-evidential fideism in Believing
by Faith, he offers a more specific and detailed examination of these two models
of faith. The main model of faith with which Bishop is concerned is the doxastic
venture model.
Bishop transitions from his characterization of faith to his explanation of the
doxastic venture model. His first characterization of faith involves a tripartite
conjunction of (cognitive) belief, (evaluative-affectional) welcoming, and
commitment or obedience. Bishop suggests that this model is venturesome, in
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that it involves a realignment of interests from the egotistical to the obedient. That
notion of venturesomeness as obedience dissipates when he introduces the
doxastic venture model. He introduces doxastic venture with no mention of
welcoming or obedience: “The doxastic venture model of such faith-commitment
maintains that it involves an active venture in practical commitment to the truth of
faith-propositions that the believer correctly recognizes not to be adequately
supported by his or her evidence.”72 How does this relate to the characterization
of faith Bishop has just offered?
Bishop’s characterization of faith involves belief, welcoming, and obedience,
but it does not involve epistemic justification.73 Indeed, given evidential
ambiguity, evidential justification is not possible. It is the obedience or
commitment condition that links his characterization of faith to this model of
venture. Obedience (commitment) is action-oriented. It involves taking certain
beliefs to be true even if these are as of yet unjustified, and this is particularly
true in the context of action. That is, one must act as if such beliefs are true.
While this may seem redundant, given that belief entails assent (holding B
entails taking B to be true), the real emphasis here is on the practical context:
one’s actions proceed in accordance with one’s beliefs. Thus, Bishop isn’t simply
suggesting that one must believe, and then assent again. What he is suggesting
72
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is that one must believe, and one must act according to one’s assent.
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Practical

commitment is the point Bishop wishes to emphasize, and he explains practical
commitment (in doxastic venture) as having three key aspects: (1) S must
believe B, (2) S must “take it to be true (with full weight)” that B when practically
reasoning, and (3) S must recognize that S is not evidentially justified in believing
B.75
In regard to (1), belief in this case is the disposition toward P. Here it does
not seem to include assent, which is instead captured in clause (2). As Bishop
puts it, “there can be occasion for doxastic venture only if there is already a
passionally caused tendency to hold the proposition concerned to be true.”76
Here Bishop suggests that the disposition toward P is “passionally caused.” This
phrase he borrows from William James, and he invokes the notion of passion
here to explain how one would have the disposition, and yet have neither
sufficient evidence nor assent. I return to this point later.
The idea of “taking B to be true (with full weight)” is crucial for Bishop. He is
explicitly distancing himself from an evidential proportionality model.77 He
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eschews the claim that one should proportion one’s belief to one’s evidence. Part
of the venturesomeness of the doxastic venture is in holding this unjustified belief
with the same degree of belief as one would hold a justified belief—and again
note that the context here is practical reasoning.78 Bishop understands practical
reasoning as requiring a degree of responsibility beyond contemplation or
consideration. In this way, taking P to be true in practical reasoning is more
demanding than taking P to be true in theoretical reasoning. Acting (especially
morally important acting) carries with it a higher onus than, say, thinking about an
article one has read in the newspaper.79 Thus, when Bishop says in the third
claim that one must recognize one’s epistemic state, he goes so far as to
stipulate that this is deliberate (and occurrent) recognition because “the venturing
involved in doxastic venture is conscious venturing.”80 For one to be responsible
in one’s venture, one must be conscious of what one is venturing. Moreover,
Bishop is concerned that faith be genuine or authentic faith. “Authentic faith
requires full pragmatic commitment… theistic doxastic venture involves giving the

Bishop 2007, 108-109.
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truth that God exists full weight in one’s practical reasoning.”
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To proportion a

belief to the evidence seems, in Bishop’s mind, to undermine the genuineness of
belief. (This notion of authenticity is important, and I will return to it in the context
of sub-doxastic faith ventures.)
One cannot make a doxastic venture that P, says Bishop, if one has
epistemic justification that P. As far as I can tell, Bishop’s reason for this is that
he does not think of justified beliefs as ventures. But if justification is understood
as defeasible, does that not make holding even justified beliefs venturesome?
For S to hold P defeasibly, S acknowledges that even while S believes P and has
evidence that P, S cannot be certain that P. It still may be the case that not-P. Is
holding P thus not a venture? (Bishop’s emphasis on justification is on P being
justified for S, not just that S is justified in holding P.) Perhaps Bishop would
suggest that with justification comes assurance or confidence, and that for such a
reason, believing a justified proposition is no longer psychologically
venturesome. But it is not clear where venture ends and confidence begins, nor
is it clear that confidence precludes venture.82 Another way to interpret doxastic
venture is in relation to a notion of degrees of belief. Bishop, as we have seen,
mentions proportioning belief to evidence, but suggests that a defining
characteristic of doxastic venture is the “taking P with full epistemic weight.” It
81
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seems that an argument could be made for the claim that S is taking a doxastic
venture regarding P even when possessing evidence in cases where the
evidence demands only a low degree of belief. Here, the doxastic venture may
be grounds for taking P with full epistemic weight (as Bishop says) even when
the evidence recommends a lesser degree of belief.83 Does Bishop’s neglecting
this point hurt his overall argument? Perhaps not. Indeed, it may be a boon. No
longer is the doxastic venture limited to only propositions with ambiguous
evidence, but perhaps also beliefs with little evidence.
Doxastic venture describes a case where one believes, and one ventures to
act in accordance with that belief even while recognizing that one is not justified
in believing.84 Bishop considers another case, though: the case where one does
not believe—where the doxastic disposition is absent. And he describes a
second form of venture model that he calls the sub-doxastic venture.
In a sub-doxastic venture, the first condition of the doxastic venture need not
hold. It is not the case that S must believe (as a doxastic disposition toward) B. In
the first chapter, I offered an account of belief that has both a dispositional
element and a requirement that an agent (either consciously or unconsciously)
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assent. There I also suggested that one might assent to B but not (at that point or
any other) develop a disposition toward B. I even suggested that justified true
assent (at time t) may count (at t) as knowledge. Bishop’s holding/taking
distinction shares the traits described: one can take B to be true (at time t)
without the dispositional component required in holding B. The sub-doxastic
model makes much of this distinction, as it suggests that one can take B to be
true (assent to B) at time t, while not believing B.
Assent, as I have construed it, must be sincere. Sincerity requires that one’s
assent is both unfeigned and honest. Does Bishop understand sincerity as a
requirement even for sub-doxastic venture? Bishop’s primary interest in his
account of taking-to-be-true is that one’s assent is lived out in one’s action. But
there remains the possibility that one may act on an insincerely held proposition.
It seems that one can take P to be true without sincerity. Bishop does not think
this counts as taking-to-be-true. “[F]ull commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth
will not suffice for authentic faith if it is undertaken in a purely experimental spirit,
or as an exercise in pretending to believe.”85 This answer is inspired by Mark 9:
24: “I believe; help my unbelief!” This may be understood, says Bishop, as the
statement that “I assent, Lord, help me to form the disposition!”86 Bishop
suggests that “if people can be so prepared without actually believing the truth of
the faith-propositions on which they act, then it ought to be conceded that they
85
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I suggest that what Bishop

earmarks as authentic in this expression is sincerity.88 One is committing to B
because one desires to form belief that B. While it may not be possible or
prudent to thereby infer from this that Bishop holds that all takings-to-be-true are
ipso facto sincere, the specific faith ventures that are at issue in this context do
seem to be characterized by sincerity.89
Authenticity plays a significant role in Bishop’s notion of venture. Both
doxastic and sub-doxastic ventures require that the agent is authentically taking
P to be true. Why does Bishop make this a requirement? Why not allow that a
venture be hypothetical, an “acting-as-if”? Doing so would substantially simplify
Bishop’s argument, perhaps eliminating “fideism” altogether. But Bishop insists
on a higher degree of commitment, and this is a result of his definition of faith.
Bishop understands genuine religious commitment to require faith. (This rightly
raises significant questions about Bishop’s notion of God—a question I address
in the next chapter. Genuine religious commitment is about a relationship with
God, and a genuine relationship cannot be had by “acting-as-if.”) The cognitive
and evaluative-affectional components of faith demand more than a hypothetical
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venture. So the doxastic venture, and even the sub-doxastic venture, requires
that one assent sincerely, making an (affectional) commitment beyond “acting as
if.” This, I take it, is the meaning of authenticity for Bishop.
There is a second (related) question we might ask about Bishop’s doxastic
venture model of fideism. Given both doxastic and sub-doxastic models, why
does Bishop emphasize the doxastic venture model? Instead, he could discount
doxastic dispositions and focus on sub-doxastic venture. The answer to this, I
think, has more to do with descriptiveness than prescriptiveness. Bishop (again
following James) is interested in giving an account of how those who believe may
rationally do so. Recall that for Bishop, the disposition to believe is a precondition
for a doxastic venture, not a result of it. The sub-doxastic venture model certainly
admits those who are seeking and who are willing to assent before believing—
and this captures a very real class of people. But Bishop is most concerned with
those who find the disposition already there, yet have difficulty assenting in light
of evidential ambiguity.
Bishop suggests that a doxastic venture may be the appropriate response to
propositions plagued by evidential ambiguity. In the next section we will
encounter a certain class of propositions that Bishop finds to be a particularly
troublesome example of evidentially ambiguous, yet important, propositions.
Some propositions play the role of framing principles.
Framing Principles
We have explored Bishop’s notions of faith, doxastic venture, and sub-
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doxastic venture. These are critical components of Bishop’s fideism. Specifically,
they explain the attitude of the believer (or assenter) in relation to beliefs. But
there is an important aspect of Bishop’s argument that has to do with types of
belief. Bishop wants to identify certain classes of religious beliefs as particular
candidates for faith ventures. One such class of beliefs is what he calls framing
principles.
Bishop uses the term “doxastic framework” to describe a set of related
beliefs: “For an identifiable doxastic framework to be a feature of a person’s
overall noetic structure is for the person to have a related set of beliefs that all
presuppose the truth of a specific set of framing principles.”90 A doxastic
framework is not (necessarily) isolationist—beliefs that are part of that framework
may be related to beliefs not in that framework. As this integrationist attitude
suggests, Bishop is not smuggling an anti-realist conception of belief into his
account. But he is attempting to capture the fact that humans may have (and
perhaps often have) clusters of closely related beliefs (political views, religious
beliefs, and so on), and that often times those clusters have certain higher order
“framing principles” that in some sense undergird them. Thus, Bishop describes
framing principles as “those propositions whose truth must be presupposed if any
of the beliefs belonging to the framework are to be evidentially justified.”91
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Presumably, for example, a monotheistic doxastic framework (e.g. evangelical
Christianity) will have the framing principle “God exists.” Some framing principles
are what Bishop calls highest-order framing principles, not depending for support
on any other propositions within the doxastic framework.92
Framing principles, thinks Bishop, have an interesting property: even if one
were to adopt proportionality (“degrees of belief”) evidentialism as a general
strategy, framing principles don’t seem to admit to degrees of belief. Bishop
suggests that when it comes to a framing principle one either buys into it or one
does not; one either takes them true (in practical reasoning) or one does not.93
Bishop adopts James’ terminology, and describes framing principles as forced—
one either accepts or does not accept. And again drawing from the so-called
evidential ambiguity of theism, Bishop suggests that at least some framing
principles are undecidable.94 “[T]he choice whether or not to commit to the truth
of the framing principles of a whole doxastic framework of faith-beliefs could
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of it being a framing principle, one must either buy in (all the way) or not. “Either
one is practically committed to the framework’s principles or one is not. Either
one takes them to be true with full weight or one does not.” 96
Bishop’s notion of framing principles plays three roles in his fideism: First,
they explain Bishop’s own notion of how we hold related beliefs. We can see
from his description that Bishop’s noetic “web of belief” has clusters of associated
beliefs, and at least some propositions in at least some such clusters are highestorder framing principles. Second, the notion of framing principles bolsters
Bishop’s claim that some propositions are evidentially ambiguous. I read Bishop
as here trying to make an architectural case for ambiguity. This is different from
the empirical case we have already encountered. Bishop here claims that
evidential ambiguity may be a necessary result of the architecture of belief.
Finally, by positioning framing principles as crucial to entire groupings of beliefs,
Bishop has elevated the urgency of his argument. Fideism is important, he
claims, when it alone can provide rationale for holding (or taking) certain
beliefs—beliefs that play a critical role in supporting broad clusters of beliefs.
The second claim, that framing principles are evidentially ambiguous, is
troublesome. The implication is that some propositions cannot be evidentially
95
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supported because of their role in one’s noetic framework. I see no clear reason
why the role of a proposition would prevent evidential support, and the very
examples Bishop gives are those currently under dispute anyway: the existence
of God, the idea that God acts in history. What Bishop seems to be doing here is
forwarding propositions that he believes are evidentially ambiguous in the
empirical sense discussed previously, then claiming that these are framing
principles that play an architectural role, and thereby concluding that framing
principles cannot be supported by evidence. Two things seem to surface when
viewed in this light. First, if the empirical argument for evidential ambiguity thesis
is weakened, so must the ambiguity of framing principles. We must shy away
from Bishop’s claim that framing principles may be essentially evidentially
undecidable.97 Secondly, with no further indications of what might constitute a
unique class of framing principles, it seems there is no reason to treat framing
principles as evidentially undecidable in virtue of their role.
Framing principles—especially those highest order framing principles—
represent an important class of propositions for Bishop’s theory of fideism. They
play an important role in one’s doxastic framework, yet on Bishop’s account they
are architecturally resistant to evidential support. These principles then seem to
Bishop to be the ideal case for doxastic venture, and lead to supra-evidential
fideism.
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Theses (J) and (J+)
Bishop’s account of rationality combines with the moral-epistemic link
principle and the evidential ambiguity thesis to pose a serious problem for the
religious seeker who espouses hard-line evidentialism: Evidentially ambiguous
religious propositions can be neither epistemically nor morally justified, and one
therefore ought to suspend judgment on such propositions. From such a
perspective, it appears that one cannot be both rational and a religious believer.
But Bishop calls into question the assumption that he finds in hard-line
evidentialism: is epistemic justification really necessary for moral justification? In
answer, Bishop suggests that epistemic entitlement (which, as he explains it,
does not require epistemic justification) meets the epistemic requirements for
moral justification. Epistemic justification is not required. But what other
conditions must be met before one may hold (or take to be true) religious
propositions, even if on principally moral grounds?
Bishop’s version of fideism, which he calls supra-evidential fideism, is based
on the doxastic venture model introduced earlier. Supra-evidential fideism is the
thesis that under some circumstances it is morally permissible to make a
doxastic or sub-doxastic venture when the evidence is inconclusive. (Bishop
does not delve into the question of how moral permissibility is tied to moral
justification. It appears both here and elsewhere that moral permissibility may in
fact require moral justification, making him “hard-line.” But a weaker reading
seems consistent with Bishop’s claims as well. Moral permissibility requires
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epistemic permissibility, but may not require satisfaction of other (unspecified)
stipulations of moral justification.)
The crucial question is this: under what circumstances can one undertake
such a venture? While Bishop is ultimately focused on only religious beliefs, he
begins with a generic account of what circumstances may admit doxastic
venture. He begins with William James’ essay “The Will to Believe,” and
suggests a la James, that only genuine options be considered candidates for
religious belief.98 According to James, there are three qualifications for an option
(candidate for assent or belief) to be genuine: it must be live, it must be forced,
and it must be momentous.99 An option is live only if that option is a real
possibility for the inquirer. One must be able to assent sincerely to P in order for
P to be live for that person. Momentous live options are those that, if held, will
have a significant impact on a believer’s overall actions or beliefs. It impacts,
says Bishop “what kind of lives they lead or persons they become.”100
Momentousness also requires an element of immediacy or uniqueness: a
momentous option is one about which a decision must be made right away.
Finally, an option is forced if the possible responses are a bivalent for or against.
(The notion of a forced option was introduced in the previous section.) In the
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context of a particular religious belief (“Jesus is my personal savior”), says
Bishop, the option is between accepting and not accepting because there is “no
salient practical difference between not doing so while suspending judgment and
not doing so while ‘positively’ disbelieving it.”101
Thesis (J): Permissibility of Doxastic Ventures
With this, Bishop introduces thesis (J), a thesis about under what conditions
one is morally permitted to make a doxastic or sub-doxastic venture regarding
religious propositions.
(J)
Where P is a faith-proposition of the kind exemplified in the context
of theistic religious faith, it is morally permissible for people to take P to be
true with full weight in their practical reasoning while correctly judging that it
is not the case that P’s truth is adequately supported by their total available
evidence (‘to make a faith-venture in favor of P’) if and only if:
(i) the question whether P presents itself to them as a genuine option; and
(ii) the question whether P is essentially evidentially undecidable.102
Evidential undecidability is related to the evidential ambiguity thesis Bishop
offers. But there is more to it—especially when coupled with (i). Evidential
undecidability would, under most circumstances, indicate that one ought to
suspend judgment. But Bishop argues that this is not necessarily the case when
P is a genuine option (live, forced, and momentous), for there are non-epistemic
considerations that must be taken into account—not the least of which is this
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Because the option is

forced, by definition one cannot invoke a proportional belief model. Thus, the
“undecidability” in (ii) cannot be avoided by claiming that one may adjust one’s
degree of belief based on the evidence. But if suspending judgment in regards to
P is not an option (or is performatively the same as disbelieving P), and the
evidence is undecidable, isn’t it simply the case that one should not assent to P?
Not necessarily, says Bishop. If “the evidence neither supports P’s truth nor P’s
falsity, then either taking P to be true or not doing so would be consistent with
intellectual assessment of the evidence, and the decision must be determined by
some further considerations about what one ought to do in such a situation of
open evidence.”104 Bishop is suggesting that if a live option P cannot be
epistemically justified, yet P has importance for practical reasoning, one may still
be morally justified in holding/taking P. But moral justification has an epistemic
requirement. And this is where thesis (J) comes in: It spells out the conditions
under which S may satisfy the epistemic component of moral justification without
having epistemic justification.
Clause (ii) has another important effect: it rules out what Bishop calls
counter-evidential fideism. In the last chapter we saw Evans suggest that in
some cases faith may be against reason. On Evans’s account, reason’s
limitations and sinfulness will lead to the conclusion that not-P, when faith urges
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toward P. Sometimes, says Evans, one must (in light of reason’s deficiency)
choose faith against reason. Bishop is opposed to any such claim, and clause (ii)
rules out this possibility for supra-evidential fideism. Only in cases where
evidence is undecidable is one morally permitted to make a doxastic venture.105
When it comes to cases in which the evidence points in a particular direction, “it
is indeed our ethical duty to take to be true only what the evidence shows to be
true, irrespective of where our passional inclinations may lie.”106 By “passional
inclinations,” Bishop intends to identify emotive (often morally charged)
inclinations that an agent may have. He suggests here that such feelings—even
if morally motivated—must not trump the epistemic outcome. Yet when Bishop
pays this point further attention later, he concludes that in non-religious contexts,
counter-evidential doxastic venture may in fact be permitted “only on the grounds
that the consequences of refraining from it might, in more or less contrived
circumstances, be sufficiently serious.”107 Why the exception for non-religious
contexts? Admitting one exception to the moral-epistemic link principle (and on
such weak explanatory grounds) calls into question whether Bishop’s method of
solving rational conflict is insufficient. Be that as it may, Bishop’s emphasis on
following the evidence whenever possible (even if only in religious contexts) does
avoid some of the issues we observed with Evans in the last chapter.
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Bishop is also eager to point out that (J) is a permissibility thesis. One is
permitted to make a doxastic venture if the conditions obtain, but one is not
obligated (ever) to make a doxastic venture. Given the requirement that
epistemic obligation proceeds from epistemic justification, one is not
epistemically obligated. And given (J)’s moral emphasis, I interpret Bishop to be
suggesting that one is not morally obligated to believe, either.108 This, says
Bishop, is a virtue of (J)—recognition of this fact (that doxastic venture is
permitted, but not required) encourages one to accept religious pluralism.109 One
may act as if P is true with full weight, but one still ought not become dogmatic,
for one must acknowledge the venturesomeness of taking P to be true.
Thesis (J+): Morally Moral Permissibility
There is something peculiar about thesis (J). Ostensibly, we have an
account of moral permissibility, yet all of the conditions are epistemic. Nothing at
all is said of morality. It seems, then, that under thesis (J), one may be morally
entitled to make patently immoral doxastic ventures. Bishop gives the example of
a Nazi religion: One may (by (J)) be morally entitled to make a faith venture in
favor of a religion that extols the extermination of others, is committed to racism,
and aspires to world military domination. Thesis (J) then, seems to be a rather
amoral moral permissibility thesis.
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To rectify this, Bishop suggests two additional conditions. First, he suggests
that the doxastic venture can only be considered moral “if it is motivated by a
morally acceptable type of motivation.”110 Bishop suggests, rightly I think, that
any adequate moral theory should be able to answer the question of whether, for
any doxastic venture V, S’s motivation in making V is morally acceptable.111
Adding this condition should successfully rule out cases where one's motivations
are immoral. But what about the case where one earnestly ventures in favor of
an immoral religion (again take Bishop's Nazi religion as an example) for morally
laudable reasons? Bishop is concerned about this case. "It seems... that it is
possible to commit oneself to a morally objectionable faith-belief with a nonevidential motivation of a morally respectable kind."112 To eliminate this
possibility, another condition is necessary.
This other condition, claims Bishop, must stipulate that the proposition about
which one makes a doxastic venture must itself be morally good. Bishop spells
out this revised version of (J) as thesis (J+):
(J+)
Where P is a faith-proposition of the kind exemplified by the
proposition taken to be true in the context of theistic faith, it is morally
permissible for people to take P to be true with full weight in their practical
reasoning while correctly judging that it is not the case that P’s truth is
adequately supported by their total available evidence, if and only if:
(i) the question whether P presents itself to them as a genuine option;
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and
(ii) the question whether P is essentially evidentially undecidable;
and
(iii) their non-evidential motivation for taking P to be true is of a morally
acceptable type;
and
(iv) P’s being true conforms with correct morality.113
Clauses (i) and (ii) remain unchanged, while (iii) and (iv) have been added.
Bishop is very clear in stating that (iv) is to be understood as an external
requirement. It is not about what one takes to be correct morality. “Condition (iv)
as stated requires faith-commitments to conform to what correct morality actually
is.”114 Bishop suggests that one is only permitted to make a doxastic venture
when that venture is moral. But Bishop's externalist construal of the fourth
condition raises a significant problem. Ultimately, to require the satisfaction of an
external condition is to undercut the entitlement thesis that is essential to
Bishop’s argument.
Reading (iv) as an external condition, the question of P’s conformance to
morality is not at all determined by P’s internal relation of P to S’s morality. Nor is
the relation between P and “correct morality” necessarily accessible to S.
Condition (iv) can be satisfied regardless of S’s knowledge of or awareness of
correct morality. Similarly, (iv) can fail to obtain while S has no awareness of that
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failure. And herein lies the problem, for S may not be entitled to venture P while
having no capacity to discover that she or he is not so entitled.115 Yet the entire
rationale for introducing the notion of entitlement is that an agent must have
internal access to her or his epistemic relation to a belief. Fideism—here spelled
out in terms of a doxastic venture—is what gives the religious seeker peace of
mind that she or he may indeed rationally take or hold P. Yet if S is only
permitted to make doxastic ventures that satisfy the conditions of (J+), and such
conformance to (J+) is external and possibly inaccessible to S, no peace of mind
is gained here. One is left uneasy about whether or not (iv) obtains, and hence
whether one indeed may make a doxastic venture. This is fundamentally
destructive to Bishop’s fideism.
It is clear why Bishop wants (iv), and wants it to be externalist. He wants to
prevent doxastic ventures that are immoral—and admitting the possibility that
(J+) may lead one to embrace militant and extremist religious views is distasteful
to say the least. While well-meaning, I think Bishop overreaches. To satisfy the
goal of building a theory that indicates to an agent when that agent may correctly
make a doxastic venture, any moral restriction must remain internal. In the first
chapter, I discussed a model of rationality, and talked about moral justification.
This may provide a foundation for an alternative to an externalist version of (iv).
We might sketch a different restriction on doxastic venture that directs focus to
115
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coherence with one’s other moral beliefs: S determines P's moral goodness in
respect to S's other beliefs relevant to S's moral evaluation of P. Perhaps this
can be best filled out by requiring that S be morally justified in believing (or
assenting to) P. This formulation I will call (iv’). Recall that S is morally justified in
holding/taking P if doing so promotes S’s goodness or morality. This is a rough
sketch—one whose completion is beyond our scope. But it points to the pertinent
issue: Just as epistemic justification leads one toward truth, so moral justification
leads one toward goodness. But the move toward goodness is done based on
one’s internal evaluation. It is worth noting, though, that this requirement is
essentially taking a hard-line moralist position by requiring moral justification as a
prerequisite for morally permissible doxastic venture. (This is not to claim that
nothing is morally permissible without moral justification, but that doxastic
venture is not morally permissible unless it is morally justified.) This rebuilding of
the fourth condition as (iv’) seems the best way to save Bishop’s notion of
entitlement from encroaching externalism. This has the negative side effect that it
might allow S to make a doxastic venture in favor of a proposition that is in fact
immoral, but this is no more frightening for us than the fact that S may also be
epistemically justified in holding a false belief.
We’ve seen that accepting (iv) undercuts Bishop’s stated goals for
entitlement. Holding (J+) results in one no longer finding peace of mind that one’s
doxastic venture is morally acceptable, and hence one must remain uncertain
about whether one is entitled to make such a doxastic venture. The way to
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escape this undercutting conclusion is to replace (iv) with (iv’), the requirement
that P must be morally justified for S.
Why is it that Bishop does not seem to recognize this problem? In fact, there
are indications in the text that Bishop does recognize it, and these surface in his
discussion of the problem of evil.
Abraham's doxastic ventures
Once Bishop has offered J+ as the morally strong version of J, he considers
a few examples of doxastic venture. We will look at Bishop’s analysis of the story
of Abraham and Isaac, and then see how Bishop addresses the problem of evil. I
argue that in these accounts, the weaknesses of (J+) come to the forefront.
Inspired by Kierkegaard’s famous opening discussion in Fear and
Trembling, Bishop examines the Genesis story of God’s calling Abraham to
sacrifice his son Isaac. Was Abraham entitled to make the doxastic venture that it
was indeed God’s command to offer Isaac as a human sacrifice? Explaining, in
terms of (J+), why Abraham is justified in making this particular faith venture
leads Bishop into trouble. Initially, he suggests that Abraham is reasonable in
supposing that he should sacrifice Isaac because as far as Abraham was able to
judge in his ethno-sociological context, God’s demand to sacrifice Isaac does
conform to correct morality.116 But Bishop must qualify this according to his
externalist construal of (iv) by pointing out that we know now that this
requirement of God’s does not conform to correct morality.
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This raises a question at the very heart of the account: Was Abraham in fact
morally permitted to make this particular faith venture? Let’s grant Bishop the
premise that a deity’s requirement of human sacrifice is indeed non-conforming
to correct morality. If we grant this, we must conclude that Abraham’s faith
venture was in fact morally impermissible. But according to Bishop, the best
possible interpretation of Abraham’s action is that indeed he thought this action
morally permissible. We seem to have arrived at a case in which Abraham is not
permitted to believe B, but where by his (Abraham’s) lights he is permitted (even
obligated) to believe B. As I understand (J+), Bishop’s conclusion must be that
Abraham was not entitled to make the doxastic venture that led him up the side
of Mount Moriah.
This is a noteworthy problem for Bishop’s account, and it illustrates the
concern I expressed initially with condition (iv). Recall what the goal of Bishop’s
fideism is: It is to provide an indicator to a reflective believer as to whether she or
he is morally permitted to make a faith venture. This goal cannot be satisfied if
(iv) is externalist, for it leads to the Abraham problem: It can be morally
impermissible for the reflective believer to hold P even when the reflective
believer has adequately reflected on both the epistemic and moral conditions in
such a way that the believer has satisfied all of the relevant internalist conditions.
It seems that a reflective believer must then recognize that, in absence of an
ability to determine the moral permissibility of a faith venture, the believer does
not have grounds to make the venture.
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Bishop desires to retain for moral permissibility the sort of indefeasibility
epistemologist long sought. But just as epistemology has largely given up on an
indefeasibility requirement for epistemic justification, in this case we should reconstrue (iv) of (J+) as internal, and recognize that the claim of moral
permissibility is itself defeasible.
Interestingly, replacing (iv) with the internalist (iv’) variant best accords with
Bishop’s Abraham example. On Bishop’s telling, Abraham initially determines
that God’s demand for the sacrifice of Isaac is morally right.117 Yet when
Abraham reconsiders his moral position, he recognizes that sacrificing his son
does not conduce to goodness (and furthermore, he recognizes that a
benevolent deity would not require a human sacrifice). This causes Abraham to
revise his beliefs. With (iv), there is no ground to accept Bishop’s claim that
Abraham’s initial doxastic venture is morally permissible. But with (iv’) Abraham
meets the requirements of a doxastic venture for both ventures, yet we can see
clearly that the grounds for making a doxastic venture are defeasible. As
Abraham’s moral reflections change, so too may his doxastic ventures.
The problem of the problem of evil
In the story of Abraham and Isaac, one difficulty for Bishop’s theory arises.
Bishop identifies another problem in regard to the problem of evil. As a thesis
essentially about moral rationality, Bishop notes that (J+) is open to a common
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objection against claims in favor of God’s existence. For the reflective believer to
rightly make a doxastic venture in regard to P, P must satisfy the two moral
conditions, (iii) and (iv). If P is claims the existence of a moral God, then one
must be able to offer an adequate explanation of God’s actions and allowances
in regard to evil in the world. The so-called problem of evil still presents a
problem for traditional theists engaging in a doxastic venture according to (J+).118
The answer Bishop gives to the problem of evil is interesting because he
sidesteps the externalism issue of (iv) by quietly substituting a new requirement
in place of (iv).
As Bishop formulates it, the problem of evil boils down to whether a
reflective believer can “endorse a moral theory under which all historical evils
could be such that God has a morally adequate reason for permitting and/or
causing them.”119 Bishop claims that the problem of evil is not a problem of the
epistemology of religious belief, but of the morality of belief. The question, as
Bishop understands it, is whether one ought to make a moral doxastic venture in
favor of some account of God’s existence in conjunction with the existence of
evil. But, suggests Bishop, the already offered doxastic venture model can be
applied here.What are the demands of (J+) when evaluating whether a
conception of God accords with the requirements in (iii) and (iv) of (J+)?
First, there is the motivational question in (iii), in which one must ask
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whether one’s motives for accepting P are morally acceptable. This does not
seem to pose a particularly troublesome blocker in the case of the problem of
evil. It requires only that the venturer’s motivations are correct; the morality of the
actions of God (thus construed) is of no consequence in the context of (iii).
Condition (iv), though, poses a greater challenge. (iv) requires that one’s
taking to be true that P (with P in this case being an explanation of how a
benevolent God can allow evil to occur) accords with actual correct morality. But
Bishop seems to recognize that this is a stumbling block, for clearly the believer
has no access to whether a given theory of theodicy is morally correct—it is, after
all, the question at hand. This renders the permissibility of the faith venture
indeterminate to the agent—the problem I have noted in the last two sections.
But Bishop draws a startling conclusion about this: “condition (iv) in such cases
will then reduce to the requirement that those beliefs [about God’s character and
the existence of evil] be mutually coherent.”120 No explanation is given as to how
this external requirement is suddenly “reduced” to internal coherence.
I find Bishop’s move to coherence perplexing, as it seems so conceptually
distant from Bishop’s earlier characterization of (iv). Not only have we moved
from an externalist condition to an internal one, we have also moved from a
question of morality to a question of epistemology. There are the problems with
this. First, the requirement that P coheres with one’s other moral beliefs is
extraneous to the morality question in the original (iv). Under Bishop’s initial
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characterization of (iv), there is no need for the agent to have any awareness of
correct morality. The condition is merely whether taking/holding P does in fact
accord with correct morality. There does not seem to be any sense in which the
fact of P reduces to P’s coherence with other propositions held by S. Second,
coherence seems to have very little to do with the morality of holding a
proposition. Bishop introduces (iv) as a way to stymie immoral doxastic ventures,
yet epistemic coherence does nothing to fill the stated goal of (iv). Drawing from
the original example, the Nazi religion may be both internally coherent and
coherent with S’s other beliefs. But this does not do anything to ensure morality.
Consequently, I don’t see how Bishop’s sudden replacement of (iv) with a
coherence requirement addresses what is of concern.
Yet I think Bishop is right to be concerned with the problem of evil, and I
think he is right in construing it as a problem for an account of doxastic venture.
What comes to light in this example is the inadequacy of (J+)’s condition (iv).
Bishop’s externalist move is a misstep. Moving to an internal account of moral
justification, as formulated as (iv’), brings the problem of evil into the proper
relation with the individual’s doxastic venture. The believer must be morally
justified in holding beliefs about the existence of God in a world in which evil
occurs.
Is Faith a Bad Guide?
In the last chapter I challenged C. Stephen Evans’s claim that given
reason’s limitations, faith is a better guide. I challenged this on grounds that there
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is no evidence that faith is a reliable method of attaining truth. Bishop shares this
same worry in regard to his own doxastic venture model. Starting from the
perspective of the hard-line evidentialist, Bishop frames the problem as follows:
Hard-line evidentialists may… seek to turn the tables by maintaining that
there is no real possibility that passional doxastic inclinations should
function as guides to evidentially inaccessible truth. It is irrational, they will
say, for supra-evidential fideists to accept the guidance of what they
themselves agree not to be a generally apt indicator of truth just because
there can be no other sort of guidance. A bad guide does not become a
good guide through being the only one available.121
The criticism, as Bishop sees it, is that whatever “passional” elements lead one
to take a faith venture, they possess no apparent qualifications as guides to truth.
As Bishop sees it, practical reasoning—even in a strictly epistemic sense—brings
to bear all of the relevant capacities.122 But how does one determine which
capacities are relevant? Bishop suggests that the hard-line evidentialist rules out
any capacity that seems “passional.” Bishop calls these passional doxastic
inclinations. Bishop, citing James, characterizes passional inclinations as “any
cause of [a] belief other than a cause that provides the believer with evidence for
its truth.”123 This strikes me as an unsatisfactory explanation primarily because of
its vagueness,124 but at other points Bishop gives indications of what sorts of
inclinations he views as passional when he suggests that fideists often try to
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transform “certain kinds of emotional states” into evidence.

125

I understand

Bishop to be targeting that sort of oft-claimed “religious experience” captured with
phrases like “an awakening of my soul” or “a stirring in my heart.”
The question that Bishop then asks is whether passional doxastic
inclinations legitimately play any role in religious doxastic venture. Before
examining how Bishop addresses the claim of the hard-line evidentialist, it is
important to note two important differences between Bishop’s doxastic venture
model and Evans’s responsible fideism. The first is that Bishop offers staunch
and unwavering requirements about the preconditions for making a faith venture
(viz. (J+)): ambiguous evidence, a genuine option, moral motivation, and moral
conformance. As far as I can tell, none of these is required in Evans’s model. The
second is that while Evans touts the occasional faith commitment “against
reason,” Bishop rules out counter-evidential fideism. Bishop’s model is not based
on a strong claim about the inadequacy of sin-entangled reason against a
stronger (untainted?) divinely-given faith. Because of these, it seems to me that
Bishop’s fideism is in a much stronger position to address the concerns of the
“hard-line evidentialist.”
As Bishop sees it, the traditional arguments over passional doxastic
inclinations have revolved around a supposed dilemma: “[E]ither treat religious
doxastic inclinations as basic evidence, or else accept that they are indeed
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passional and thus never properly treated as guides to truth.”
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As we’ve seen,

Bishop is opposed to countenancing feelings (qua passional doxastic
inclinations) as evidence.127 He is opposed to the idea that one’s feelings about
some proposition be treated as evidence in favor of that proposition.
Furthermore, Bishop does not want to admit “experiential awareness” as
legitimate evidence as Evans seeks to do.128 Bishop seems to view such
awareness as nothing other than a passional experience. Even while he
maintains that passional doxastic inclinations are not evidential, he also does not
want to rule them inapplicable to epistemic rationality. He rejects the apparent
dilemma, suggesting that there is a middle way through.
The key to the answer, says Bishop, lies in the nature of a doxastic venture
as a venture that is amenable to later modification. Consider the case where one
makes a faith venture, and later happens upon conflicting evidence. “Under the
supra-evidential fideism expressed in (J+), she is then morally obliged to
withdraw or modify her initial faith-venture….”129 How does this escape the
dilemma? By the commitment to epistemic rationality expressed in (J+) and the
understanding of a commitment as subject to revision, Bishop believes that the
supra-evidential fideist is indeed not only acting (generally) rational, but
126
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remaining fully committed to epistemic rationality. And Bishop does not just
restrict modification of one’s faith-ventures on epistemic grounds, he identifies
both prudential and moral reasons for modifying a faith-venture.130
Furthermore, he suggests that even these “passional intuitions” can have
epistemic restrictions placed on them. He sketches three such conditions, though
he does not dwell on them. “First, they are subject to the constraint of mutual
logical coherence.” I understand this to mean coherence between intuitions, as
the next condition has to do with other beliefs. And this second condition is that
intuitions must have “evidential fit” with existing “evidentially-based factual
beliefs.”131 Bishop defers explaining evidential fit, choosing to characterize it only
as making sure that intuitions are constrained by facts.132 Finally, Bishop
suggests that there is a sense in which these intuitions need to be checked by
“critical pressures” from the community.133 By exposing one’s intuitions to others
in a community (and I take Evans to be referring here to an epistemic
community—a group of people who share common epistemic commitments),
one’s judgments about how these intuitions fit with available evidence are open
to further perspectives and evaluations.
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With these constraints in place, Bishop suggests that while the intuitions or
passions do not necessarily themselves gain evidential weight (which, again, is a
position he seeks to avoid), they do function rationally—that is, they accord with
an agent’s rational (all things considered) goals.134 They can thus rightly
influence one’s ventures, but for this to be rational, one must remember that
one’s doxastic venture is essentially experimental.135
It is important to note that Bishop is not exactly accomplishing what he
states. What Bishop is claiming is that passional doxastic inclinations may indeed
be valid truth indicators. Essentially, Bishop claims that when no strong evidence
is available, these inclinations may rightly serve an epistemic goal. Evidentialists
have a name for this sort of indicator: evidence. Even if it is weak and defeasible,
it remains evidence. What I see Bishop doing here is offering a defense that,
when strong truth indicators are ambiguous, it is at least epistemically
permissible to admit passional doxastic inclinations as weak evidence. I don’t see
this as particularly problematic, subterfuge aside. This seems consistent with
how humans actually do reason (even in non-religious contexts), and is also
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consistent with at least some characterizations of evidentialsm.

136

Is Fideism Preferable?
Bishop’s model of doxastic venture suggests that when certain conditions
are met, it is morally permissible to make a doxastic venture. But how does this
tie back to Bishop’s model of rationality? Is hard-line evidentialism defeated?
More generally, has Bishop shown his variety of fideism to be rationally (all things
considered) preferable?
First, there is the question of epistemic rationality. As we have seen already,
Bishop believes fideism to be epistemically rational, yet he does not think that
one can conclusively show that his version of fideism is epistemically preferable
to hard-line evidentialism.137 But Bishop is not particularly troubled by this
conclusion. Recall that for Bishop, the epistemic goal is not maximizing true
beliefs while minimizing false ones. Instead, it is to put one in the best position to
act rightly—and as Bishop construes this, this is a moral goal. For that reason,
Bishop believes he can make his case in terms of moral rationality. And he does
think that it is morally rational and morally preferable to accept supra-evidential
fideism. There seem to be two alternatives:
Does the highest morality liberate us from enthrallment to all forms of
religion or quasi-religion that require cognitive commitments in principle
beyond evidential support, as the hard-line evidentialist maintains? Or is the
136
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fideist correct in holding that the highest morality permits us—or perhaps
even requires us—to trust certain of our passional doxastic inclinations in
making such faith commitments?138
Clearly, Bishop enjoins the latter. (Note that here, late in his argument, he
includes passional doxastic inclinations as a key component.) If moral obligations
are the most important of all rational obligations—indeed, if all rational obligations
are (as Bishop suggests) ultimately understood as moral obligations—then, he
says, we may, and perhaps even must espouse a doxastic venture model.
He has more to say about why hard-line evidentialism is not the preferable
model. Bishop offers three reasons why he believes hard-line evidentialism is not
the most morally rational theory. The reasons are:
(1) The suggestion that fideism expresses a more balanced and authentic
self-acceptance than evidentialism; (2) the claim that hard-line evidentialism
arises from an unwarrantedly dogmatic attachment to a naturalist view of the
world—and may even count as a failure in love; and (3) the claim that those
who accept that basic moral values rest on passional commitment will end
up with a doubtfully coherent overall position if they also (as hard-line
evidentialists) reject religious-ventures in favour of the claim that the world is
a moral as well as a natural order.139
From these objections, Bishop draws the conclusion that supra-evidential fideism
is in fact morally preferable—and rationally preferable—over hard-line
evidentialism as an agent’s epistemological toward the world.
Thus far, I have raised some reservations about this argument. I have
suggested that Bishop misconstrues epistemic rationality and epistemic goals.
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Most crucially, I have argued that Bishop conflates moral and epistemic goals. I
have also claimed that epistemic rationality is not dependent upon moral
rationality (recall the example of the two nuclear scientists). To what extent do
these issues impact Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism? This is the topic of the
final section of the chapter.
Conclusion
I have outlined Bishop’s theory of fideism. Along the way I have pointed out
some of my concerns. In some cases, I have suggested ways to improve
Bishop’s theory (such as by revising (J+) to avoid moral externalism). In other
cases, I have left problems unanswered. But I have not claimed to defeat
Bishop’s theory. The goal of the next chapter is to argue that evidentialism
presents a better alternative to fideism. Making that argument will require
clarification of what makes one theory better than another, but I will not claim to
conclusively show either Bishop’s or Evans’s varieties of fideism to be false.
At a high level Bishop’s fideism suggests that (a) what the religious seeker
is (or ought to be) interested in is moral entitlement for holding religious
beliefs,140 (b) epistemically speaking, justification for important religious beliefs
cannot be had because the evidence regarding religious propositions is
ambiguous, and therefore (c) what the religious seeker is left with, as a best
available course of action, is a doxastic venture model as exemplified in thesis
(J+). Along the way, Bishop has made some claims that I have argued against.
140

Recall that moral entitlement, for Bishop, requires epistemic entitlement.

231
First, there is Bishop’s model of rationality, in which moral obligation is the only
form of obligation, and thus meeting one’s rational obligations (regardless of the
domain) becomes a question of meeting one’s moral obligations. Second, Bishop
claims that considering the total available evidence for important religious
propositions (such as “God exists”), the result is evidential ambiguity. Third, when
certain conditions obtain (as enumerated in thesis (J+)), one may—or perhaps
ought to—make a doxastic venture regarding faith propositions. Such doxastic
ventures are, it seems, permanent in the sense that we cannot hope for more
evidence that will lead from doxastic venture to justified belief. For this reason,
Bishop calls his theory a type of fideism.
The positive impact of Bishop’s argument should not be lost in the critique.
Bishop provides a much-needed theory of doxastic venture. There are cases
indeed where evidence is ambiguous, yet the situation presents what Bishop
calls a forced option. Bishop provides a rational alternative to the traditional
“hard-line evidentialist” answer that would require suspension of judgment. He
offers an account of how agents can make responsible (rational, all things
considered) doxastic ventures. And having approached the problem with both
moral and epistemic rationality in mind, Bishop has kept an eye on the practical
aspects. Even in religious contexts, there are situations that, for some S at time t,
involve ambiguous evidence. While I do not think doxastic venture is a broad and
enduring solution to the problems of religious beliefs and evidence, it seems
clear to me that sometimes a doxastic venture is a responsible (and perhaps the
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only responsible) course of action. Sometimes that initial doxastic venture opens
up the possibility of identifying evidence that might otherwise remain
inaccessible. And Bishop is right, I think, in criticizing the hard-line evidentialist
for mis-handling the situations that arise from evidential ambiguity, taking false
refuge in a demand for suspension of judgment.
My concern is with the extension of this theory of doxastic venture into a
version of fideism that claims that in general the doxastic venture is the correct
approach to addressing religious propositions. Is Bishop’s model the best a
religious seeker can or should hope for? Is doxastic venture the answer for the
religious seeker? Or is there a better candidate?141 Much of the question now
seems to hinge upon whether it has really been shown that there is not sufficient
unambiguous evidence (or that sufficient evidence cannot be had).
This evidential critique of Bishop’s, and even the agent-centered critique by
Evans, should raise another question for us. What do these questions about
evidential availability and agent reliability say about the character of the God
these arguments purport to defend? Might we turn the question a different
direction and ask about what can or ought to be expected (epistemically) from
such a God? This will be a guiding question in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EVIDENTIALISM AND FAITH
Introduction
In the last two chapters, I have explored Evans’s and Bishop’s theories of
fideism. I have claimed that each has difficulties. In this chapter I offer an
evidentialist alternative to fideism. Both versions of fideism position themselves
as answers to evidentialism’s insufficiencies. But neither has conclusively shown
evidentialism incapable of addressing the supposed problems raised by the
fideist. In this chapter I wish to make the following claim: Far from being
defeated, evidentialism provides a better account of how one can hold
epistemically rational religious beliefs.
To begin, I will look at fideism’s most troubling aspect: it’s seeming inability
to address the concerns of the skeptic. Evans builds a theory centered on agentbased limitations and flaws. While Evans invokes cognitive limitations as an
argument against evidentialism, ultimately it does damage to the fideist. Bishop’s
theory is about the permissibility of belief, but it leaves no compelling reason to
accept religious beliefs in the face of skeptical challenges. When accepting
evidential ambiguity as a permanent state, one has little hope of answering
skeptical challenges to religious beliefs.
If the goal of both forms of fideism is to assuage the critical doubts of the
233
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religious seeker, the fact that neither theory can rebuff the skeptic is cause for
concern. An individual with rational goals is interested in acquiring theories
resistant to skepticism.1 Evidentialism, I argue, remains a better epistemological
approach than fideism. Against the formulations of evidentialism in Bishop and
Evans, I suggest a formulation that is less “hard-line,” and I call this moderate
evidentialism.
A theory of evidentialism alone is not enough to adequately answer the
criticisms of these two fideists. Evans and Bishop raise significant concerns
about the purported evidence. We must return to the question of whether there is
non-ambiguous evidence for religious beliefs, and whether that evidence is such
that an agent can grasp it—even an agent cognitively limited and prone to
selfishness and pride. Bishop and Evans each claim that the evidence of natural
theology is insufficient. I examine why, discussing this sort of evidence as
forensic evidence. But perhaps seeking forensic evidence for God is a less
fruitful approach than others. Might we look elsewhere for a source of evidence?
I return to the distinction discussed in the last chapter between public and private
evidence. I examine the notion of private evidence in its various forms,
concluding that we often admit private evidence in well-accepted epistemic
practices. Certain claims about the evidential role of religious experience, though,
give reason to pause. Ought we really accept these as evidence? Are they the
best available evidence? And are they sufficient evidence? I briefly address
1

See the discussion of rationality in the first chapter for more on this.
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these questions before moving on to another potential source of evidence.
Both the fideists and the natural theologians may have erred in their
approach to evidence, in that they have neglected a critical leading question: If
there is a being worthy of the title God, how would this being be evident to
humans? A being worthy of the title God would be, among other things,
relational, perfectly loving, and altogether moral. Based on these characteristics
we might be able to project how such a being would interact with us. I suggest
that the answer to the question of evidence is that God’s existence would be
evident to us through God’s interactions (at a moral level) in our lives. Rather
than seeking forensic evidence, traces of God, residue of his actions in the world,
we are better off seeking evidence of God’s person-based interactions. If we are
to look for evidence of God, we should look for evidence of God’s efforts to noncoercively motivate moral improvement in individuals. I call this volitional
evidence, and suggest that we look at moral promptings experienced in
conscience as a starting point for evidence of God’s acting in our lives.
Such promptings, should we find them, still may not be sufficient for
justification. But our response to these promptings may become the basis for
encountering additional evidence. Thus, I suggest that Bishop’s notion of
epistemic venture may yet play a substantial, but non-fideistic, role in the
epistemic journey of the religious seeker. But this venture model is rightly
sensitive to the skeptic. That is, the venture does not conclude with evidenceless belief, counter-evidential belief, or even mere acceptance in the face of
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ambiguity. Rather, it is an epistemically rational strategy for diachronically
acquiring evidence.
Doubt and Skepticism
A mark of a good epistemic theory is its resilience to the skeptic. Theories
resistant to skepticism lend a higher degree of doxastic (or at least epistemic)
stability. If there is one problem that troubles fideism in general, it is skepticism.
By focusing on epistemic entitlement instead of justification, the two varieties of
fideism presented here have committed to a permissibility thesis. But epistemic
permissibility, as I claim below, is ill-equipped to rebuff skeptical challenges.
This claim may strike some as surprising. After all, historically fideism arose
as an answer to the skeptics. Bayle and Montaigne, both considered fathers of
fideism, were deeply rooted in Pyrrhonian skepticism.2 They believed, as do
Evans and Bishop, that traditional epistemic theories failed to answer the
questions of the skeptic. Yet these early fideists make the claim that one ought to
have faith (construed primarily in doxastic terms) in the face of epistemic failure.
Early fideism was situated in a milieu in which certainty was held to be a
necessary characteristic of knowledge.3 This commitment to certainty opened the
possibility of seemingly devastating skeptical attacks exemplified by Descartes’
evil deceiver. But devotion to the certainty criterion for knowledge did not
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diminish, and the epistemic theories (again, best exemplified in Cartesian
epistemology) seemed to limit what may be known to a small pool of beliefs.4
Humans can hope to know only a little. And religious beliefs seemed (to many) to
be outside the scope of what could be known. Early fideism may be understood
as reactionary—perhaps to the extreme opposite. If certainty is a necessary
condition for knowledge, then the skeptic is in a strong position to undermine
many knowledge claims. The solution offered by early fideists is to allow religious
believers to retain conviction in the face of this radical undercutting doubt. Yet
fideism accomplishes this by ignoring the skeptic’s concerns. To those historical
fideists, the precariousness of fideism was no more or less troubling than the
precariousness of certainty-based knowledge. But when we turn toward the
contemporary theories of Evans and Bishop the picture is different.
Contemporary epistemology has changed in at least one notable way:
certainty has given way to defeasibility and fallibility. It is now rare to find a theory
of epistemology that insists upon certainty as a criterion for justification or
knowledge. In so changing, contemporary epistemology displays a marked
improvement in resilience to the skeptical challenge. No longer can the
introduction of doubt, however minuscule that doubt may be, undermine a
knowledge claim. Nor can the mere possibility that not-P undermine justification
that P. Taken in this light, that classical notion of fideism (as espoused by Bayle,
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Montaigne and others) seems to be a fringe epistemology. Instead of being a
5

theory in opposition to another equally strong (yet widely accepted) theory, it
appears to be an outlier that has perhaps fallen into disrepute.
But might fideism enjoy a re-formulation in kind? Might certain aspects of
fideism be recalibrated to better address problems faced in contemporary
religious epistemology? Evans and Bishop find reason to again forward varieties
of fideism. As we have seen, these two theories of fideism are moderate when
compared to earlier theories.
Many (though not all) contemporary epistemic theories fare better against
the skeptic than the certainty-based theories of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries. While this is not to say that all succeed in all regards, global
skepticism may not appear to contemporary eyes to raise quite the specter that it
was to Descartes.6 But this raises an interesting question: Do the new forms of
fideism forwarded by Bishop and Evans also display better resilience to the
skeptic?
Entitlement and the Skeptic
Bishop and Evans both purport to develop fideism not as an alternative to
epistemic justification, but as a form of entitlement for belief. As I have shown in
the preceding chapters, both Evans and Bishop are developing an account of the
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permissibility of holding faith beliefs. To what degree is such a permissibility
thesis resistant to skepticism? Bishop and Evans both state that their claims are
modest: these two versions of fideism only show that an agent may remain
(generally) rational in holding qualifying faith beliefs. But even while qualifying the
argument thus, both acknowledge that religious beliefs are anything but trivial
details of one’s overall beliefs. The core of the Christian beliefs at issue in both
accounts is not merely a set of historical propositions, but an entire moral and
epistemic framework, an outlook on life (and death, and beyond), and even a
personal relationship between a human agent and God. Bishop expresses the
importance of some of these core religious beliefs by claiming that these beliefs
are framing principles: They become the foundation of a framework upon which
one’s entire view of the world—and one’s acting within the world—is based.
There is a magnitude to these beliefs that extends far beyond a simple venture
that some historical fact P obtains.
Yet even while acknowledging the magnitude of such beliefs, Bishop and
Evans seem to feel that it is sufficient merely to be permitted to hold these
beliefs. Justification is not necessary. Here it behooves us to draw attention to a
detail: Both Evans and Bishop conclude (though for different reasons) that one
cannot be epistemically justified in holding faith beliefs. Evans believes that our
epistemic equipment is “fatally flawed.” Bishop believes that the evidence is
irremediably ambiguous. But both reject the claim that the correct response is
of knowledge (2000, 334) and Barry Stroud (2000).
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suspension of judgment. Bishop goes so far as to claim that the reason
suspension of judgment is not appropriate is precisely because of the magnitude
of the beliefs in question.7 Here the skeptic is likely to raise the objection that
basing one’s overall noetic structure on beliefs that are not only unjustified, but
perhaps unjustifiable, is epistemically irrational.8
For Evans, what precludes justification is the chronic malfunction—due to
sin and cognitive limitations—of one’s epistemic capacities.9 Once we recognize
this, says Evans, we can overcome this limitation by taking religious propositions
by faith. The skeptic is unlikely to be swayed by Evans’s admonition to have faith.
The objection is one I raised in chapter 2: What makes faith less prone to lead
one into error than epistemic rationality? Faith is at least as likely (if not more
likely) to mislead one than reasoned decision making.10 When one does not have
the necessary capacity to reason about P, concludes the skeptic, the appropriate
7

It is not morally appropriate because of the practical implications of such beliefs. But Bishop
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response is not belief, nor disbelief, but suspension of judgment.
Bishop’s rebuttal to the skeptic is to make the Jamesian claim that in cases
of forced options, such as faith beliefs, suspension of judgment is (practically
speaking) the same as disbelief.11 Therefore, to claim that one ought to suspend
judgment in the face of ambiguous evidence is equivalent to claiming that one
disbelieve (because of suspension of judgment). Consequently, one is actually
entitled to select between belief and disbelief. Such an argument has a peculiar
quality. The claim seems to be that because the outcomes of disbelief and
suspension of judgment are (in some way) equivalent, the criteria ought to be
considered equivalent. The criterion for disbelief (stated roughly) is that one have
sufficient undefeated evidence that not-P. That is, if S has sufficient undefeated
evidence that not-P, one epistemically ought to hold not-P. On the other hand, if
S lacks sufficient undefeated evidence either for P or for not-P, S epistemically
ought to suspend judgment. Bishop’s claim seems to be that suspension of
judgment regarding (“forced”) religious propositions results in performatively
similar or identical consequences to holding that these religious propositions are
false.12 This is not problematic, but what Bishop claims based on this does seem
problematic: He indicates that because there are really only two outcomes
(acting as if P, and acting as if not-P), suspension of judgment is the same as
11
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have different doxastic states regarding religious propositions, but those doxastic states both lead
to the same sort of actions.
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disbelief: “not taking p to be true is in practice equivalent to taking p to be
false.”13 Hence one is actually faced with a bivalent choice (believe or
disbelieve). There is no meaningful sense of “suspending judgment” for what
James calls a forced option.
The skeptic will point out that this is a troublesome conflation. The
requirements for suspension of belief were met; therefore one epistemically
ought to suspend judgment. Even if suspending judgment is not performatively
different from holding not-P (a claim which itself may be dubious) this does not in
any way change the fact that the criteria for suspension were met, nor does this
similarity of conclusions entitle one to re-jigger one’s epistemology to preclude
suspension of judgment as an option. In a shell game, the token is under only
one of the three shells. There may be only two possible outcomes to the game
(find the token or don’t find the token), but this does not mean that there are only
two choices.
For the skeptic, neither Evans nor Bishop can deliver a reason why inability
to gain justification that P (or that not-P) ought to lead one to hold P, even if “by
doxastic venture” or “by faith.” When it comes down to it, the skeptic holds the
epistemic high ground: it is epistemically rational to suspend judgment. When
faced with irremediable evidential ambiguity or with defeated evidence, one
(epistemically) is not entitled to hold a belief.
There is a second aspect of Evans’s and Bishop’s entitlement thesis that
13
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encounters skeptical objections. One who adopts fideism will find oneself in a
precarious doxastic (or at least epistemic) situation. Permissive beliefs are not
resilient against skeptical attacks. Epistemic permissibility may accomplish a
purpose. In being permitted to believe, one may claim to be, in some sense,
rational. But by acquiescing to the claim that sufficient evidence cannot be had
(either because of agent-based deficiencies, as in Evans, or because of
evidential ambiguity, as in Bishop), one relinquishes the claim that religious
beliefs can be justified. One acknowledges the insufficiency of evidence, and yet
suggests that fideistically held beliefs may still play the part of framing principles.
This leaves not just a belief, but an entire system of beliefs susceptible to each
and every novel skeptical attack that an agent encounters. And the skeptic can
make a simple claim: Without justification, the fideist—even the rational fideist—
is relying on dogmatic assertion.
The skeptic can raise this simple objection against entitlement-based
unjustified beliefs by pointing out a result of entitlement for a belief that is not
epistemically justified. For some held belief B, for what epistemic reasons would
one hold this belief rather than something other than B (including not-B)? (I call
such epistemically oriented explanatory questions why-questions.) Why believe
Christianity rather than Buddhism? Why believe in one God rather than a
multitude? Why believe in a personal deity rather than a powerful but uninvolved
one? The permissibility theses found in Evans and Bishop do nothing to show
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that holding a belief is the best available option.

14

This is where skepticism

outmatches fideism. A fideistically held belief may be rational to believe, but in
absence of justification, the skeptic may challenge the fideist on the grounds that
other similarly rational beliefs may be held. Is fideism then cognitively arbitrary?
Does religious preference come down to non-rational (or at least non-epistemic)
deciders? The fideist then appears to be the dogmatist—that favorite epithet of
the skeptic—bluntly asserting P against the relative alternatives.
The upshot is that fideism does not seem to be an overwhelmingly
compelling answer to the plight of the religious seeker. Against the claim that one
ought to believe regardless of evidence, the skeptic will claim that suspension of
judgment is the epistemically rational stance. And against the claim that
permissiveness (epistemic entitlement without justification) is sufficient for
epistemically rationally holding religious beliefs, the skeptic will contend that the
fideist dogmatically asserting some P without showing it to be the best available
explanation.
But Bishop and Evans suggest that entitlement (without justification) may
just be the only game in town. Epistemic permissibility may not be ideal, but if
epistemic justification is not possible, entitlement will have to do. Fideism, at least
on the two accounts discussed here, is the best explanation only if evidentialism
is defeated. Unsurprisingly, both Bishop and Evans claim that evidentialism is in

14

In the next section I will discuss how a critical part of epistemic justification involves addressing
the question of best available explanations.
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fact defeated. But is it? Or might it yet show itself to be the better alternative?
Is Evidentialism Defeated?
Both Evans and Bishop claim that evidentialism suffers from flaws so severe
that the rational human agent cannot use evidentialism to answer important
religious questions. In chapter 2, we encountered Evans’s claims that
evidentialism’s flaw lies in its conception of the rational agent. In chapter 3, I
explained Bishop’s notion of evidential ambiguity, along with the strong but
questionable claims he attributes to the so-called hard-line evidentialism. These
claims and their bearing on evidentialism must be addressed if we are to
resuscitate evidentialism. First, though, some characterization of evidentialism is
in order. While a full defense of evidentialism is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, the sketch I offer will indicate how evidentialism functions in the
context of religious epistemology.15 I will then address the problems raised by
Evans and Bishop.
Moderate Evidentialism
Bishop has much to say about the “hard-line evidentialist.” Among his
concerns is the hard-line evidentialist’s privileging of epistemic rationality above
all other forms of rationality.16 Evans, too, paints a picture of evidentialism that in
many ways matches Bishop’s portrait of the hard-liner. But hard-line

15

The account I offer here is strongly influenced by Moser (1985, 1989), Feldman (2004a, 2004b,
2008), Conee and Feldman (2004a, 2004b), as well as by Foley (1993, 2002) and others.
16

Bishop 2007, 62.
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evidentialism is not the best form of evidentialism, and the characterizations
found in both Bishop and Evans suffer from deficiencies that, when rectified, will
show evidentialism more compelling. The theory of evidentialism I defend here
does not fit the mold of hard-line evidentialism, thus I characterize it as moderate
evidentialism. It is moderate in that it avoids certain strong claims about both
evidential practice and an epistemic rationality.
A theory of rationality has loomed large in this dissertation, as I have
claimed that questions about religious propositions have not only epistemic
dimensions, but also (at least) moral and prudential dimensions. For that reason,
I wish to be clear in framing this theory of moderate evidentialism within the
larger context of this theory of rationality. Specifically, I claim that at no point
does epistemic rationality automatically trump other forms of rationality. Human
agents can and do have different rational goals, and satisfying goals (when
rational conflict arises) may not necessarily entail accepting only the conclusions
of epistemic rationality. Moderate evidentialism thus does not overreach
epistemic authority and dictate moral or prudential (or other) rational obligations
or goals.
Justification, as I have characterized it throughout this dissertation, is always
internal.17 Roughly speaking, epistemic justification serves the role of indicating
that agent S is epistemically rational in holding belief B at time t. Importantly,

17

In chapter 2 I use Foley’s distinction between warrant and justification to address the claims of
the externalist.
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justification indicates that S is epistemically rational in holding belief in B instead
of any other contrary belief. The focus of our discussion of evidentialism and the
fideist critique, given the framing of both Evans and Bishop, is not on religious
knowledge, but on justification of propositional religious beliefs. In passing,
though, it may be noted that the evidentialist maintains that knowledge is justified
true belief (perhaps with an additional Gettier-defeater).
What is evidentialist justification as it pertains to propositional beliefs?
Roughly speaking we might characterize it this way: S is justified in holding P just
in case S has sufficient undefeated evidence supporting P. While a full
discussion of justification is beyond scope, I will give a sketch of how we are to
understand “sufficient undefeated evidence supporting P.” I will discuss the
notion of evidence itself more in the coming pages, for it plays a crucial role in
the present discussion. But evidence, at is simplest, functions as a truth indicator.
That is, it points (fallibly and defeasibly) toward the truth of P.18 Evidence may be
propositional, but it need not be; non-propositional content may also function as
evidence.19
Justification requires that one have sufficient evidence. At what point is the
evidence S possesses sufficient? We can imagine that S may posses some
piece of evidence E, and that E may indicate P. But at the same time, we may

18

A truth indicator indicates that P (points toward P), but is not a guarantee that P. It is fallible
and may be subject to defeat.
19

I return to this in the section on private evidence.
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grant that, all things considered, S may not be justified in believing P. Perhaps S
has other evidence that indicates something other than (or broader than) P.
Thus, for S to have sufficient evidence, S must have evidence that makes P
decisively more epistemologically probable than any competing propositions,
including not-P.20 That is, for S to be justified in believing that there is an
individual being worthy of the title God, one’s evidence regarding that proposition
must not only plausibly answer important questions, but must also render the
proposition decisively more probable than not just the proposition that there is not
one being worthy of the title God, but also more than the propositions that there
is at least one being worthy of the title God, that there are several beings worthy
of the title God, and so on. Here I am using the terms probable and probability
not in the statistical (or strictly logical) sense, but in an epistemological sense as
shorthand to capture the outcome of a comparison relationship between two or
more alternatives: roughly, P is decisively more probable than P’ (P’’, P’’’, etc.)
when (and only when) P provides the best explanation (plausibly answers the
most why-questions)21 with the least complications and side effects, while still
exhibiting an adequate level of explanatory parsimony.22 Thus, the evidence

20

“Competing propositions” here should be understood as propositions that S considers to be
possible alternatives. For more on epistemological probability, see Moser 1989, Kyberg 1971,
and Pollock 1993. My usage follows Moser’s.
21

We may further adjust this to qualify the why-questions: some why-questions are more
important (e.g. have more explanatory value) than others. So perhaps this would better be
characterized as answering the greatest number of important why-questions.
22

My characterization of decisive epistemic probability is roughly based on Moser 1989, 99ff. I
have simplified (I hope not too detrimentally) for brevity. By explanatory parsimony, I am
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must make P a plausible answer to the questions, but also do so better than the
competing alternatives P’, P’’, and so on. Decisiveness is not the same as
certainty. Evidence may be decisive, but a belief may still be defeasible, fallible,
dubitable, and so on. Certainty carries with it a certain supposition about the
future. Given that S has undefeated evidence for P at t, certainty is the claim that
at time t + 1 there cannot be a contravener for P.23 In contrast, decisiveness does
not necessarily carry with it a certification about the future. Decisiveness
indicates that at t, the evidence renders P more probable than its competitors to
the extent that there is no immediate threat to P’s probabilistic advantage. 24 I will
return to the notion of decisiveness later in this chapter, for it plays an interesting
role in addressing the challenges raised by the fideist.
Sufficiency, considered this way, is not necessarily a quantitative measure—
it’s not the case that the proposition with the most evidence wins—but a broader
measure of the degree to which the evidence supports P over possible
alternatives, while not also introducing undesirable consequences that might
otherwise be avoided. When S’s total evidence makes P decisively probable for
S, S has sufficient evidence for holding P.

suggesting something in the spirit of Ockham’s razor.
23

Goodman’s infamous grue hypothesis may come to mind here: the success of that argument
hinges on the fact that induction cannot make such a guarantee that S will be blue at t+1, and not
green (Goodman 1983, 72-76).
24

That is, if evidence renders P more probable at t, but there is strong reason to suspect that the
evidence is about to be overturned, that reason may qualify as a defeater and render holding P
indecisive, even while more probable at t.
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In chapter 2, I discussed different kinds of defeaters, and how each defeats
evidential support. There I discussed both rebutting defeaters and undermining
defeaters. This same notion of defeaters is what I have in mind in the sketch of
justification I am offering. Justification requires that no relevant defeater remains
undefeated.25 When considering epistemic justification of religious beliefs, we
may interpret both Evans and Bishop as raising defeaters. One may interpret
Evans’s claims about the sinfulness and corruptness of one’s cognitive faculties
as being a proposed undermining defeater for any evidence in support of faith
beliefs (and, for that matter, any evidence supporting beliefs contrary to faith
beliefs). For any given piece of evidence E, Evans could respond with the
proposed defeater that the evidence is unreliable for reasons tied to one’s
cognition. In that way Evans is calling into question the support of E to P.
Likewise, one may also be inclined to view Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis
as a general claim that there are rebutting defeaters against any piece of
evidence one might forward in support of a religious belief. In this sense, the idea
of “evidential ambiguity” is understood as the claim that for every piece of
evidence E in support of P, there is another piece of evidence, E* that supports
not-P. As Pollock and Cruz put it: “If M is a defeasible reason for S to believe Q,
M* is a rebutting defeater for this reason if and only if M* is a defeater (for M as a

25

By qualifying defeaters as being relevant defeaters, I intend to leave open the possibility that
some far-fetched counterexamples against P may not actually count as defeaters of P in virtue of
their far-fetchedness. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, though.

reason for S to believe Q) and M* is a reason for S to believe ~Q.”

26
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Thus one

(perhaps sloppy) interpretation of evidential ambiguity is to suggest that it is the
claim that every piece of evidence for a religious belief has an undefeated
rebutting E*. Applying this characterization to Bishop’s notion of evidential
ambiguity may be a stretch. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the
evidential ambiguity thesis is surprisingly complex. The principal point, though, is
that it is prima facie plausible to interpret some of Evans’s and Bishop’s
arguments as proposed (undefeated) defeaters to all evidence regarding
religious propositions. I will return to these in the following sections, but first I will
finish this sketch of justification,
Next there is the matter of evidence being in a support relationship to P.
Evidence, on my account, has directionality. That is, it functions as a truth
indicator about some belief B. For some agent S, evidence is not neutral at time
t. It is the directionality of evidence that qualifies it as evidence, and not merely
data. So S may have evidence that P, and S may have evidence that not-P, but
S cannot have a piece of evidence that supports P or not-P.27 Again this brings
Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis to the fore. The evidential ambiguity thesis is
not necessarily at odds with this characterization of P, but it does draw out a

26

27

Pollack and Cruz 1999, 196.

More specifically, one cannot have evidence that supports P v ~P, yet does not support P and
does not support ~P.
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salient detail: there is a perspectival element to evidence.

28

It is possible that

there are cases where some piece of evidence E will be held by S1 as support
for P, while for S2 it may be held as support for not-P. In such cases, the
difference in interpretation is likely to involve how E interacts with the other
available evidence for each subject. For example, there is a single mostly-empty
wineglass on the kitchen counter. S1 may conclude from this that the proprietor
drank a glass of wine alone, and was thus by herself. But say that S2 has an
additional piece of evidence available: the proprietor does not drink alcohol. S2
may conclude that, given that the proprietor does not drink alcohol, she must not
have been alone. The evidence is directional for both S1 and S2, but the
combination of the evidence with other evidence may change the interpretation of
the evidence.29 Thus there might be some sense in which we can interpret
evidential ambiguity as the case when E supports P for S1 (when E is considered
as part of a body of evidence), and E supports something other than P (perhaps
not-P) for S2 (when E is considered to be part of a different body of evidence).
In this section I have given a rough characterization of a moderate theory of
evidentialism. While this characterization is far from exhaustive, this sketch
should server our immediate purposes. I shall ask how this fares in the face of
28

Accepting that evidence has certain subjective elements does not require that one embrace
global subjectivism, alethic relativism, and so on. Both the fallibility and the defeasibility of
justification accommodate stronger notions of truth. cf. Moser 1993.
29

This raises a number of questions about evidence as singular or as aggregate. Addressing this
in any detail is beyond the scope of the dissertation. At present I am suggesting that we can
meaningfully talk of an individual piece of evidence (a datum with alethic directionality) as well as
evidence taken together (data with alethic directionality).
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Evans’s and Bishop’s critiques. In the next two parts I will return to Evans’s and
Bishop’s (respective) criticisms of evidentialism.
Evans’s Claims Against Evidentialism
Evans’s primary argument against the evidentialist isn’t that that there is
little or no evidence, but that a human agent’s capacity to reason is limited and
tainted by sin. Even if there is evidence, human agents will display, says Evans,
the capacity to ignore, misunderstand, or reject the evidence. This is partially a
result of cognitive limitations: we may simply be incapable of mustering the
intellectual wherewithal to appropriately analyze the data and draw the correct
conclusions. But pride and selfishness may play the bigger role; because of them
human agents refuse to look for evidence, and (we are to infer) would refuse to
assent even if possessing evidence. Thus, Evans says that sinfulness corrupts
one’s epistemic capabilities.
As Evans frames the problem, epistemic limitations render evidentialism a
dubious epistemic practice in regard to religious propositions. I understand Evans
to be claiming that cognitive limitations and sinfulness prevent justification,
particularly in regard to religious propositions (and therefore religious
propositional beliefs). At this point, we must ask how epistemic justification is
thus prevented.
There are at least three ways in which we can understand Evans’s claim.
We might understand the claim to be that cognitive limitations and sinfulness
prevent us from justifiably inferring from evidence to a proposition. Or, as I
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mentioned in the previous section, we might understand Evans as suggesting
that cognitive limitations and sinfulness are defeaters to any justification of
religious propositions. Or we might understand these deficiencies to be operating
at a higher (meta-epistemic) level, thus preventing epistemic justification from
functioning properly on the more broad plain of rationality. Ultimately, it seems
that cognitive limitations may raise one set of problems while selfishness and
pride raise another. But it is not clear that either renders evidentialism
implausible or inoperative.
Cognitive Limitations and Inference
First there is the matter of whether the deficiencies prevent us from drawing
justified inferences from the evidence. The crux of the matter here has to do with
the access conditions for S’s doxastic justification that P. For P to be justified for
S, S must be have sufficient evidence, and correctly infer from this evidence to
the belief. Do cognitive limitations and selfishness preclude proper inference?
Evans does seem to answer this in the affirmative, though in a roundabout way.
Evans claims that one of the evidentialist’s main limitations in regard to
supporting religious propositions has to do with our inability to understand. By
understanding P, Evans seems to have in mind the ability to give a thorough
explanation of P.30 Thus, for example, to be justified in believing that there is a
God, one must have thorough understanding of what it means to be God
30

Evans 1988, 83 and 87. Evans’s notion of understanding is tremendously complex, borrowing
at various times from Aquinas, Kant, Plantinga, and Kierkegaard. I draw this particular
characterization from his remarks on cognitive limitations.
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(including, it appears, a complete grasp of omnipotence, omniscience, etc.).
Understanding, on Evans’s account, does not become a barrier in our day-to-day
reasoning, largely because we understand the world of our day-to-day reasoning.
But when it comes to God and other religious matters, we cannot even hope to
understand such things.
Elsewhere, Evans acknowledges that the presumption of what we do and do
not understand may be an oversimplification.31 Problems of understanding are
not at all unique to religious propositions. We have many other beliefs—scientific,
relational, and otherwise—that involve matters that we do not understand. Yet
humans seem to be able to assess what limited evidence they can understand in
an epistemically rational way.32 Indeed, if we were to require thorough
understanding of the external world before being justified in believing in the
existence of the external world, the sort of fideism proposed by Evans would be
far too modest. But thorough understanding is not required for justification. More
specifically, for some evidence E to function as evidence for some agent S in
support of some proposition P, it is not a requirement that S understands (in the
sense just explained) E in order for S to rely upon E as evidence for P. Thus, an
absence of understanding does not pose a significant problem to evidentialism.
This opens a second challenge, though. Perhaps it is not understanding, in
the strict sense, but argument that is missing. Perhaps it is better to take Evans
31

Ibid., 20.
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Ibid., 55.
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as suggesting that we must be able to give argument for our beliefs, and
because of our cognitive limitations we cannot reliably and consistently produce
arguments in support of our beliefs.33
To have evidence, and even to be justified in a belief because of that
evidence, does not require that one be able to produce an argument.34 The
skeptic may demand that one produce an (irrefutable) argument for a belief, but
this is not a reasonable demand, as many of our beliefs—especially empirical
beliefs based on experiential evidence—are rightly held by the evidence alone.
As Paul Moser puts it:
[O]ur having evidence, even evidence that satisfies the justification-condition
for knowledge, doesn’t necessarily include our having a nonquestionbegging argument, or any argument, against skeptics… Our having
evidence doesn’t entail our giving an answer or claim of any kind… One’s
supporting evidence could still be cognitively impeccable, despite one’s
lacking the kind of argument demanded by a skeptic.35
While much can be said about the relation between evidence, argument, and
justification, I will only make three brief points here: First, an argument is not
required for establishing a relationship between evidence and belief. Second,
evidence is not made less significant solely because one cannot produce an
argument; most importantly, evidence can justify a belief B (and S can be
justified in believing B) without S producing an argument.36 Third, one need not
33
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Neither does it require a causal explanation. cf. Moser 1989, 49.
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Moser 2008, 63.
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It may indeed be the case that not all evidence has propositional content. cf. Moser 1985,
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be able to produce a genealogy of evidence. That is, one needn’t provide an
argument identifying the source and reliability of one’s evidence. While this is not
to say that argument is useless (there are indeed many cases where it is useful),
the skeptic is making a misstep when claiming that one must be capable of
producing arguments before one can believe in an epistemically rational way.37
Consequently, Evans’s claim that an agent’s inability to understand or provide an
argument for belief undermines one’s justification is based on a
misunderstanding of the roles of understanding and argument in justification.38
Cognitive limitations do have an impact on epistemic rationality. Because
human agents sometimes forget evidence, or fail to acquire evidence, or
misinterpret evidence, there are numerous occasions in which we hold beliefs
that are not true. However, this does not mean that those beliefs are not justified.
Empirical justification is defeasible and fallible: we can meaningfully talk of
holding justified false beliefs.39 Admitting as much is not tantamount to granting
the defeat of internalist justification.

chapter 5.
37

By not requiring an argument, I am not claiming that one can be (doxastically) justified without
any awareness of the evidence. For more, see Moser 1989, esp. chapter 3.
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For propositional beliefs, one must still be able to infer from the evidence to the proposition.
That is, there must be a connection for S between the evidence and the propositional belief. But
this inference may not be accompanied by an argument.
39

There is the question of whether or not a priori justification is defeasible and falsifiable. But this
is beyond the present scope, since we are focused on empirical evidence.
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Cognitive Limitations and Sinfulness as Defeaters
A second way of understanding Evans’s cognitive limitations/selfishness
argument is as the claim that these deficiencies become defeaters for any
evidence about religious propositions. Thus, one cannot hold justified beliefs
about religious propositions because one’s evidence is always defeated. I
suggested earlier that Evans may be understood as offering an undermining
defeater for religious beliefs. If evidence E supports P, E* is the claim that
cognitive limitations and selfishness have tainted E, and E is hence unreliable. It
is possible, therefore, that E does not actually support P.
This concern does not necessarily defeat justification, for the claim it makes
is too general. That is, for some specific evidence E, simply raising the doubt that
E is tainted by selfishness or cognitive limitations does not raise a specific
challenge to the relationship between E and P. Further, it is unclear how the
evidence may be tainted in a way that disqualifies it from being a truth indicator.
The moderate evidentialist would accept the possibility that an agent makes
cognitive mistakes and does not have unblemished evidential capacities. For the
evidentialist, the possibility that the evidence available to S at t is not the most
accurate representation of reality (however such a claim might be spelled out) is
not a defeater.40 Nor is the claim that E may be tainted by selfishness. Evidence
is fallible and may be wrong; it is defeasible too. But one would be remiss to

40

My master’s thesis explored the possibility that various psychological biases might undermine
evidentialism. My analysis there suffered from the same oversight made here.
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jettison evidence on the grounds that it may be tainted by sin or cognitive
limitations.
This is not to discount the possibility that a specific defeater may arise
whose origin is best be explained by cognitive limitations or selfishness. Such a
defeater (whether undercutting or rebutting) would need to be defeated. Given
this, Evans may be right to raise the concern that such defeaters may arise. It
just is not the case that the general claim (fact?) that we have cognitive
limitations and act selfishly is itself a defeater of all evidence for religious belief.
Rational Conflict, Selfishness, and Cognitive Limitations
A better explanatory model for selfishness operates not at the epistemic
level, but at the level of rational conflict.
Instead of understanding selfishness as a factor in epistemic justification, it
is better to understand them as leading one to adopt a (rationally) prudential goal
of doing what is best for oneself. We may understand selfishness as the
condition that occurs when one favors one’s own wellbeing (prudential rational
obligations) in violation of one’s moral obligations.41 That is, it is a state that
comes about when one is prudentially justified that P, but morally (and perhaps
epistemically) justified that not-P, and one opts to act on prudential goals to the
detriment of moral goals. As I stated in the first chapter, one need not be
conscious of one’s opting to act selfishly. Given this characterization, we can see

41

Note that this may include acting in violation of one’s epistemic obligations as well, but this is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for selfishness.
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how selfishly selecting P when it is epistemically rational to select not-P does not,
per se, indicate that one has failed to reason epistemically, but rather that one
has opted to act selfishly by privileging prudential goals over moral and epistemic
goals.
If selfishness is a threat at the (all things considered) rational level, and not
at the level of epistemic rationality, perhaps it does not threaten evidentialism in
the way Evans suggests. That is, at this level, Evans’s argument does not
question the status of evidence as a truth indicator. But there is a seemingly
plausible further argument that might be raised.
Humans make mistakes when setting rational preferences. On the present
account of rationality, setting one’s superior rational (all things considered)
preference involves determining which rational preferences are most important,
and this has epistemic aspects.42 Might it be the case that it is here, at this stage
of rationality, that selfishness produces faulty evidence about how best to satisfy
a rational preference? There is something about this suggestion that makes it
compelling. Perhaps we sometimes act selfishly not because we intentionally
selected prudential obligations over moral ones, but because our epistemic
faculties taint our epistemic judgment. Thus, one cries foul: “It tricked me! I didn’t
mean to act against my moral obligation.” But the problem with this account is
that, at this level, it runs into definitional problems. If selfishness is the selection
of prudential goals against moral goals, then it is an agent-invoked behavior, not
42

Moser 1985, 229-234.
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a “faculty.” True, the decision to act selfishly may be unconscious—it may even
be true that some or all people have a default disposition to act selfishly—but this
does not entail that selfishness is an evidence-producing faculty run amok. Nor
does it show that the evidence is not a truth indicator.
In the end, I do not see a successful argument that evidentialism fails
because of the epistemic insufficiency on the part of the reasoner. Evidentialism
is not fatally damaged by the fact that humans suffer from cognitive limitations, or
even by the fact that humans do sometimes make wrong (and sinfully so)
choices. It remains possible for S to be evidentially justified in holding P, provided
S has sufficient undefeated evidence. S may occasionally be wrong. Or S may
decide to act as if not-P to satisfy other goals. But deficiencies in S’s evidence or
behavior do not indicate that evidentialism as a theory is a failure. Nor does it
indicate a pervasive fault in evidential justification of propositional religious
beliefs.
Ultimately, Evans’s agent-focused critique of evidentialism does not
succeed. Bishop’s argument, in contrast to Evans’, suggests that it is the
evidence, not the agent, that poses the problem. While Evans is focused on the
defectiveness of the agent, Bishop focuses on the evidence itself, claiming that
the evidence (not the evaluator) is defective.
Bishop's Claims Against Evidentialism
Bishop suggests that, when the total available evidence for religious
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propositions is examined, what ‘we’ find is that the evidence is ambiguous.
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same evidence can be interpreted (presumably correctly) as confirming or as
disconfirming. Its ambiguity means it cannot support belief, which means
justification cannot be achieved. Furthermore, Bishop believes that the ambiguity
of evidence may even be necessarily so: there may be no possibility for it to be
otherwise.44 If this is so, propositional religious beliefs are resistant to
justification, and the hard-line evidentialist must suspend judgment.
Already in this chapter I have suggested that evidence has directionality.
That is, evidence qua evidence points toward the truth of a proposition. Were it to
have no such directionality, it would not, by definition, be evidence. But this
directionality also has a subjective aspect. I have given the wine-glass example
of how S1 may view E as supporting P, while S2 may view that same E as
supporting not-P. This shift in the interpretation of E has to do with the larger
body of evidence in which the particular evidence is evaluated (that is, the total
evidence available to S1 at time t and the total evidence available to S2 at time
t). This “ambiguity” is not a problem for the evidentialist, for it is the directionality
of an agent’s total evidence that matters for justification of a propositional belief.
And it is possible that the total evidence recommends suspension of judgment
just as it is possible that summing a series of positive and negative numbers may
equal zero. So for some agent S at time t, the total evidence available to S may
43
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support P, something other than P (say Q or ~P), or may require suspension of
judgment.
As I claimed in the previous chapter, Bishop’s move from a notion of “total
available evidence” to the evidential ambiguity thesis has a difficulty that can be
located in a misconstrual of the individual’s available evidence. Bishop seems to
be suggesting that if we gathered the evidence available to all people, we would
be able to infer nothing other than that the evidence is ambiguous, and thus we
would suspend judgment. Therefore, we should suspend judgment. But this is
not how (moderate) evidentialism works. Evidentialism asks whether the
evidence possessed by some particular S (at some particular time t) is sufficient
for S to be justified in believing P.45 Moreover, as our focus has been on whether
P is justified for S, we are asking whether S evaluates the evidence available and
is aware that it supports P. It is not a requirement that all possible evidence be
brought to bear, but only the evidence S has.46 To move from this understanding
of evidence to the claim that evidential ambiguity is a universal (or nearly
universal) experience is to make a tremendous leap—a leap made all the more
tendentious by the fact that both ardent believers and ardent disbelievers alike
will claim that they do indeed have evidence supporting their beliefs. 47
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There is considerable debate about what it means to have evidence (cf. Feldman 2004b and
also Moser 1989). Ironing out that technicalities of this is not critical for the argument here. In the
present context, I gloss that debate by suggesting that for S to have evidence E, S must have
cognitive access at time t to E.
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Some people at some times may find themselves in the position where their
total available evidence recommends suspension of judgment. In such cases, as
I will discuss later, there may in fact be rationale for making certain epistemic
ventures (on the grounds that a venture may turn up additional evidence). But I
do not see grounds to move from this possibility to the broader claims that (a)
evidential ambiguity is a universal phenomenon, and (b) it represents a flaw in
evidentialism.
Evidential ambiguity is not the only reason Bishop gives for rejecting hardline evidentialism. A second issue Bishop raises has to do with the model of
rationality espoused by the hard-line evidentialist. The hard-line evidentialist
claims that S is only morally justified in holding P if S is epistemically justified in
holding P.48 This, in effect, places epistemic rationality over moral rationality in
the context of resolving rational conflict. I have already claimed that this is not the
case for the moderate evidentialist. For the moderate evidentialist, it is prima
facie desirable to hold beliefs that are both epistemically and morally justified
(assuming that one desires fewer rational conflicts, and this is certainly not a
dictate of the system, but only a hypothesis). But this need not lead the moderate
evidentialist to claim that one must be epistemically justified in order to be
morally justified. On the present account, the moderate evidentialist may find
oneself confronted with a situation in which it is morally rational to hold P, and
and found them equally problematic.
48
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265
epistemically rational to hold not-P. The resolution of this conflict does not
automatically fall on the side of epistemic rationality, but is resolved according to
one’s rational (all things considered) preferences.
Finally, Bishop suggests a problem that must be addressed carefully, and
this has to do with what counts as evidence. Bishop talks about passional
attributes as pertaining to one’s evidential base. To what extent are so-called
passional attributes (emotions) admissible as evidence? Bishop is careful when
making claims of how “passional” attributes can count as evidence.49 He thinks
they can be allowable only under certain circumstances.
Feelings that involve intuitions of the truth of propositions will count as
evidence… only when they can be brought within an applicable normative
evidential practice. That will require, at a minimum, that the veridicality and
defeasibility conditions of such intuitions be open to wide intersubjective
agreement within the relevant community. Where subsumption under and
evidential practice is not possible, however, ‘feelings’ as to truths, however
subjectively compelling, will not count as evidence, and will rightly be
classified as passional doxastic inclinations.50
Bishop sees it as a requirement that evidence, even when non-public, be
governed by public evidential practice, namely veridicality and defeasiblity
conditions. How are we to understand this? First, Bishop gives an example of an
emotion that is properly considered evidence: One feels fearful and threatened in
the presence of another person.51 This feeling, says Bishop, is appropriately
49

Bishop 2007, 198-199.
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Bishop 2007, 199. Italics in original.
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Note that Bishop does not distinguish between the feeling (passion), the intuition (see the
quote), and the means of reception.
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considered evidence that this other person is hostile. Why? Because this sort of
emotional response is widely regarded as an “intuition of basically evident
truths.”52 But what about the feeling of the presence of God? Is this also
evidence? Here Bishop’s story becomes complex. On the one hand, Bishop is
reluctant to claim such feelings are evidence, yet we do make decisions on the
basis of “passions.” Does that make us epistemically irrational (or worse,
generally irrational)?
First, there is the question of whether the rationality of a passion can be
determined. To this, Bishop requires that for passions to be rational, they must at
least meet two conditions: they must not conflict with “evidence-based factual
belief” and they must be logically coherent.53 But Bishop further suggests that
any beliefs we hold “based on passion” be “subject to critical pressures from
others.”54 As I understand these claims, Bishop is suggesting that passions may
be treated as evidence that P only if they meet all three of the conditions above.
Here, though, Evans is careful to never suggest that such evidence is justifying.
Instead, he only claims that one may be rational when holding beliefs based on
passions.55 As Bishop continues to spell this out, passions become the basis for
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doxastic venture, rather than for justified beliefs.
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When it comes down to it, for

Bishop the passions become the guide to if and when one ought to make a
doxastic (or sub-doxastic) venture in the face of evidential ambiguity.57
It is not clear to me what is gained by taking this route of argument instead
of claiming that passions serve as truth indicators but only weak evidence—
evidence whose explanatory value is limited and unlikely to (on its own) be
sufficient.
Bishop sees his advancement of the argument in favor of passions as a
counter to the hard-line evidentialist. Bishop’s hard-line evidentialist accepts only
“incorrigible and self-evident truths and truths evident in sensory perceptual
experience under ‘normal’ conditions.”58 This, thinks Bishop, forecloses on
passional truth-indicators that suggest anything about the supernatural.59 That is,
as Bishop understands it, by admitting passions in even this minor capacity,
Bishop’s fideism is open to truth-indicators that hard-line evidentialism is not. To
what extent does this view conflict with the moderate evidentialism proposed thus
far?
56

It is unclear to me how evidence could be evidence, yet not have any potential to be part of a
justifying body of evidence.
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It is unclear how this link is forged, but I believe that Bishop assumes a presumption in favor of
philosophical naturalism among hard-line evidentialists (Ibid., 65-76). Another possible
explanation may be found in Bishop’s requirement that evidence must pass evaluation of a
relevant epistemic community, where such a community may rule out supernatural experience
(199-200).
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The heart of the matter seems to be whether or not passions—emotions—
qualify as evidence. Bishop has pointed to cases where an emotional response
may rightly be considered evidential. One may feel fearful in the presence of
another person, and this emotion may well be evidence that the person is hostile.
Bishop continues from there to suggest that many other emotions may not be
evidence, but may yet be indicators suggestive of a particular doxastic venture.
But if some emotion E is an indicator that P, what more must E have before it can
be considered evidence? Bishop suggests three additional criteria: consistency
with other evidence, logical coherence, and the nebulous criterion of being
acceptable to the greater epistemic community. 60
The first two are, I suggest, not qualifiers for evidence at all. Evidence, in the
atomic sense, need not meet criteria of coherence with other evidence before it
can be evidence. Such a requirement would have the stilted effect of
exacerbating a confirmation bias. The first piece of evidence would in many
cases become the deciding piece of evidence. Contrary evidence would be
discarded for failing the coherence test. Furthermore, in the atomic sense it is
difficult to see what logical coherence affords. It may indeed be the case that two
individual pieces of evidence display a superficial logical incoherence. This does
not serve as grounds for rejecting one or the other ipso facto. Rather, the
resolution of such evidential difficulties is part of an agent’s resolution process in
meeting the sufficiency and support conditions for justification.
60
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However, admitting evidence without these qualifiers does not automatically
endow such evidence with justifying power. It must still be shown, along with
other available evidence, to be sufficient. And evidence must weather defeaters
as well. Consequently, admitting emotional evidence does not, by that fact alone,
transform evidentialism into a soft emotivist theory of knowledge.
But there is Bishop’s third qualification: that for any emotion to qualify as
evidence, it must accord with existing epistemic practices of the community. By
this rule, Bishop suggests that we may accept the evidence of fear in the case
just cited (because “we all” agree that that emotion is evidential) while still
resisting the claim that one’s feeling that God exists be taken as evidence that
God exists. In the previous chapter I objected to the vagueness of such
“community scoped” conditions. And this remains a problem in the present
context. Such an emotion, considered in the epistemic context of a charismatic
Christian church on Pentecost may be perfectly acceptable, while invoking this
same claim at the anthropology department’s holiday party may be met with
derision. That said, again I would step back to the claim that while acceptance by
the relevant epistemic community might not be a criterion for an emotion’s status
as evidence, it may play another role in justification—be it as evidence or as
perhaps as part of a potential defeater. That is, if S becomes aware that such an
emotion is widely considered to be unreliable, S has just obtained a potential
defeater for evidence that has as its content that emotion.
In the end, it seems to me that Bishop simply mischaracterizes the problem:
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emotions are not to be tested as to whether or not they qualify as evidence.
Instead, we can accept them as evidential (assuming they act as truth-indicators)
and subject to the same sorts of evaluation that all other evidence is subjected.61
Emotional evidence may be defeated—and perhaps it is more susceptible to
defeat than other evidence. Perhaps logical incoherence, consistency, and
accepted epistemic norms may play a role in the defeat of some piece of
emotional evidence, but that does not entail that the emotion is non-evidential in
the first place.
Bishop’s criticisms of hard-line evidentialism are less problematic for the
moderate evidentialism I am defending here. And Bishop’s observations about
emotions, ambiguity, and moral and epistemic rationality are well accommodated
within moderate evidentialism without requiring a wholesale rejection of the
possibility of justification of religious beliefs.
Bishop has suggested that against the hard-line evidentialist, the most
plausible theory is a doxastic venture-based fideism. In contrast, I am suggesting
that moderate evidentialism does not suffer from the problems of hard-line
evidentialism, yet has attributes that make it more compelling than fideism. The
first step in consideration of this claim is to begin with a fundamental (yet
underdeveloped) notion central to the debate: What do we mean by God?
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A fruitful epistemological exploration of emotions might separate between the emotion itself that
the accompanying intuition. E.g. the fear response may be parsed into the emotion (fear) and the
intuition that the fear is a response to a threatening individual. Such a discussion is beyond the
present scope, though.
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The Fideist's God
Fideism, in the forms we have examined, is largely a theory about the
rational status of religious beliefs. Both Evans and Bishop are focused on
religious epistemology. Both also have constrained their discussion to
Christianity. But neither spends much time developing a notion of God. In some
regards, this might strike one as almost superfluous or unquestionably
unnecessary. After all, if we are talking about the God of the Christian Bible, do
we not already have suitable background knowledge to answer even non-trivial
questions? Perhaps we do. But answering one specific question may cast
fideism in a new light, and may redirect the inquiry along a fruitful path. Here is
the question: If there is a God, how might we expect to encounter evidence of his
existence?
At first blush, it may seem that this question is irrelevant for some forms of
fideism, with Evans’s being an example. Evans may re-iterate that the presence
of evidence is not an issue if indeed our faculty of epistemic reasoning cannot or
will not accept the evidence. But in fact the question does remain relevant. Here
is why.
Natural theology is rooted in the idea that we, as philosophers, ought to look
for evidence of God in the natural world. But the kind of evidence the natural
theologian has in mind is what we might call forensic evidence: traces left as a
side effect or consequence of some attribute, manifestation, or action of God.
Intricately functioning systems are a result of God’s design. Our moral rationality
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is a result of God’s imbuing creation with a sense of morality. Even the
ontological argument locates the proof in notions of perfection or necessity,
tracing from the concept back to the being. Thus the natural theologian plays
Sherlock Homes, weaving evidence that might otherwise seem circumstantial
into a compelling and (hopefully) cohesive body of evidence in support of belief in
God’s existence.
If we were to stop here, then perhaps Evans would be able to rightly claim
that the limits of our cognitive abilities do indeed become an intractable
hindrance. It may indeed be the case that we are not Sherlock Homes, but
Inspector Clouseau, and our perpetual bumbling and ineptitude prevents us from
seeing and properly assessing the evidence. But the very characterization of
evidence offered by the natural theologian neglects a crucial aspect to the
question at hand: namely, the character and personality of the very being for
whom we seek evidence. Here we must step back and ask that important
question: What do we mean by God.
I use the term God as a maximally honorific title, not a name.62 The term
means one who is worthy of worship. Worship is not the cowering in fear or the
heaping of empty praise, but the earnest reverence and adoration that expresses
one’s genuine feelings of devotion and love toward a deserving authority. Only a
being who is worthy of that sort of adoration and reverence is deserving of the

62

cf. Moser 2008, summarized in 2012, 264-266. Given that a title does not imply a title holder,
no question-begging is going on here.
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title God. Moral perfection, self-sufficiency, and perfect lovingness is what
warrants this adoration and reverence, and thus a being deserving of the title
must also be morally perfect, self sufficient, and entirely benevolent. “Since God
must be inherently worthy of worship and full trust, God must be altogether
morally good, a God of unflagging righteousness and perfect love.”63 Such a God
would desire that we, too, strive toward moral perfection. And to this end, God
would actively and lovingly promote our own moral development.64 Thus we can
expect two things of such a God: this God would act personally, and this God
would act with the intent of provoking moral growth. To this list we can add a
third: a morally perfect God would act non-coercively.65
Considering natural theology in light of this rough sketch of God, a curious
detail emerges: The natural theologian expects and looks for forensic evidence—
residue or traces of God. A footprint on the beach. But this is done with the
assumption that God does not necessarily intentionally leave this evidence. The
natural theologian does not ask the question if there were a being worthy of the
title God where might he choose to leave me evidence? The personality of the
God they seek is not taken into account.
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That is, if God is omni-benevolent and morally perfect, God would seek to instill in us moral
perfection. By my lights, love is quintessentially relational, and for that reason, it follows from the
definition of God that God would want a relationship with us.
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A being worthy of the title God desires to be worshiped out of love. Love cannot be coerced out
of one, though. An objection grounded in paternalism does not necessarily apply here: Some S
may act coercively out of love (and thus be paternalistic). But to attempt to coerce another into
loving one is neither paternalistic, nor (by my lights) morally laudable.
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It is not just the natural theologians who make this mistake, but the fideists
we have looked at do as well. Bishop claims that the evidence for God is
ambiguous. In the last section I treated this as an epistemic question—a question
about how evidence is and what evidence does. But there is another way of
looking at evidential ambiguity. We can ask what Bishop is saying about a God
who would offer (only) ambiguous evidence. While Bishop frequently talks about
the possibility of the existence of God, he says very little about the character of
God. His conception comes largely from traditional Christianity. But what scant
characterization he does give of God—the view he finds in natural theology—he
questions as perhaps failing to capture the notion of God with which he is
concerned:
Classical philosophical theism specifies the nature of God as the
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, supernatural personal Creator ex
nihilo of all that exists. It is an interesting question—though a question I shall
not here directly pursue—whether that classical theistic conception of God is
in fact adequate to the God who is worshipped in theistic religious
tradition.66
It is unclear whether Bishop is claiming here that the natural theologian has
overreached, or underdeveloped, or perhaps both. But there is the suggestion
that answering the question has no relevance to the task at hand—the task of
finding God. Still, Bishop may be suggesting the same thing I did above: that if
we are to start with a description of God, listing the omnis might not be the best
starting point. Throughout his book, Bishop implicitly treats God as I have
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suggested above: as a title fit only for one deserving of sincere praise, where
such deserving entails absolute moral perfection. But even while this is implied,
he does not make the epistemic connection. The lacuna he leaves may have a
surprising consequence.
On the face if it, Bishop provides a compelling case for fideism without
addressing his notion of God. I suggested in the last chapter that there are a few
problems that arise when there is no clear characterization of God. The first has
to do with faith (and doxastic venture). The second has to do with evidential
ambiguity. We can treat both generically here by asking this question: What sort
of God does Bishop expect to find? If the God Bishop seeks is indeed
characterized in line with what I have already said, then it seems Bishop may
have made a misstep. Evidential ambiguity as construed under natural theology
is a red herring. What we ought to ask is where we might expect to find evidence
for a being worthy of the title God. In what way might a divine moral being
present himself to us? This question is applicable to both Evans’s fideism and
Bishop’s, for the answer addresses the worries of each.
If God is intentionally acting, an assumption that seems well grounded in our
notion of God, then to what extent ought we worry about Evans’s cognitive
limitations argument? In the characterization of God that I gave above, I claimed
that God desires that we progress toward moral excellence. With this reason,
God would work actively (but non-coercively) to bring this about in our lives. 67 So
67
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we can expect God, should God exist, to act in subtle ways to promote our moral
growth. There is a second trivial point to be made. God has knowledge about our
cognitive limitations and selfish proclivities. This sort of knowledge does not even
require omnipotence—it is a readily observable trait of humanity. Combining this
trivial point with the claim about God’s acts of moral promotion, we can ask a
simple question of Evans: Would a God who is well aware of our cognitive
limitations rightly set the evidence so far beyond our abilities as to obscure
himself, only to demand thereafter a (cognitively negligent) leap of faith? More
specifically, if God were to work toward our moral good, would he do so in a way
so obscure that were unable to detect it? For the sake of argument, let’s answer
this with a tentative yes. Let’s say that God acted in such a way that his actions
were undetectable to us. This would raise two concerns. First, one may assert
that for an agent to act in undetectable ways to us is coercive. As enticing as this
option is, it does not hold water. Only if one acted in undetectable ways against
which we could not resist would this be coercion. But the second concern in
answering this question in the affirmative is that it seems to go against both the
characterization of God as one who seeks a relationship with us, and also
against Evans’s own characterization of the Christian God as one who demands
overt faith as a prerequisite for salvation.68 If God deliberately obscures the
and then commanding us would all be coercive, and thus contrary to the character of God. This is
not to claim that all revealing is coercive—revelations may be non-coercive. Doing so in a way
that demanded worship, though, is coercive.
68
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evidence to extent to which he gives no indications at all of his presence, it
seems that God’s method is at odds with God’s own goals. To obscure in this
way—and then to demand (on Evans’s account) evidence-less faith—does not
seem to be consistent with God’s character. I think this disqualifies such a being
as worthy of worship. Note that this is not to say that at some times, and for
some people God may not provide evidence. It may be the case that it is
sometimes in line with God’s own goals for God to not provide evidence.
However, if divine hiding were a global permanent state, one might question the
morality of such a God for thus also demanding evidence-less faith on the part of
humans.
What about Bishop’s evidential ambiguity? Would a God who desires a
relationship with us, a God who acts personally, somehow be either incapable or
unwilling to provide evidence that does not suffer from the sort of fatal ambiguity
Bishop posits? Bishop’s evidential ambiguity is based largely on the evidence of
natural theology. To answer the question as presented here, we could make a
simple concession: the evidence of natural theology is ambiguous. This leaves
us on level ground when asking whether evidence in the form of a volitional
challenge is in fact also ambiguous.
A Robust Notion of Evidence
In the previous section, I claim that Bishop and Evans have neglected a
question that, when answered, would change the discussion. What kind of
evidence would we expect from a God who is worthy of worship? The common
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approach of the natural theologian is to take a forensic view of evidence
gathering, looking for trace evidence—footprints—of God in the world. But this
approach does not take into account the purported personhood of God. If God is
a personal being, we should expect evidence of a personal nature—evidence of
communication. And since a God who is worthy of worship would also desire our
moral improvement, we can expect this communication to promote morality, yet
be without coerciveness. Thus we might expect God to challenge an individual
volitionally, challenging the individual to make the decision to act morally. If this is
the case, then we ought to seek evidence of God’s volitional challenges.
If a God worthy of worship exists, we would expect such morally challenging
but non-coercive communications to have some of the following characteristics.
First, the message would be specific to an individual. Second, to be noncoercive, the message must be such that an individual can choose to ignore it.
Third, the message would (try to) promote our moral goodness. We should not
expect such evidence to necessarily be public, for public evidence (and forensic
evidence in particular) may not be aligned with God’s moral and redemptive
purposes. Some sorts of public evidence may in fact be coercive.69 Here I agree
with Evans’s suggestion that some types of public evidence (historical evidence,
for example) are irrelevant to the relational aspect of God’s character while other
types of public evidence—“Miracles or other evidence”—may in fact alienate
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people from God.

Public evidence is the type of evidence that is available intersubjectively.
That is, for evidence E to be public, it must be the case that if S1 has access to
E, it is possible (in principle) for S2 to also have the same evidence. Often, public
evidence can be intentionally transferred from one agent to another.
Transferring evidence—revealing it—can be done either directly or
indirectly. By suggesting direct and indirect forms of revealing, I intend to capture
the cases where (a) S1 can give S2 evidence, and (b) S1 can direct S2’s
attention to evidence. For example, directly revealing evidence may entail
physically or verbally transferring something, while to direct one’s attention may
be the suggestion that one look over there or listen to that. Notice that there is no
requirement that S1 does transfer evidence, but only that it is possible that S1
transfer evidence. If I find an object and proceed to hide the object, not showing it
to anyone, this does not (by that fact) make the object my private evidence.
Likewise, if Fermat did indeed prove his last theorem, yet failed to transfer it, this
does not mean that the proof is private evidence. It is only public evidence that
has not been transferred.71
Above I suggested that indirect sharing of evidence may come in the form of
a directive to adjust one’s attention (look over there!). But this is a more
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Note also that this definition of public evidence allows that an incorrect proof is also public, as
the derivability of the proof does not influence the proof’s publicness or privateness.
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complicated matter than it initially appears, for what evidence is shared? There is
a sense in which two individuals in the same place at the same time with their
attentions directed in the same way experience the same thing.72 When the
whistle in the distances draws attention to the oncoming train, in a very real way
the train (and the whistling noise) are public evidence. This is largely because the
individuals share common notions (though perhaps not identical notions) of
“train,” “whistle,” and so on.
But included in the experience is, for each person, the phenomenological
content of the experience to which attention is attracted.73 I feel the ground
vibrate. I hear whistle in the distance. I see a puff of smoke. (Or, following the
adverbial form, I am being appeared to thusly.) In the first chapter I mentioned
beliefs whose content is non-propositional, and the question arises here whether
the contents of these beliefs are public or private. In each experience, the
phenomenological content is, so to speak, dependent on the agent. That is, the
experience does not appear independently of the agent.74 While I may be able to
direct others toward the smoke, or to listen to the whistle, I cannot share the
phenomenological content of my experience. I can anticipate (based on other
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evidence I possess) that others may have similar experiences with similar
phenomenological content. But my evidence for the proposition “there is a puff of
smoke” depends on many individual pieces of evidence. And some of that
evidence (foremost the phenomenological content) cannot be transferred. Thus,
a common type of private evidence is phenomenological evidence.
Evidence is private just in case when S1 has access to E, it is not possible
for some other agent (S2) to also have that same piece of evidence. This
suggests that evidence such as memories, dreams, pain, and emotive states
(elation, depression, sadness, etc.) are among those pieces of evidence that are
rightly classified as private evidence. In these cases, at least some nonpropositional content of the evidence is available only to the given individual.75 To
share this evidence, we may offer a propositional formulation of the experience in
hopes that the listener may also have similar enough experiences to fill in the
gaps incommunicable propositionally. (Consider the doctor’s frustration with the
patient attempting to describe “where and how it hurts.”)76
Private Evidence
It should be clear from the characterization above that private evidence
plays an important role for evidentialism. If nothing else, it prevents the sort of
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infinite regress argument that Evans worries over.

77

Beliefs with non-

propositional content do not rely upon other propositional beliefs, and contain as
their content something that does not necessarily need the support of other
evidence or argument.78
The characterization I have given has steered well clear of the traditional
conflation in religious epistemology of private evidence and religious experience.
But religious experience is a question that must be addressed in the context of
evidence generally, and private evidence specifically.
Given my sketch of the distinction between public and private evidence, it
seems evident that most experiences that fall under the rubric of religious
experience are indeed private. The non-propositional content of such
experiences remain solely in possession of the one who experiences them. In
fact, this is often the complaint lodged against such experiences. When such
experience cannot be examined by others, and when such experience seems so
intensely personal, we raise an eyebrow about whether it is legitimate evidence.
By addressing headlong the questions about religious experience and evidence,
we may better understand Bishop’s complaint about evidential ambiguity. And we
may gain new clarity on how to judge evidence.
There are two questions we may ask about religious experience and
evidence. The first is whether or not religious experience is evidence at all. The
77
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second question is whether this evidence (if it is evidence) is sufficient evidence
for justification.
Given what has been said above, I characterize religious experience as the
broad category of private evidence in which a human agent experiences God or
has an inner state or event that, to the agent, indicates the presence (or,
perhaps, the absence) of divineness. I have intentionally kept the notion broad.
Mystical experience, in which one experiences a vivid mental event (perhaps
coinciding with a physical event) that is inexplicable yet suggestive of divinity,
may indeed be a kind of religious experience. But so also may be deeply moving
feelings. Are religious experiences truth indicators? Religious experiences may
have directionality just as do many of the previous examples of evidence.
But in regard to the second question I raised above, we must ask whether
religious experience is good evidence. Is it easy to defeat? Does it answer whyquestions? This is where many forms of religious experience show weakness.
Take the inexplicable mystical experience. An earmark of the mystical
experience is its singularity and non-repeatability. There is generally no way to
authenticate such an experience, nor is there a substantial body of additional
evidence that bolsters the trustworthiness of a mystical experiences. Mystical
experience is not particularly resistant to defeaters. For any given experience, it
seems that one may raise defeaters as to the cause of the experience: was it
God’s voice, or just bad sushi? Because of the aforementioned problem of
authentication, there seems to be no general response to such defeaters.
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Mystical experience may be evidential, but it is also of dubious value.
On the other end of the spectrum are the more innocuous religious
experiences—those explained as (sometimes strong) emotional responses, or
feelings of conviction. Where the mystical experience presents a difficulty in its
uniqueness, the emotional response presents difficulty in its ubiquity. Emotional
experiences, even strong ones, are by no means unique to religious experience.
We experience these in many areas of our lives. Conversations trigger them. Life
experiences trigger them. And common wisdom dictates that we ought not
immediately take such feelings as reliable truth indicators. In fact, we attempt to
safeguard ourselves from emotional decision making by invoking mediating
strategies. Take a deep breath. Wait a day. Have a cup of tea. Sleep on it. In
short, we often mistrust our own emotions. As Bishop points out in his fear
example discussed previously, sometimes our emotions are trustworthy. Yet it
seems that we are incapable of offering a simple rule to distinguish the
trustworthy from the spurious or overwrought. The consequence seems to be
that religious experiences of a wide variety are evidential, but we treat them as
easily defeasible and on their own they are not likely to be sufficient evidence to
justify belief.
Religious experience may be of value, then. But perhaps there is yet a
better sort of evidence that we might look to.
Evidence and God
If there is a God, where “God” is a title indicating a being who is absolutely
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worthy of worship, then how might such a God reveal himself? I have suggested
that we should expect such a God to reveal himself in a way that would promote
moral improvement. That is, such a God would be interested in changing the
motivational core of the believer, giving that believer a disposition toward the
good. Because this evidence is directed toward an individual’s will, challenging
the receiver to willfully choose to act, this evidence may be called volitional
evidence.79
If this is the sort of evidence we are to expect, then one ought to look for
such evidence by looking for instances where one’s will has been challenged to
act, and act for good. Where might one look for such challenges? We often talk
about conscience as a locus of moral promptings. So might we look to
conscience as a source of divine moral promptings? First we can talk briefly
about what is meant by promptings of conscience. Initially we may interpret the
notion of “promptings of conscious” as being a reflective and conscious
rumination on what action is morally best in a given situation. This is not what I
have in mind—indeed, that would not be a prompting at all. It is better to
understand conscience as working analogously to our senses. When I hear the
whistle of the train or feel the ground shake with the incoming engine, at the
phenomenological level something attracts my attention. The whistle sound. The
quaking sensation. Conscience, too, works by attention attraction. To phrase it
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Paul K. Moser provides a richer development of this idea in The Elusive God (2008), especially
in chapter 3. The description of evidence that follows here is largely my take on Moser’s claims.
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adverbially, I am appealed to conscientiously. My attention is attracted to a moral
prompting.
There are many cases of simple moral promptings—help the poor, do not
steal that book, take care of your family, do not strike that person. There are also
extraordinary moral promptings. We are familiar with stories of individuals who
have given up comfort, wealth, and even a livelihood to become agents of
positive moral change. Cases are not limited to the likes of Mother Theresa, but
to those who make short term commitments (to become a temporary aid worker)
or even momentary commitments (to take a single decisive and morally
outstanding action). The promptings that lead individuals to act in such moral
ways are the sort of prompting that we would expect from God. As Paul Moser
explains this sort of evidence:
It would include the perfectly authoritative divine call, via human conscience,
to relinquish our own selfish willfulness for the sake of living for the unselfish
perfectly loving will of God. This elusive wake-up call would aim to work, if
painfully, through human conscience in order to reach us at our internal
moral center, where one could ‘know reality together’ with God, as the
etymology of ‘conscience’ suggests. It wouldn’t be reducible to spectator
evidence, but would come instead with a moral challenge to us to be
awakened from our selfishness to the moral primacy of divine love, even if
we dislike and dismiss the challenge.80
What Moser points out is that one avenue by which God may provide evidence is
through moral promptings, which we receive via conscience.81 Given an
80
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This is not to claim that all promptings of conscience are morally good. This may or may not be
the case. But (a) moral promptings are received via conscience, and (b) agents can test the
morality of these promptings. The operative claim here is that conscience is the avenue by which
we might expect God to prompt us morally.
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understanding of these moral challenges as degrees of the same sort of
prompting, from mundane to extraordinary, to what extent might we consider
such promptings evidential?
Consider the following case: S identifies a prompting of conscience E. A
characteristic of this prompting is its attention attraction. That is, an agent’s
attention is drawn to the event. For the sake of argument, E has neither any
mystical attributes, nor is E an extraordinary demand (e.g. “fix world poverty”). E,
for S, indicates the existence of a morally perfect being—a being worthy of the
title God.82 Ought S immediately believe in God on the basis of E? Most
evidentialists would express restraint. While E may be evidence, it is unclear that
E would (or could) be sufficient evidence on its own. Many evidentialists would
advocate seeking more evidence. But this particular example presents a unique
characteristic in regard to obtaining more confirming evidence: The best way to
gather additional evidence (either for or against) is to submit to the prompting.
That is, if one is interested in gathering more supporting evidence that a
prompting of conscience is indeed an indication of the existence of God, one
ought to follow the prompting, for doing so is the most likely route to encountering
additional evidence.83 So S may then follow the prompting (E) in S’s actions. We
might say that in doing so, S has conformed S’s will to the prompting (and thus, if
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cf. Moser 2012, in which this encounter with a volitional prompting becomes a “Gethsemane
moment.”
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This is, I think, roughly the idea of diachronic evidence Moser (2008, 69) suggests.
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God exists, to God’s will). Our characterization of God as a being worthy of
worship suggests that God is interested in the continual moral development of
each individual. S might then expect to encounter additional evidence in the
following forms: (1) experiencing other similar promptings of conscience, and (2)
experiencing a genuine change in S’s motivational core, gaining a stronger
disposition toward acting unselfishly moral and following moral promptings. 84
Regarding (1), I am suggesting that if there is a God (as defined above), a being
whose interests include the moral betterment of any willing individual, then God
would (joyfully) meet one’s obedience in regard to E1 with another challenge E2,
and so on. Regarding (2), again our definition of God suggests that it is in God’s
interest to transform individuals morally. “[A] perfectly loving God would
noncoercively seek perfectly loving human submission to the degree that God’s
moral character is perfectly represented in willing humans.”85 And thus such a
God would well be likely to invest in the individual with a transformation of the
individuals motivational core—but only in a way that leaves the receiver free to
reject the offer of transformation.86 When one becomes willing to be transformed
morally, one may expect to encounter God’s offer of transformation. This is the
idea Christians sometimes try to express with the phrase “having Jesus in one’s
84

This is developed substantially in Moser 2008 and 2010. Moser suggests that a “call to repent
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heart” (though sometimes this notion is confused with other notions). A
substantial body of this evidence from conscience may indeed be sufficient for
justifying one’s belief in God, given that the inference made is that God’s moral
actions via consciousness is indeed the best available explanation.
But lest we get ahead of ourselves, there remains the initial problem: That
second level of evidence is not accessible based solely on an initial prompting of
conscience. While I have suggested that more evidence might be had, that
second level requires that S act on E. But is it not the case that for S to
(epistemically) rationally act, S must already believe (or at least assent to) the
claim that E is a prompting? Such belief/assent would not be justified—it has
already been stated that the evidence is insufficient. On what grounds, then,
might one act on this belief (or instance of assent)?
The skeptic might here recommend suspension of judgment. But this may
not be the appropriate course of action, for there is some evidence, and the
outlook for garnering additional evidence is promising. In this situation, one may
rationally assent to E (even in one’s practical commitment) in hopes of obtaining
further evidence. We already have a term for this sort of following of evidence: an
epistemic venture. But the notion of venture that I employ differs from Bishop’s.
Bishop distinguishes between doxastic and sub-doxastic ventures. Either will do
for us—one’s disposition is not at issue. There is indeed a place for venture in
epistemically rational reasoning, but this venture does not lead to fideism of any
sort. Further, we do not need a thesis of evidential ambiguity as an initial prompt
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for the making of this venture. Evidential ambiguity suggests (at least on some
interpretations) that the evidence lacks directionality for us, and because of this
we may need to venture. Yet the evidence in question does have directionality.
Finally, contrary to Bishop’s account, venture and justification do not stand as
mutual exclusives.
Earlier I pointed out that most contemporary epistemologists, including most
evidentialists, no longer require certainty as a condition for knowledge. In
absence of certainty, believing (or merely assenting) based on evidence is
venturesome. Even a justified belief may then be venturesome. That is, one may
acknowledge that one has conclusive evidence for P at t, while still
acknowledging that disconfirming evidence or defeaters may arise at t + 1; yet
one may venture (for the future) that P.
Given this notion of venture, one might venture that some volitional
prompting E is indeed a divine prompting—evidence of God’s interaction in the
agent’s life. One may act in accordance with E, with hopes that doing so will lead
to the availability of more evidence (in the form of promptings or transformation of
one’s motivational core).87
This notion of venture is compatible with the characterization of sufficiency
and decisiveness introduced earlier in the chapter. If decisiveness does not
require an assurance about the future (as certainty does) then justified but
uncertain beliefs carry with them an element of venture. In accepting an
87
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uncertain belief P, S ventures that at time t + 1, S’s total available evidence will
continue to suggest P. S’s holding P (and acting on P) is not because S is acting
out a hypothesis for the sake of experiment, but because the evidence is
sufficient for S to decide that P. Venture, as I am describing it, does not carry
with it an additional caveat about how one assents or believes. Rather, it
describes one’s epistemic disposition toward P in light of an absence of
certainty.88
Is this sort of venture a type of fideism? I do not think it can be so called.
Fideism suggests a long-term commitment to faith without regard for an
evidential base. Evans, for example, treats faith as dispositional: One believes by
faith and no longer relies upon epistemic rationality. Bishop invokes permanent
evidential ambiguity, claiming that there is no reason to hope that one’s evidential
base will ever disambiguate. Both treat this step of venture as replacing
justification. In contrast, I am claiming that venture is appropriate solely on the
epistemic grounds that it is the most likely course of fulfilling one’s epistemically
rational goals. The epistemic goal of holding a maximal number of (important)
true beliefs while minimizing false beliefs is still the goal, and epistemic
justification remains the best way of attaining that goal.89 But even in absence of
justification, epistemic venture can (at time t), play a role (assuming S has
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As I pointed out in the first chapter, not all beliefs are equally important. There are many
possible beliefs that are for most people at most times unimportant. Determining, for example,
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evidence, though inconclusive, for P). The strategy for epistemic venture here is
diachronic: venture today in order to be justified tomorrow.
Disconfirming Evidence
One may read the argument thus far as suggesting that if S follows
prompting E, S will obtain evidence. That is, one may see, or hope for, a
necessary connection between accepting and acting upon E, and immediately
gaining further evidence. (Or one may hope that if acting is not immediately met
with further evidence, one is now justified in disbelief.) I am not claiming this,
though. I am suggesting that if S is interested in gaining more evidence, the most
likely route to obtaining evidence is to follow E. Given a God who is a person, not
a mechanism, one must keep in mind that providing volitional evidence (that is,
promptings) may well be a volitional act on God’s part. That is, God would decide
when to prompt us. To expect that immediately upon completion of acting upon
E1, I ought to be prompted with E2 is to neglect the point that another willful
being may choose not to communicate at time t.
Initially this may smack of a falsifiability violation, but what I am claiming is
that the model to be applied to moral promptings must be the same model we
apply to our interactions with human agents: we must assume that each party
has a will, and that because of this the communication will be asynchronous.90 In

how many blades of grass are in the front lawn, is not likely to best fit one’s epistemic goals.
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I am borrowing this terminology from computer science, in which network communications are
described as synchronous or asynchronous. A synchronous communication channel is one in
which communication is expected to occur with immediacy. The sender thus expects the receiver
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fact, it is the asynchronous nature of the communication that most aptly indicates
the existence of a being who meets our definition of God. Consider the case of
an email exchange with an unknown sender. I may receive an initial email from
an unknown sender. The email may have been intentionally sent by an individual.
Or it could have been sent by an automaton—perhaps it is a built-in feature of
the email server. Indeed, the message may just be a cosmic fluke caused by
wayward electrons. My initial reception of the email message is not sufficient to
indicate which of these is the case. I have the option of ignoring the email; I also
have the option of responding. The later option may provide me the best route for
learning more about the sender. If I send a reply and hope for an immediate
returned response, my hopes are more likely to be fulfilled if the sender is an
automaton than if the sender is a willful agent. (Email auto-responders are
synchronous and automatic: They re-act immediately to a prompting.) An agent
responds willfully—when the time is right for the agent. A response may be
immediate; or it may be delayed, unsent until the agent deems it appropriate. The
relationship with an agent is asynchronous and not automatic.
But does failure to receive additional evidence constitute disconfirming
evidence? If the process of receiving a prompting and then acting on the
prompting does not result in additional promptings and changes (in a reasonable
to act upon message reception with an immediate response. An asynchronous communication
channel is one in which the sender is not entitled to expect that the response will follow
immediately. A synchronous process sends a message and waits (blocks) for a response. An
asynchronous process sends a message and then continues work, checking back periodically for
a response.
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amount of time), then the initial evidence is not strengthened. It is not defeated,
perhaps, but it is not strengthened. What I mean by “strengthened” is nothing
mysterious. We talk about our total evidence in support of some belief, B.
According to the venture model I have suggested, accepting and obeying E is a
venture intended to unearth additional evidence, which would in turn lead to
greater total evidence. But if additional evidence is not encountered, the total
evidence remains unaltered. Again drawing from the email analogy, if I send a
reply and hear nothing, I gain no further evidence about the nature of the sender
(other than that the sender has not yet replied). But this does not constitute
disconfirming evidence of the agent-ness of the sender, either.
A Further Challenge from Bishop
Does this theory adequately address Bishop’s concerns over evidential
ambiguity? Evidential ambiguity no longer looks like the global and pervasive
problem Bishop claims. Yet Bishop may here borrow from Evan’s playbook and
suggest that evidential ambiguity is not a result of the actual evidence, but of our
unwillingness to take the evidence as it is. That is, Bishop may argue that
evidential ambiguity may turn out (at least in this case) to be a result of
selfishness and pride on the part of the human agent. And such a point is wellmade. Receiving, recognizing, and acting upon a volitional challenge is subject to
the will of the individual. Pride and selfishness could indeed interfere when one
refuses to submit.
Volitional evidence is to be found, I have suggested, in conscience.
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Promptings for non-selfish moral actions, promptings to conform to the will of a
morally perfect God—these are non-coercive. They can be rejected, and they
can be ignored. Thus, the willingness of the agent to receive (and consequently
act upon) volitional evidence is, in a very real way, a determinant for the
evidence.91 One who ignores or rejects simply will not have the evidence. For this
reason, if we are to fall back on a notion of evidence as forensic in nature—if we
are determined to look only for traces of God without becoming engaged at a
relational level—the evidence may well appear “ambiguous”—or, more
accurately, vague and unreliable.92
But such an objection illuminates a crucial facet of this sort of evidential
approach: The religious seeker must be genuinely receptive and willing to act. A
relationship is not built by abstaining from commitments. And when searching for
a being who is by definition both morally perfect and totally loving, it would be
foolish to expect that we might keep aloof while still knowing God.
Moderate evidentialism remains a plausible—the most plausible, I argue—
epistemological approach for addressing religious belief. But the success of the
method is contingent to a large degree on our ability to look for the appropriate
kind of evidence. Natural theology—as both Evans and Bishop argue—has not
provided compelling evidence. But that may well be because we have asked the
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wrong questions and looked in the wrong places. By first asking how a being
93

worthy of the title God might reveal evidence, we may recognize a better
approach to gaining evidence. Though this approach requires a degree of
venture by the religious seeker (an issue unremarkable given that much truthseeking involves venture), it is the best method for acquiring sufficient evidence
to justify religious belief.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that a variety of moderate evidentialism is
preferable to fideism. I began by pointing out that ultimately fideism cannot help
the religious seeker ward off skepticism. From there, I moved on to an
examination of Evans’s and Bishop’s critiques of evidentialism. Through that
discussion, I developed what I have called “moderate evidentialism”—an
alternative to Bishop’s hard-line evidentialism. This moderate evidentialism
comes with a robust notion of evidence that includes both public and private
evidence. Focusing on varieties of private evidence, I have suggested that there
are in fact forms of evidence that may rightly indicate religious truths. In particular
I have focused on volitional evidence. Two important lessons emerge from
fideism: First, Bishop points out the value of epistemic venture, which I have
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developed (in a non-fideistic way) as part of moderate evidentialism. In absence
of certainty, one may venture upon one’s evidence, and in so doing may obtain
additional confirming evidence. Such a venture, when made without justification,
is not the basis of continued faith, nor a staple condition for faith, but a temporary
epistemic move designed to pragmatically address our cognitive and situational
limitations and open the possibility of diachronically receiving additional
evidence. Secondly, from fideism we have seen how the challenge of cognitive
limitations identifies the role of the receiving agent in regard to volitional
evidence. One must be willing to receive evidence. One must be willing to forgo
selfish motivations to act upon volitional moral promptings. And in this
willingness, one may open oneself to gaining evidence otherwise blockaded by
selfishness and cognitive limitations. This is where evidence disambiguates.
In the first chapter of the dissertation I developed an account of rationality,
focusing on epistemic rationality. I began with this because doing so grants a
higher degree of clarity to the sometimes murky relationship between epistemic
reasoning and rationality in general. In particular, it provides a framework for
asking meaningful questions about what the fideist means when claiming that
fideism is rational. Bishop and Evans each claim to provide rational accounts of
fideism, and as we have seen, these two theories can be understood as such.
But for each theory I have pointed out what I take to be substantial flaws—flaws
that indicate that fideism is an impoverished epistemic standpoint. Most troubling,
as I have indicated in this chapter, is that fideism does not resist skepticism.
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There is a detail common to both Evans’s and Bishop’s fideism: the success of
each theory is contingent upon the failure of evidentialism. Fideism only gains
traction if epistemic justification is out of reach. I have shown in the present
chapter that evidentialism can indeed address the epistemic questions of the
religious seeker. And if this is so, then evidentialism is the best available
explanation for how one can hold epistemically rational religious beliefs.
Future Directions
The original topic for this dissertation was volitional evidence. I had intended
on examining what volitional evidence is, and how diachronic evidentialism might
function in light of this. Yet my initial encounters with fideism suggested that
before I could embark on that topic, I must first ensure that such a theory does
not devolve into fideism. (I am indebted to Fr. James Murphy for raising this
objection to my dissertation proposal.) Thus, my original starting point—a rough
sketch of how initial volitional evidence might open one to additional evidence—
has become the conclusion for this dissertation. I fear that once again where I
hoped to plumb the depths of this topic, I have given an unsatisfactorily cursory
treatment.
In other places I have had to bracket important topics. First, in appropriately
scoping this dissertation, I found it necessary to eliminate an historical
examination of fideism. Bayle, Montaigne, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Kant have
all been grouped into the fideist camp (for better or worse). Pascal in particular is
interesting because he may better be understood as suggesting short-term
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epistemic ventures rather than the full-fledged fideism sometimes attributed to
him because of his wager argument. With its close associations with skepticism
of both Academic and Pyrrhonian varieties, fideism has a rich heritage. 94 Yet in
this dissertation I have made scant reference to the historical heritage of
contemporary fideists such as Evans and Bishop.
Second, there are three classes of fideism that have received only faint
attention. Irrationalism, the first of the three, is one I find less interesting. But
Wittgensteinian fideism (sometimes called language-game fideism) and religious
anti-realism present problems of interest for future investigation.
As a work of religious epistemology, I have opened many epistemological
topics again addressing them only briefly. One is the epistemological
perspectives relied upon by various forms of natural theology. Also, I have
offered a rough characterization of evidentialism, one that I consider to be a more
moderate form than the characterizations offered by Bishop and Evans. My own
characterization is in need of careful elaboration, especially in regard to
sufficiency and the notion of best explanation.
Finally, there is the issue of rationality and resolving rational conflicts. Any
moral philosopher will rightly recognize that my sketches of rationality were
somewhat lopsided, as I have given more detailed descriptions of epistemic
rationality than of moral or prudential rationality (and I have not even considered
other forms of rationality). This is largely due to the fact that I feel better equipped
94
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to offer an explanation of epistemic rationality than to offer one for, say, moral
rationality. This is an oversight that I would like to rectify in future work.
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